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This thesis offers a novel insight into the relationship between British government 
engagement with the public on nuclear deterrence policy, and the factors which 
influence that policy development.  It considers the evolution of a complex, and 
largely unacknowledged aversion to the implications of total war, in particular the 
notion of inflicting non-combatant casualties as a deliberate, if not intentional, 
aspect of national strategy.  This aversion was evident in the reluctance to engage 
in reprisals for bombing raids on London during the First World War, and the 
tensions it caused between operational strategy and public policy during the 
bombing campaign of the Second World War.   
The same aversion influenced early British understanding of nuclear deterrence, 
and public government engagement on nuclear deterrence policy tends to have 
been limited to technical detail such as performance or cost ever since.  This is 
symptomatic of a reluctance to engage in complex moral debates in public, and 
modern media have exacerbated the problems by a tendency to reduce such issues 
to polarised arguments inhibiting genuine discussion while producing eye-catching 
studio drama. 
The public messaging implications of the challenging relationship between 
contemporary ‘rights-based’ ethical concepts and the more consequentialist ‘just 
war’ ethics that tend to dominate government policy have not been satisfactorily 
examined before.  This thesis considers that relationship and its impact.  It 
concludes that only government must face all aspects of moral choices: while anti-
nuclear opposition can afford selective deontological absolutes, governments must 
have recourse to consequentialist moral concepts to provide for national defence, 
and this is difficult to portray in public, particularly through modern media. 
Government must engage in more than technical arguments if the strategic 
requirement for retention of the nuclear deterrent is to be perceived as legitimate 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 ‘It is two and a half minutes to midnight: … In addition to the 
existential threats posed by nuclear weapons and climate change, 
new global realities emerged, as trusted sources of information 
came under attack, fake news was on the rise, and words were 
used in cavalier and often reckless ways.’1 
The Doomsday Clock statement is compelling, not only because it is closer to 
midnight today than it has been since 1954, but because the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists articulates the importance of ‘trusted sources of information’ and the 
impact of ‘fake news’ and cavalier use of words.  In early 2017, populist scientist 
Professor Brian Cox argued that; 
‘What you rely on in an open democracy is the ability of people to take 
an informed position ... Facts are easy to obtain, but knowing what 
they mean is more elusive than ever.  Perhaps this is why facts can 
be taken and twisted to serve multiple purposes.’2 
The political campaigns prior to the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum highlighted the need 
for the ‘ability of people to take an informed position’ on such decisions, but the 
same campaigns also exposed significant failings in existing mechanisms to ensure 
the validity of polemic assertions, contributing to the demise of trusted sources of 
information and the rise of fake news.  This difficulty is manifest for almost any 
complex policy decision, and the decision to leave the European Union was 
definitely complex.  Such difficulties will be exacerbated if a decision is not only 
complicated technically, but imbued with moral implications where there are myriad 
competing options, all of which involve hazard of one kind or another.  The 
Doomsday Clock is a very clear metaphor presenting just such a complex issue in a 
way which seems simple, but which is, in fact, anything but. 
This thesis will consider UK government engagement with the public on one such 
technically and morally convoluted area; the evolution of nuclear deterrence policy.  
Starting from an assumption that there has been very little government engagement 
with the public on nuclear deterrence policy, the thesis examines the factors that 
have influenced historic policy decisions, and identifies perpetually recurring 
themes; geo-strategic demands, military imperatives, technical aspects such as 
																																								 																				
1 BRONSON, R. 2017. It is two and a half minutes to midnight; 2017 Doomsday Clock Statement 
[Online]. Chicago: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Available: 
http://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Statement.pdf [Accessed 27 
January 2017]. 
2 COX, B. & FORSHAW, J. 2016. Education is as important to Security as Aircraft Carriers or Missile 
Defence. The Big Issue. 21 Nov 2016 ed. London: William Gibbons. 
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system performance and cost, and ethical reservations. 
Government intervention in contemporary 21st Century discussion (such as it is) of 
the replacement of the submarine element of the strategic nuclear deterrent tends to 
have been focused on the technical aspects of policy decisions; capability, 
invulnerability and cost.  The strategic necessity is taken as assumed, despite 
fundamental changes to the international security environment since Trident was 
procured.  The ethical implications of nuclear deterrence are, simply, a closed box. 
The British public is therefore inhibited in its ability to take an informed position in 
terms of Professor Cox’s point above because such public debate as there is, is 
substantially instigated, informed and interpreted by those opposed to the British 
retention of nuclear weapons.  As one commentator put it in the context of the 
Hutton Enquiry in 2005; ‘… smug assumptions about the general public’s willing 
acceptance of government statements on such issues as the strategic deterrent 
may not be entirely wise.’3 
In 1980, Mrs Thatcher’s government decided to replace Britain’s strategic nuclear 
deterrent, the Polaris missile system, with the Trident missile system and to build 
four Vanguard class submarines to carry it.  Having pointed out that the Commons 
had not debated nuclear deterrence since 1965, the Secretary of State for Defence, 
Mr Pym, told the Commons; ‘…the arguments surrounding nuclear strategy neither 
should be, nor can be, taken for granted.  They require constant rethinking and 
restating…’4  However, in 2007, the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Browne 
spoke on ‘The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century’, opening his 
speech by saying; ‘I am pleased to be giving this speech here at King’s – the venue 
of the last major speech on this subject by any of my predecessors in this job, 
Malcolm Rifkind back in 1993.’5  
Between 1993 and 2007 the World had been coming to terms with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation; NATO and the 
Russian Federation had become partners in the Partnership for Peace programme;6 
Trident had replaced Polaris; the UK’s only other nuclear weapon, the free-fall 
WE177 bomb had been withdrawn; the 1998 Strategic Defence Review had been 
																																								 																				
3 HAINES, S. 2005. Replacing Trident; A New Nuclear Debate? Naval Review, 93, 113-117. p116 
4 HC Debate 24 January 1980. HANSARD vol 977 cc672-784. Col 672 
5 BROWNE, D. 2007. The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century. In: MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE (ed.). London: TSO. 
6 Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the partnership for Peace in 1994: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm (accessed 24 Jun 17) 
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published; the 9/11 attack on the World Trade centre had happened and; the UK 
had been engaged in the subsequent Global War on Terror.  The raison d’etre for 
nuclear deterrence when both Polaris and Trident were purchased was the Cold 
War.  In the 2006 White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent’7 the retention of the nuclear deterrent had been justified against an ill-
defined potentially emerging threat; and each Secretary of State for Defence had 
been publicly silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence for 14 years.  The next major 
speech on nuclear deterrence to be made by a Secretary of State for Defence was 
in 2016.8 
Research Question 
On one level, the research question can be described as; ‘what factors have 
affected British government engagement with the public on nuclear deterrence 
policy?’  It is, however, the central argument of this thesis that government 
involvement in public discourse about nuclear deterrence policy has been inhibited.  
The thesis will therefore consider the salient factors considered by British 
governments when formulating nuclear deterrence policy and identify what causes 
this apparent inhibition. In short, the thesis will consider; ‘why have successive 
British governments struggled to sustain a public discourse on nuclear weapons 
policy and strategy?’   
The author’s underlying hypothesis is that there is a connection between the 
Second World War debate about the legitimacy of the strategic bombing campaign 
and subsequent government reluctance to engage in public discussion about 
nuclear deterrence policy.  The common element here appears to be a political 
aversion to being seen to be basing strategy on a willingness to inflict significant 
non-combatant casualties.  The core of the issue is not necessarily the willingness 
to inflict non-combatant casualties per se, but the aversion to public admission of 
that as a policy objective.  As is demonstrated in Chapter 4 below, this is evident in 
the highly nuanced correspondence on the purpose and conduct of the strategic 
bombing campaign between Whitehall and Bomber Command between 1943 and 
1945.  Early research for this thesis suggested that this moral ambivalence could be 
																																								 																				
7 UK GOVT 2006. The future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent: the White Paper CM6994. 
London: HMSO. 
8 FALLON, M. 2016. The case for the retention of the UK's independent nuclear deterrent; Speech at 
the Policy Exchange 23 March 2016 [Online]. London: HMSO. Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-case-for-the-retention-of-the-uks-independent-
nuclear-deterrent [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
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traced back to the reprisals debates after the German bombing raids on London 
during the First World War. 
This thesis will show that this ambivalence has been a perpetual undercurrent of 
British nuclear ownership, and Britain could fairly be characterised as having been a 
reluctant nuclear power.  It will also show however, that over the same period the 
persistent government view has been that nuclear weapons constituted a key 
component of British foreign, security and defence policy.  Retention of nuclear 
weapons remains a fundamental aspect of 21st Century policy.  This tension at the 
heart of British foreign and security policy is the key to public reticence about 
nuclear deterrence policy, and this thesis will demonstrate continuity in that tension 
from 1915, through the development of the Royal Air Force in the inter-war years, 
the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War and the development and 
maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent through the Cold War and 
subsequently.  
Commitment to another generation of Trident will offer the UK Nuclear Weapon 
State status until the 2060s and a dispassionate and objective examination of the 
processes underpinning that decision should be a logical and necessary 
prerequisite in a 21st Century liberal democracy.   This thesis demonstrates that 
there is an important lacuna in contemporary understanding in this area, in the 
public, in government, and in academia, and it seeks to contribute to a more 
informed, balanced and open public discourse on this critical aspect of national 
security.  There are challenges involved in any objective review of current 
government strategy or policy, but without such a discussion, policy may stagnate or 
develop tangentially, and this is not tenable for something as fundamental to 
foreign, security and defence policy as nuclear strategy.  
Thematic framework and structure 
By the retrospective nature of the question, the research tends to focus on historical 
analysis of decision making and public engagement. Throughout the history of the 
UK nuclear deterrent, there appears to have been limited government engagement 
with the public.  In the 21st Century, up to the general election of 2015, the deeply 
philosophical public debates characterised by the Reith lectures of 1957 and 1982 
have not been repeated; public discourse on nuclear deterrence policy appears 
comatose; and what there is receives little government participation or interest. 
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The relationship between politicians and senior officials and the media has always 
been symbiotic– the media are the oxygen of the politicians, and without the 
politicians, there is no story.  Foreign Secretary Robin Cook complained that ‘[the 
public] are served up interviews on political issues that often appear designed more 
to produce studio drama than to inform their audience.’9  He makes a fair point, but 
from the opposite side, the Ministry of Defence Senior Officers’ Interview technique 
course is all about not answering the questions posed, but using them as hooks to 
get across the points that you want to impart, regardless of the interviewer’s intent.10  
This contributes to antagonistic media interviews and is even more pronounced in 
analysis programmes such as ‘Question Time’ or ‘Any Questions’ where contentious 
issues are posed to politicians, officials and individuals of completely opposed 
opinions.  This tends to reduce media discussion of complex policy issues to 
punchy soundbites, instead of a careful analysis of conflicting options and mutually 
exclusive priorities, influenced by myriad highly nuanced factors. This section has 
sketched the context of the research question and suggested why it is pertinent 
today, and the remainder of the introduction will outline the methodology and 
conduct of the research and the structure of the remainder of the thesis.   
The introduction will conclude with a short case study considering the decision not 
to broadcast ‘The War Game’, a 1965 BBC docu-drama on the aftermath of a 
nuclear attack on a Kent town.  The political, media and public reactions to its 
withdrawal illustrate many of the key elements of the research questions being 
considered here.  Its core message was that Civil Defence contingencies were 
completely inadequate.  It was withdrawn prior to transmission after the BBC 
consulted with the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence.  The director 
resigned from the BBC in protest, and questions were raised in Parliament and in 
the media.  Ironically, the fate of the programme, rather than the issues it depicted, 
became the story, although in private cinema showings after 1966 it became a motif 
for the anti-nuclear movement, and was finally shown on British television in 1985.  
The lack of credibility of Civil Defence as a plausible element of national strategy in 
the nuclear age was well known to governments by the mid-1950s, but public 
acknowledgement of that was increasingly challenging and in 1968 it was shelved.  
The Home Office resurrection of the 1964 ‘Protect and Survive’ pamphlet in 1980 
																																								 																				
9 COOK, R. 2003. The Point of Departure, London, Simon and Schuster. P57 
10 Author’s personal experience 2003 
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against the backdrop of the deployment of ground launched cruise missiles in the 
UK was a public relations blunder on an epic scale, and is considered below.   
The existing literature will be considered not in terms of the whole canon dealing 
with UK nuclear deterrence policy; that would constitute a thesis in itself, but only 
that pertinent to the themes and concepts being explored here.  Analysis of such a 
vast area is by necessity highly selective, and the treatment of the surrounding 
context therefore may appear superficial and may neglect important aspects other 
than to mention them in passing.  The background information should, however, 
provide sufficient information for those not familiar with the history to contextualise 
the main themes of this study.  If required, a more comprehensive political history 
than Stoddart’s three volume history covering 1964 to 198311 would be difficult to 
imagine, and secondary sources are cited as appropriate. 
The bulk of the evidence and analysis will be historical; however, the purpose of 
chapters 4 to 6 is not to provide a political history of the development of the British 
nuclear deterrent, but to identify and consider particular elements suggesting 
continuity in public engagement within that development.  As with the literature 
review, analysis is selective and focused on the central research questions; what 
factors affected decision making, and which factors influenced government 
engagement in the public discourse?   
Chapter 4 considers the evolution of the mindset associated with the direction of the 
strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War but, drawing on Baldwin’s 
famous 1932 dictum ‘the bomber will always get through’, it considers the evolution 
of a level of political recognition that; ‘…there is no power on earth that can protect 
[the man in the street] from being bombed…’12 and it traces this back to the 
experiences of the First World War Zeppelin and Gotha bombing raids on London.  
In responding to these raids, the British government expressed distinct aversion to 
reprisals against German towns and cities.  Debate about the merits of strategic 
bombing and ‘traditional’ means of warfare dominated strategic thinking during the 
interwar years.  The experiences of the ‘total war’ Second World War gave the 
strategic impetus and led to the technical ability to inflict the massive damage 
																																								 																				
11 STODDART, K. 2012. Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear 
Weapons, 1964-70 London, Palgrave Macmillan.  STODDART, K. 2014b. The Sword and the 
Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970-1976, London, Palgrave MacMillan.  
STODDART, K. 2014a. Facing Down the Soviet Union; Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear 
Weapons 1976-1983, Palgrave Macmillan. 
12 HC Debate 10 November 1932. HANSARD vol 270 cc632. 
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envisaged by Douhet13 and dramatised by HG Wells14 and films such as ‘Things To 
Come’, and graphically foreshadowed at Guernica in 1937. 
There was protracted and serious discussion within the British War Cabinet and 
RAF high command about the strategic bombing campaign and its legitimacy, a 
discussion which continues to this day.  The unique contribution this thesis makes is 
to consider the impact of concerns about public opinion on that discussion and 
resulting strategy; it concludes that there was a concerted effort to maximise 
damage to areas of German cities, including industrial and residential areas, but 
that the public presentation of this policy was adapted to appear to show a precision 
bombing aspiration against industrial facilities only, which also caused unfortunate 
but unavoidable casualties amongst non-combatants.  This ambivalent position; a 
distinct aversion to public acknowledgement of the willingness to inflict non-
combatant casualties was inherited by those responsible for the early development 
of British nuclear strategy.   
Chapter 5 analyses briefly the evolution of an independent British nuclear deterrent.  
It identifies the closely symbiotic relationship between strategy and technology, and 
the imperatives that each placed upon the other; critical factors for a state 
developing a nuclear capability on a shoestring budget.  After the initial flurry of 
interest in the atomic bomb attacks on Japan in 1945, public attention moved on.  
Attlee’s near-obsessive secrecy impacted on both development and more general 
understanding, and left a persistent legacy in the way that the nuclear deterrent 
policy was handled within government, Parliament and the public domain.  Both 
Attlee and Churchill were very concerned about the moral implications of such 
weapons, but were equally completely convinced that they were necessary for 
Great Britain to retain her position and influence in the post-War World; neither 
chose to share this logic widely within Cabinet, let alone the public.  Successive 
governments constrained nuclear policy within very small circles, convening 
restricted-membership Cabinet committees to oversee major policy decisions, and 
completely ignoring the nascent anti-nuclear opposition groups.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis may be a major event in hindsight, but the contemporary 
records suggest that the British Cabinet was not substantially engaged, and nor was 
																																								 																				
13 DOUHET, G. 1998. The Command of the Air, Washington, Air Force History and Museum 
Programme. 
14 WELLS, H. G. 1908. The War in the Air, and Particularly how Mr. Bert Smallways Fared While it 
Lasted, London, George Bell and Sons. 
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Parliament.  Macmillan appears to have exploited, but not actually cultivated, a 
public perception that the American cancellation of Skybolt in 1962 left the UK 
without a long term deterrent capability, and that the USA was therefore somehow 
responsible for provision of a substitute; Polaris.  The Royal Navy had actually been 
working on the strategic case for a submarine-based strategic nuclear deterrent 
since at least 1958, and had a fully developed business case in hand the moment 
the Skybolt decision was known.   
Having had a 1960 Conference vote in favour of adoption of a policy of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament reversed in 1961, Wilson’s Labour government was elected in 
1964 on a manifesto commitment of renegotiation of the Polaris Sales Agreement.  
Within months, Wilson’s Cabinet agreed on the construction of four Resolution class 
submarines and the purchase of Polaris missiles as agreed by Macmillan and 
Kennedy, although the force was presented publicly as part of an Anglo-American 
‘Atlantic Nuclear Force’, a concept that was dropped almost immediately afterwards.  
The first of the class was to be HMS Revenge, and the submarines would 
thenceforth have been the ‘Revenge Class’ but this was thought (by the First Lord 
of the Admiralty) to be too malevolent and the first of class was commissioned HMS 
Resolution and the 4th ‘Resolution Class’ submarine was commissioned HMS 
Revenge.15 
The period 1964-1979 is particularly interesting for the student of nuclear policy 
because it includes two Labour governments which abrogated manifesto 
commitments to reduce or cancel nuclear deterrence commitments; Wilson’s 
government had commissioned Polaris and introduced it into Service, and in the 
1970’s, under extreme secrecy, introduced and sustained an update programme for 
Polaris; Super Antelope (later Chevaline).  Callaghan’s government, faced with the 
impending obsolescence of Polaris in the early 1980s, chose to continue the 
Chevaline programme and to commission studies into a Polaris replacement, 
despite having ‘renounced any intention of moving towards the production of a new 
generation of nuclear weapons or a successor to the Polaris nuclear force.’16  Both 
governments used very carefully worded public and parliamentary statements to 
convey one meaning which could be interpreted within their manifesto 
																																								 																				
15 HENNESSY, P. & JINKS, J. 2015. The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945. 
UK: Penguin Random House. P237 
16 LABOUR PARTY. 1979. The Labour Way is the Better Way [Online]. London: Labour Party. 
Available: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab79.htm [Accessed 23 Sept 2015]. 
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commitments, while also conveying almost exactly the opposite.  Little wonder they 
avoided detailed public exploration of policy. 
The Thatcher government inherited a febrile security situation in Europe in 1979; 
the Soviet deployment of SS20 medium range ballistic missiles upset NATO 
warfighting plans and threatened to decouple the Alliance nuclear deterrence 
posture from the American strategic deterrent.  Combined with this was speculation 
that an announcement of the successor to Polaris was imminent.  Mrs Thatcher, in 
keeping with precedent, set up a small Cabinet committee (MISC 7) to consider 
options, greatly informed by preparatory work commissioned by Callaghan which 
exceptionally had been provided to the new government.   
Chapter 6 examines a torrid three-year period which saw the resurgence of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament as part of a pan-European protest against 
NATO nuclear weapons, the announcement of the NATO dual track response to the 
SS20 deployment and the near simultaneous decision and announcement to 
replace the Polaris nuclear deterrent with the similar, but more capable, Trident 
submarine launched missile system.  Many of the technical factors which pertained 
for the Polaris decision in the early 1960s remained relevant, including the need to 
use an American system because the research and development costs for a 
bespoke British system would be prohibitive.   
Elements of Mrs Thatcher’s Cabinet held the opinion that more open engagement 
with the public would be beneficial, and both Pym (Defence Secretary) and his 
successor Nott advocated more engagement.  They were not supported by the rest 
of MISC 7.  Despite the 1980 publication of a ground-breaking Open Government 
Document17 which described many of the factors on which the decision to replace 
Polaris with Trident had been taken, two years later Nott still felt that the case was 
not being made strongly enough; ‘… we may find that public opinion runs away from 
us.  If this happens we will lose our strategic deterrent - and much besides.’18   
Mrs Thatcher’s government persisted in treating the decisions about NATO nuclear 
posture and the national nuclear deterrent as entirely separate, missing the point 
that they were indivisible in public perception.  The anti-nuclear opposition mounted 
very coherent campaigns at local and national levels, and the government did not 
																																								 																				
17 UK GOVT 1980. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force. London: HMSO. 
18 MOD Letter Nott (MOD) to Thatcher (PM) MO18 'Nuclear Issues' dated 20 Oct 82. TNA PREM 
19/979. Paragraph 6 
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attempt to engage with this until it had been running for three years – by which time 
the parameters of the debate had been set by CND and others.  The Roman 
Catholic Church had become involved as a result of the European-wide mass 
protests, and the British Churches therefore expressed their views.   
Throughout, Ministers’ understanding of the discourse was woefully 
underdeveloped, with the Prime Minister’s Press Office singularly failing to grasp the 
importance, or the complexity, of the issue until a small Conservative Party 
committee began work on the 1983 election manifesto in late 1982.  This committee 
engaged immediately with the Cabinet Office and the MOD and, under Nott’s 
replacement Heseltine, the public campaign took an aggressive stance, aiming to 
undermine the credibility of anti-nuclear lobbies by suggesting that the leadership 
was being at least significantly influenced by Soviet pressure.   
The early 1980s saw a rapid development of government understanding of the 
importance of engagement in the public debate.  Pym and Nott understood that 
early engagement was necessary in order to set the parameters of the debate, but 
they were not supported by their Cabinet colleagues.  Despite some false starts, the 
Conservative government recovered and actively engaged on deterrence during the 
1983 general Election campaign against a Labour Party which stood on a unilateral 
disarmament platform.  Mrs Thatcher’s overwhelming victory at that election was a 
clear mandate to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles as part of the NATO 
response, and to procure Trident as the successor national nuclear deterrent.  The 
anti-nuclear movement never really recovered. 
The historical analysis suggests that there are a number of perennial factors which 
effect government decisions, and to a greater or lesser degree, the extent of public 
engagement.  There is an elusive and insubstantial thread suggesting that 
engagement is linked to political concerns about potential perceptions of the 
morality of strategies which involve threat to non-combatants.  Chapter 7 therefore 
considers specifically the ethics of the use of force, and the ethical challenges 
posed by emerging technologies as factors in political decision making.   
Most moral consideration prior to the Second World War was generally conducted in 
the framework of the Just War Tradition.  A key aspect of this Tradition is that it 
evolves constantly with experience and technology; only analysis of the Second 
World War enabled ethicists such as Walzer and Childress to articulate (and 
explain) key concepts such as ‘double effect’ and ‘dirty hands’ in terms which are 
	 17	
commonly understood today.  It is clear from the evidence in chapter 4 that the 
protagonists, especially in the Bomber Command hierarchy, were wrestling with 
these almost visceral ethical issues, and evolving responses as best they could, 
with little prior preparation and no training. 
It can be argued that statesmen inhabit a world dominated by ethical 
consequentialism within a realist framework where states act in terms of national 
interest. Invariably, if considering the use of force, the options statesmen have to 
choose all have negative moral outcomes; but they must decide which negative 
outcome.  However, the thinking of most contemporary philosophers writing about 
the ethics of war is not based on consequentialist, or utilitarian, bases, but on a 
more individual rights-based concept, where individuals have unassailable rights, 
and it aspires to a normative concept of international relations.  How does a Realist 
statesman articulate consequentialist thinking in the contemporary anarchy, against 
a deontological position based on an aspirational view of the World?  In essence, 
little has changed in the hundred years since Mr Molteno MP demanded in 
Parliament; ‘…would [it] be in accordance with the high principles of humanity … to 
attack the civil population?’19  What has changed is the nature of the media which is 
far less deferential than it was in Molteno’s time and successive political figures 
have lamented the inability to consider complex ethical matters in public because of 
the binary nature of modern media presentation. 
In order to provide a comparative context, two short case studies into the different 
ways governments have handled other complex technological and ethically 
challenging areas have been conducted; the 1982 Warnock inquiry into human 
embryology and fertilization, and the 2003 public consultation exercise on the 
genetic modification of crops.  Both of these case studies offer alternative models 
for the handling of ethically complex technologies.  Analysis of the Warnock Inquiry 
exposes a wealth of detail on her advice to government on the relationship between 
public perceptions and scientific advances, and ‘experts’.  Particularly, she 
highlights the pluralism of society and the related wide diversity of views, concluding 
that; ‘there is a danger that ‘public opinion’ may come to be identified not with the 
views of the relatively … open-minded majority, but with the views of the committed 
																																								 																				
19 HC Debate 24 April 1917. HANSARD vol 92 cc2224-5. Col 2225 
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and the fanatical.’20  The inquiry ‘model’ did not provide a definitive answer to 
Ministers, but it did provide demonstrably independent ‘expert’ advice.   
Such expert advice is not necessarily palatable in intensely moral questions where 
individuals may want to follow their own views, but it certainly provides a credible 
source of independent information on which to form those views.  This of course, 
addresses Professor Cox’s point.  Much less credible is the public consultation to 
which the Food Standards Agency resorted in its Consumer Views of Genetically 
Modified Food in 2003.  This merely harnessed exactly the vociferous dogmatism 
which Warnock had sought to avoid.   
The case studies also expose the importance of the public perception of risk as a 
factor in complex issues. Whilst experts routinely consider the relationship between 
likelihood and consequence, such balanced views are not conducive to simple 
media presentation, and ‘risk’ and ‘expert advice’ can therefore lead to distorted 
scrutiny of complex issues, especially complex ethical issues.  Again, this suggests 
that independent, authoritative input to the public debate is critical.   
The first part of the conclusion examines the changing nature of the engagement 
between government and public over deterrence issues between the deployment of 
Trident in 199521 and the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review against the 
historical development of the themes which affect that engagement.  Each of these 
themes is closely inter-related, and the research question; ‘what factors have 
affected British government engagement with the public on deterrence policy’ 
suggests that there is a number of technical factors which influence system choices 
and decisions, and which form the bulk of the public discourse.  Engagement on the 
ethical elements; the issue of why Britain needs a nuclear deterrent and the moral 
implications of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war (the two are not synonymous) 
has been avoided by successive governments. The ethical elements are always 
considered, in fact they are agonised over, privately and in camera, but not in public 
and not on the record.   
The conclusion addresses why successive British governments have struggled to 
sustain a public discourse on nuclear weapons policy and strategy and concludes 
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organisation/the-fighting-arms/submarine-service/ballistic-submarines/hms-vanguard (accessed 24 
Jun 17)  
	 19	
that it appears to come down to an aversion to engage in debate about the 
conditional willingness to threaten non-combatants.  This is the crux of how nuclear 
deterrence really works, despite anodyne technical language such as counter-value 
or counter-force.  No-one could possibly consider nuclear war a moral good, but the 
debate should be about nuclear deterrence.  The debate should be about how best 
to avoid war, not in a hypothetical World of normative ethical constructions, but in 
our present realist anarchy.  There is a moral good in peace, and there is a 
compelling case to be made that there is a perfect correlation between the advent of 
nuclear deterrence and the absence of major conflict between great powers.  That 
this peace may have been bought at the cost of conditional intent, and the 
associated moral tarnish of the very small numbers of those involved in nuclear 
deterrence (of whom the author is one) is a risk analysis that can and should be 
aired in public.  At present, in much of the public view, nuclear deterrence is 
equated to nuclear war, and such debate as there is, is often predicated on this 
misunderstanding. 
This inability to articulate the strategic case for the retention of the nuclear deterrent 
undermines its coherence and increases the risk that decisions on the future of the 
British strategic nuclear deterrent may be taken without full understanding of the 
strategic imperatives, based on technical discussions on cost and capability.   
Sources and methodology 
Government records, internal correspondence and policy documents and 
statements therefore constitute the major textual sources for this thesis.  Obviously 
the first area of attention for any study of such documents is the text itself.  In 
isolation, published political texts tend to be very convincing and they appear 
cohesive and substantial; that is what they are designed to do.  Similarly, internal 
correspondence is not designed to elucidate policy to historical researchers but to 
influence its development in a particular direction.  It was thus imperative that the 
context of the publication of the document; who wrote it; under what instructions; to 
what end and; with what audience in mind, was fully understood; before any critical 
analysis of the document was attempted.  
Media records have been key sources; newspaper and television or radio articles 
are as vulnerable to contextual exploitation as government records and needed to 
be treated just as sceptically.  That said, they act both as primary and secondary 
sources – primary in the sense of being prima facie evidence of a public nuclear 
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discourse, and secondary in the sense of acting as sources of what other people 
have written or said in public. In terms of the debate on nuclear policy, all sources 
are liable to polemic bias and this includes media records and, especially, public 
statements by either politicians or campaigners.  More emphasis has been 
accorded to contemporary records and speeches than retrospective records – 
hindsight is a formidable tool for political critique, but not for understanding why 
decisions in particular circumstances went a particular way.  
Similarly, while this thesis seeks to be as objective as possible, the author (an ex-
Commanding Officer of HMS Vengeance and HMS Vanguard) views the World from 
a Realist paradigm and believes that the most effective way to prevent nuclear and 
serious conventional war between the great powers in the 21st Century World is 
balanced and credible nuclear deterrence.  
The background information on the context of deterrent strategy decisions; 
especially any prevailing imperatives that led to them, has been fundamental to 
determine the pressures that may have genuinely affected the final shape of the 
strategy decisions.  The imperatives of the Cold War in 1965 were different to those 
of the early 21st Century but only through analysis of the context can the long term, 
personal and cultural pressures on decision-making be considered.  Such analysis 
has been greatly enhanced through interviews with the very senior authors of some 
of the original decisions, a number of whom have very generously given of their 
time.  Interviews with these very senior policymakers provided much primary source 
information and invaluable context for the government documents and records, and 
the author is indebted for their openness. 
Departmental policy positions within government tend to attract a degree of 
departmental loyalty, and the author’s personal experience suggests that reticence 
over nuclear deterrence issues is not limited to the public sphere but is ubiquitous 
within the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office.  There is an understandable 
natural tendency to avoid discussion because of perceived security implications, but 
while many of the capability and performance statistics are classified, the vast 
majority of the more broadly based issues associated with nuclear deterrence are 
not.  They do tend to be treated with extreme sensitivity however, both by experts 
who routinely deal with the nuclear deterrent, and those whose contact with it is 
more peripheral.  Most of the issues associated with the nuclear deterrent therefore 
tend not to be officially articulated within the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, nor are they discussed except informally amongst peers.   
	 21	
There were therefore sensitive issues to be expected in the research phase of this 
paper.  Those interviewed to establish the factors affecting policy formulation could 
be expected to be all too aware of this and were anticipated to be uncomfortable 
being completely frank. There is a finite, but limited, risk that adverse comment in 
interview could be professionally detrimental.  For these reasons, this study was 
conducted with Research Ethics Approval.22  
Security 
Obviously, expert discussion of nuclear deterrence tends to involve material that is 
by its nature extremely classified.  Whilst published government papers themselves 
are unclassified documents, supporting papers tend to be of a much more limited 
distribution and of a significantly higher security classification.  During the research 
phase of the study, it was an overriding requirement that any information of a 
classified nature stays that way.  Every element of preparation has been checked at 
every stage to ensure that the final thesis and all notes and records are 
unclassified.  No classified documents were consulted during this study, although 
declassified documents in the National Archives constitute the bulk of the primary 
sources. 
In interview, the line between unclassified discussion points and those of more 
sensitivity could have been much more easily breached.  Thus, when discussing 
interview plans with potential interviewees, security aspects were dealt with and 
agreed beforehand.  In the event, with similarly experienced and security conscious 
professionals both conducting the interviews and being interviewed, there were no 
instances where security issues were a concern.   
Statistical research 
Due to the hugely complex and emotive nature of nuclear policy derivation, 
especially the importance of individuals’ actions in determining the course of events, 
surveys and quantitative analysis are of limited relevance to this study.  The 
epistemological limitations involved in quantitative analysis are too narrowly 
prescriptive to to allow convincing substantial conclusions to be drawn in this area 
of policy and grand strategy.  In order to perform the extremely sophisticated 
regressions involved, so many very serious assumptions have to be bounded; from 
the definition of war to the order in which the variables are input into the model, that 
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quantitative analysis of this area is very prone to omission of perturbing variables 
and for the purpose of this thesis is not likely to yield results proportional to the 
effort involved. 23  No quantitative analysis is intended during this research.  Equally, 
there is no attempt to provide any kind of data mining or discourse analysis of 
government public engagement; whilst that may well provide a great deal of 
information.  This study is focused on the information available to the decision 
makers, and what influence that information had, not on subsequent analysis of the 
same issues with different information. 
Study methodology 
The study of contemporary government policy throws up unique challenges and 
opportunities.  Historical analysis can generally excise the influence of polemic at 
the first stage of analysis of primary sources, and a degree of objectivity can be 
achieved purely by the separation in time between the study and the protagonists.  
Study of primary documentary sources entailed careful consideration of the 
derivation of each document in order to identify its political context.  This was easier 
for earlier sources (pre-1985) but more recent sources have to be assessed in their 
public context, without the benefit of the classified Cabinet discussions which 
informed the decision making processes.  For more recent government engagement 
with the public discourse, therefore, interviews with key decision makers and 
opinion-formers have been critical in order to provide some of that context.  It is for 
this reason that the thesis will consider activities only up to the 2015 General 
Election. 
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Chapter Two:  The War Game; a case study 
This analysis of the fate of ‘The War Game’, a radical film about the effects of 
nuclear weapons made in 1965 provides a clear illustration of the ambiguity of 
government engagement with the public on nuclear deterrence policy in the context 
of the height of the Cold War.  It is based on an extended interview with the Director 
of ‘The War Game’, review of the film and its historical context, analysis of the 
official record and consideration of a protracted historiographical debate about the 
fate of the film.   
In May 1965, a fictional BBC television documentary drama depicting the possible 
aftermath of a nuclear attack on Britain was completed and the initial draft shown to 
the Controller of BBC2, Huw Wheldon.  Five months later, the BBC announced it 
had decided not to air the programme on television because it was an ‘artistic 
failure.’1  It was subsequently given a limited cinematic release and won the 1966 
Venice Film Festival Award for the best documentary, and the best documentary 
Academy Award (Oscar) in 1967. Eventually, the BBC first screened it on television 
on 31st July 1985, twenty years after its completion.  To this day, its director insists 
that the film was suppressed because of its political impact.2   
From the beginning Wheldon was well aware of the political impact that the film 
might have and insisted on close supervision of the filming process.  As the Head of 
Documentary programming he had commissioned the film in the first instance.  
Even before filming started he was in close liaison with Grace Wyndham Goldie 
(Head of Talks at BBC) who supported the film in principle; ‘I have discussed this 
several times with HTG, who thinks the film should be made, so long as there is no 
security risk and the facts are authentic, the people should be trusted with the 
truth...’3 This is the essential question here; what is it that prevents government 
trusting people with the truth?   
In parallel, there was an ongoing dialogue with the Home Office throughout filming, 
with Wheldon insisting on editorial independence despite; 
‘...the Home Office argu[ing] that as ‘partners in the civil defence 
field’, the government and Corporation ought to work together 
																																								 																				
1 WATKINS, P. 2007. Peter Watkins; filmmaker/ media critic [Online]. MNSI. Available: 
http://pwatkins.mnsi.net/index.htm [Accessed 3 January 2013]. 
2 WATKINS, P. Interview with A S Corbett 27 Sept 2012. 
3 BBC WAC T56/263/1 Wheldon to Kenneth Adam 31 Dec 64 quoted in CHAPMAN, J. 2006. The BBC 
and the Censorship of The War Game (1965). Journal of Contemporary History, 41, 75-94. P81 
	 24	
throughout production to ensure that the film was ‘prepared with the 
utmost care and responsibility’ given its potentially harmful effects 
on the public.’4 
The film’s director, Peter Watkins, had previously directed ‘Culloden’, a dramatic 
depiction of the fate of the 1645 Jacobite Rebels at the eponymous battle, and that 
film had been well received critically and publicly.  Watkins had a list of difficult 
topics which he wanted to address with his docu-drama format, challenging both 
received wisdom on the subject matter, and also stretching the use of television as 
a medium for entertainment and information.  Watkins’s intent was to ‘challenge 
viewers’ assumptions and provoke different perspectives.’5  Top of his list was 
nuclear war.   
Watkins’s research was meticulous, including interviews with survivors of Second 
World War mass bombing raids, both British and German, and members of the 
emergency and police services.  He also sent a number of detailed questionnaires 
to government departments and local government offices regionally, inquiring 
specifically into the detailed preparations being made in civil defence in the early 
1960s.  From its very inception, ‘The War Game’ was potentially politically 
contentious.  It set out to televise a depiction of the aftermath of nuclear war that 
directly challenged the official view.     
Inherently pacifist, Watkins was perturbed by the lack of public information and 
understanding of the nature of nuclear war, and by the government claims about the 
effectiveness of preparations being made for civil defence within the United 
Kingdom.6  This is the central refrain of the film and is literally echoed by the 
narrator at the end of the film as the camera pans across a group of children 
orphaned by the nuclear attack;  
‘On almost the entire subject of thermo-nuclear weapons; problems 
of their possession; effects of their use; there is now practically total 
silence; in the press, in official publications and on television.  There 
is hope in any unresolved and unpredictable situation but is there a 
real hope to be found in this silence?’7  
The War Game is filmed using handheld cameras in a highly dynamic ‘newsreel’ 
style, closely reflecting the contemporary footage being returned from the conflict in 
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Vietnam.  The actors are almost all amateurs, locals of the town where the film was 
made.  The film portrays plausible outcomes of a nuclear war, starting with the 
immediate aftermath of blast and heat; already well understood.  The memories of 
the bombing raids of the Second World War were still vivid to many.  The War 
Game specifically parodies the Civil Defence Information films being produced by 
the Home Office; the narrator repeatedly uses the phrase ‘This is what nuclear war 
means’ which had been a central motif of ‘Doom Town’; a 1955 Pathé Civil Defence 
training film depicting search and rescue in burnt-out buildings.8   
The Government Civil Defence Corps had produced a number of training films and 
publicity ‘shorts’ in the 1950s and early 1960s.9  These films depicted Civil Defence 
exercises and scenarios which were scripted to run up to the evacuation of 
casualties to conveniently located first aid posts where assistance from unaffected 
areas was available.  The rescue services always appeared in control and there 
was a clear message that civil defence was a viable response to a nuclear attack. 
The War Game scenario develops beyond this point and the film portrays the failure 
of the civil defence organisation to respond to the demands of ever-increasing 
casualties, including the inadequate provision of medical care, mercy killings of the 
very seriously burned casualties by the police and mass cremations in order to 
prevent spread of disease.  As time passes in the film, the situation changes from 
one of an immediate emergency to one of protracted crisis due to failure of the civil 
defence organisation, leading to food shortages, looting and finally the imposition of 
martial law on the streets; graphically depicted in the execution of food rioters by 
police firing squad. 
Throughout, this fabricated newsreel footage is interspersed with interviews to 
camera of equally fictitious ‘establishment figures’ such as a bishop, government 
ministers, officials and senior military officers.   These interviews are filmed at desks 
or in offices and they rehearse genuine government statements on civil defence 
planning; assurances that procedures and processes are in place to ensure that 
nuclear war is survivable.  Immediately after each official statement, the film depicts 
its ‘reality’, directly in counterpoint to the reassuring view of the ‘establishment 
figure’.  This reality includes live unscripted interviews with members of the public 
who were actually participating in the filming.  They were asked real questions and 
answered from their real viewpoints.  Watkins later said; ‘And those questions and 
responses – particularly the responses – are perhaps the biggest single indictment 
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in the entire film of the way we are conducting our present society and of the lack of 
common public knowledge of the things which effect humanity.’10  Ultimately, the 
effect is that the fictional newsreel and interview footage completely discredits the 
genuine government statements and Civil Defence Organisation assurances.   
The decision not to show The War Game 
Despite Wheldon’s support, The War Game caused considerable unease within the 
BBC hierarchy during its production.   Filming was completed in April 1965, and 
Watkins completed his initial editing by mid-June.  The first cut was screened to 
Watkins’s panel of expert consultants on 17th June and to Wheldon and Richard 
Cawston (Wheldon’s replacement as Head of Documentaries) on 24th June.  After 
each of these screenings, the film was edited further.  After a further screening to 
BBC publicity officers, the re-edited film was viewed again by Cawston on 18th 
August and he gave the film a provisional broadcast date of 7th October, to be 
followed by ‘Tonight’.  However, on 2nd September, Hugh Carleton-Greene (BBC 
Director General) and Lord Normanbrook (Chairman of the BBC Board of 
Governors) viewed the film and decided to ‘take soundings’ from Whitehall.  As an 
ex-Cabinet Secretary, and Chair of the 1954 ‘Committee on Nuclear Defence and 
Civil Defence’, Normanbrook would have been very aware of the potential domestic 
impact of the film.  He wrote to the Cabinet Secretary that the film;  
‘...has been made with considerable restraint.  But the subject is, 
necessarily, alarming; and the showing of the film on television 
might well have a significant effect on public attitudes towards the 
deterrent ...I doubt that the BBC alone should take the responsibility 
of deciding whether this film should be shown...’11   
When informed of this decision by Wheldon, Watkins resigned over what he saw as 
political interference in the independence of BBC.12 
On 24th September, The War Game was screened to senior government officials 
including the Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend, the Permanent Secretaries from 
the Home Office, and the Ministry of Defence and a senior officer representing the 
Chief of Defence Staff.  Trend clearly understood the government position very well, 
writing in October to the Lord President and Prime Minister that ‘The War Game 
was unbalanced and pessimistic about civil defence, but that ‘the dilemma for the 
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government ... was that it could not afford to give the impression that, by overriding 
the BBC’s duty to educate, it was sweeping under the rug an issue which ministers 
found politically embarrassing.’13  Trend met Normanbrook again on 5th November 
and Normanbrook records that the ‘… decision should be left to the discretion of the 
BBC. ... it is also clear that Whitehall will be relieved if the BBC chooses not to show 
it.’14  On 24th November, Normanbrook wrote to Trend to inform him that the BBC 
had decided not to show the film.  A BBC press release on 26th November read ‘this 
is the BBCs own decision ... not as a result of outside pressure of any kind.’15  The 
Times reported this release, including; ‘... the film has been judged by the BBC to 
be too horrifying for the medium of broadcasting.’16    
There were questions asked about the degree of government involvement in the 
BBC’s decision in both houses of Parliament, but government officials and 
ministers, including Prime Minister Harold Wilson, simply reiterated that; ‘The 
Government have not interfered in any way with ... any of these programmes.  As 
regards rumours about ‘The War Game’, the Government have not interfered at 
all.’17  Peter Watkins remains in absolutely no doubt that the government applied 
pressure to the BBC to inhibit the showing of The War Game.18   
The historiographical debate about The War Game 
There was undoubtedly contact between the hierarchy of the BBC and very senior 
government officials prior to the decision being made.  The extent to which that 
contact manifested as pressure on the BBC is unlikely ever to be established 
definitively from the official records.  There is clearly a degree of historiographical 
debate about the exact decision-making process that resulted in the censorship of 
The War Game; at least three historians have independently assessed substantially 
the same evidence and reached substantively different conclusions.  Two of the 
articles cited above, both published in 2006, reflect a common understanding of the 
historical narrative, but with different interpretations and conclusions.  Chapman 
concludes;  
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‘... the decision not to show The War Game on television was largely 
consensual. ... That there was pressure from Whitehall (not from 
Westminster) not to show the film cannot be doubted …’19  
In a formatted letter sent to those who had written to the BBC to complain, the BBC 
wrote; ‘There was an element of experiment in this project ...  Such programme 
experiments sometimes fail ...’20  This is not quite the view expressed by the 
Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors; he had admitted on first seeing it that the 
film was an impressive documentary but he clearly had reservations about its 
political impact since he also insisted that the responsibility for showing it was too 
great for the BBC to shoulder alone.21  ‘In making this decision, the BBC had to set 
aside its own belief that the probable effects of nuclear warfare should be made 
known to the public, if at all possible, through the medium of television.’22  This does 
appear to concur with Wyndham Goldie’s comment that the people should be 
trusted with the truth, but it then rather begs the question why the BBC had to set 
aside its own beliefs and not show the film.  The BBC’s letter continued;  
‘...most of those who saw it were very deeply affected, and believed 
that it had the power to produce unpredictable emotions and moral 
difficulties whose resolution called for balance of judgement of the 
highest order ...’23   
The War Game vividly challenged the sterile depictions of the aftermath of nuclear 
war shown in the Civil Defence Corps training films and the Pathé news reports.  
The opportunity to inform ‘balanced judgement of the highest order’ is exactly what 
Watkins was seeking to promote; a genuine debate about nuclear weapons policy.  
By not showing the film, the BBC did not provide that opportunity, and according to 
some commentators, deliberately stifled it;  ‘… The War Game was censored for 
politically motivated reasons … the state was intimately involved in the BBC's 
decision and that there was nothing 'ad hoc' about the process.’24  The BBC had 
written in 1965;  
‘The BBC has, therefore, reluctantly decided that, because of its 
nature, this film cannot be broadcast. ... In making this decision, the 
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BBC acted on its own judgement.  There was no outside pressure.  In 
particular, we received no advice from Government Departments or 
officials about whether or not the film should be shown on the air.’ 25 
Shaw concludes that; ‘Available records fail to make it clear precisely who took the 
decision to pull The War Game and when.’26    Wayne’s article above was a direct 
challenge to Chapman, but the most salient point from their exchange for this study 
is; ‘In its own way, Wayne’s passionate and polemical response is further evidence 
of the controversy that continues to surround the BBC’s decision not to broadcast 
The War Game ...’27  Based on substantially the same evidence, Chapman and 
Wayne disagreed fundamentally about who took the decision, and why, and they 
perpetuated the debate that had been running for nearly 40 years.  Shaw was non-
committal about the precise origin of the decision not to show The War Game.  
Instead he viewed the impact of the decision from the slightly longer term.   
The evidence is compelling that the BBC consulted government officials, who, 
whether or not they actually coerced the BBC decision, clearly felt that The War 
Game was in some way ‘hazardous’.  Trend’s memo to Wilson suggests that the 
Cabinet Office felt that the government was in a cleft stick; it could neither suppress 
the film for fear of being accused of suppressing it, nor allow it to be aired, for fear 
of the concerns it would raise. 28    
The analysis of the events surrounding the suppression of The War Game to date 
has focussed on the extent to which the government influenced the BBC decision.  
The debate above concentrated on whether the government effectively compelled 
the BBC’s decision (Wayne) or was merely a more passive party to it (Chapman 
and to a lesser extent Shaw).  There is, however, a clear consensus that the film 
was suppressed.  But none of the articles addressed in any depth the assumption 
which underlies all three; why would the government want to suppress The War 
Game?   
The question underlying the debate about The War Game 
Much of the information associated with nuclear deterrence capability and 
limitations is necessarily very highly classified and therefore not at all appropriate for 
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the public domain.  There is, especially in the middle of a war, even a ‘Cold’ War, 
some information that is just too sensitive for public dissemination.  In 1962 five 
members of the radical anti-nuclear protest group, the Committee of 100, who had 
planned a protest outside nuclear and civil defence bases and thus compromised 
their locations, had been convicted of offences against the Official Secrets Act and 
received custodial sentences.29 
As a result of a Cabinet Office study (the Strath Report) of 1955, the government 
knew all too well that the civil defence procedures and capabilities were inadequate.  
The War Game promised to ridicule the claims of the Civil Defence Organisation 
and to challenge government claims that a nuclear war would be survivable.  In 
particular, the loss of control by the Civil Defence Organisation and Police Forces 
reflected accurately the concept of ‘breakdown’ highlighted by the Strath Report and 
subsequently in very highly classified government studies; ‘when the government of 
a country is no longer able to ensure that its orders are carried out.  This state of 
affairs could come about through breakdown of the machinery of control.’30  
Therefore it could be argued that there was a national security issue raised by The 
War Game and the government did not want the shortfalls to become public (or 
Soviet) knowledge, hence the desire to have it suppressed.  But had security really 
been a salient issue, the government would have been able to stop transmission of 
The War Game through well-established ‘D-Notice’ procedures, with none of the 
attendant publicity.31  There was no genuine concern about security expressed in 
the government papers of the time; merely that The War Game exposed issues that 
might be ‘embarrassing.’ 
There was an ongoing debate within government as to whether spending on civil 
defence should be increased or whether to rely on investment in active elements of 
deterrence on the assumption that war could be deterred in the first place, and the 
need for civil defence obviated.32  In general, government decisions about nuclear 
weapons policy had been kept within very limited circles since Churchill had 
authorised the Tube Alloys project in absolute secrecy in 1942: ‘Mr Churchill had 
vigorously insisted that knowledge of the atomic bomb be kept to the smallest 
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possible circle of Ministers and advisers.’33  Veteran parliamentarian Tony Benn 
notes as a junior MP in 1950;  
‘As for the nuclear issues, my first involvement in that was when I 
tried to put down a question about nuclear weapons, having 
discovered that the Labour government had built the atomic bomb 
without telling parliament.  I was sternly rebuked by Attlee, which at 
the time was quite frightening.’34    
On returning to government in 1951, Churchill had been astonished to discover the 
extent of atomic expenditure that had been secretly made by Attlee’s administration; 
‘How was it that the £100 millions for atomic research and manufacture was 
provided without Parliament being informed?  How was this very large sum 
accounted for?’35  During his second term as Prime Minister, Churchill was more 
open with Cabinet and Parliament about nuclear matters than Attlee had been but 
even so, there appears to have been very limited public discourse on nuclear policy 
in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s.  Even in the face of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament activities which reached their peak at the turn of the decade, there 
was persistent government reticence about nuclear matters. (See Chapters 4 and 5 
below).   
The fate of The War Game acts as a useful case study into this reticence.  Four 
months after the decision not to air The War Game, the BBC arranged a cinematic 
screening to an invited audience of MPs, journalists (mostly war correspondents) 
and others by invitation in February 1966.  It received reviews ranging from; ‘A 
Warning Masterpiece; It may be the most important film ever made’36 to ‘Muddle-
Minded Mr Watkins’37 or ‘One Ban the BBC need not have Defended’38  In March 
1966, the British Film Institute was given a limited licence to screen The War Game 
and it was granted an X certificate by the British Board of Film Censors; ‘... The War 
Game was a brilliant film which he [the secretary of the British Board of Film 
Censors] thought should be shown in cinemas.’39   
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The film itself was virtually judged in absentia by newspapers and the fate of the film 
became the story, rather than the story being about the scenario it depicted and the 
issues it raised. Mrs Stella Reading, the Chairman of the Women’s Voluntary 
Service for Civil Defence wrote, shortly before the BFI licence was granted;  
‘The reported decision of the BBC to make The War Game available 
to the National Film Institute for public showing ... is to my mind a 
grave error of judgement. ... If the argument is that the film should 
be shown in the interests of truth, then let us have all the truth, not 
only the certainty of enormous destruction and loss of life but the 
equal certainty that with efficient national preparation many millions 
of lives could be saved’.40   
By 1966, the (Top Secret) Strath Report was a decade old.  Nuclear weapons had 
grown exponentially in capability and the damage that could be expected in the UK 
in the late 1960s was immeasurably greater than that in 1955.  However, in line with 
the decision to rely on deterrence, Civil Defence funding had been reduced, not 
increased, after 1960, and Civil Defence Corps numbers had fallen from a 1960 
peak of 360000 to 140000 in 1965.  In 1965, the Civil Defence Corps was put into a 
minimal budget ‘care and maintenance’ stance by the Labour Government Home 
Defence Review.41  It is not clear whether Mrs Reading knew of the Strath Report, in 
which case her letter would have been a piece of breathtaking hypocrisy, or (far 
more likely) she was completely ignorant of the report and its ramifications, despite 
her position of apparent authority, and she was simply convinced of the efficacy of 
‘efficient national preparation’.   
The BBC made the decision not to show The War Game, and then made the 
decision to allow it a limited cinematic release.  It was an Oscar-winning success, 
not an experimental failure.  It depicted a narrative of nuclear war that was familiar 
to government officials.  The concept of breakdown was officially understood yet the 
‘Civil Defence Handbook No 10’42 (the extant volume in 1965) and the Civil Defence 
training and information films were sanitised to the point of sterility, particularly on 
the prospects for law and order following an attack.  The arguments about the 
accuracy of the fiction depicted by The War Game were played out in public, but by 
proxy.   
Whether or not the BBC asserted the independence of its decision not to show The 
War Game, it did decide only after extensive and detailed consultation with 
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government officials, which both denied publicly.   The debate in the letters sections 
of the press was conducted by the Chairman of the Women’s Voluntary Service for 
Civil Defence and other quasi-government spokesmen, or especially interested 
Members of Parliament, from either camp.  Anti-Nuclear lobbyists were vocal, the 
film gave the waning membership of the CND a rallying point, but it was short-lived. 
The one participant in this debate conspicuous by its absence is an authoritative 
government voice; why?  
In 1965, there was almost total silence on the subject of nuclear weapons.  The 
withdrawal of The War Game highlighted that issue, but even then the government 
did not intervene either in discussion about the fate of the film, nor the core issue.  
After a review of pertinent literature, the analysis chapters of this thesis will consider 
the historical evolution of British government engagement with the public and seek 
to establish what factors led to the ‘total silence’ of The War Game narrator quoted 
above.
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Chapter Three:  Investigating the factors influencing nuclear deterrence policy 
Literature Review 
The factors influencing government thinking and decisions on nuclear deterrence 
are myriad and related in very complex relationships.  Few can be considered in 
isolation, but the impact of the historical context, the experience, prejudices, 
opinions and the beliefs of the senior officials and politicians are often neglected as 
factors in this process.1  
Other work has considered the evolution of UK nuclear deterrence capabilities, 
strategy, policy, ethics and anti-nuclear movements.  This thesis will consider each 
of these as factors in a succession of historical decisions made in specific 
circumstances under specific pressures and limitations.  The social changes over 
the same period have been the subject of considerable analysis elsewhere, and this 
work will be addressed only where it pertains directly to the research question.  The 
literature associated with British nuclear deterrence is, itself, substantial, and this 
thematic review will concentrate on those publications which are directly relevant to 
the thesis arguments – there is no place here for detailed tactical, technical or 
strategic appraisals of NATO deterrence policy, nor the UK role within that, except 
as it pertains to this thesis. 
Social change in Britain 
There are numerous models of change in Britain’s political and cultural make up in 
the Twentieth Century.  Robinson et al suggest that there has been a dominant 
meta-narrative; ‘that organizes post-war British history into three periods: social 
democracy, ‘crisis’ and the triumph of ‘neoliberalism’.2   In a broad assessment of 
competing social meta-narratives, they focus on the 1970s as the crisis of British 
politics; ‘the decade when the social democratic settlement is said to have broken 
under the weight of its economic, social and post-colonial contradictions, supplanted 
by an intellectually vigorous and well- organized neoliberalism...’3  
Inglehart suggests that class-based and economic issues were challenged as the 
dominant election issues in the 1960s and early 1970s by other non-material issues 
such as overseas aid and the extension of civil liberties, reflecting the increasing 
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affluence of the majority of the population in that period.4  O’Connor argues that the 
mass democracy of the post-war state demanded the ‘…capacity to secure 
consensus…’ especially, but not exclusively, in economic policy.5  Describing the ‘… 
strong commitment to the anti-nuclear peace movement [of the ] … new urban left’, 
Dunleavy nevertheless suggests that the electoral focus reverted to materialist 
concerns after the economic crises of the 1970s; ‘Although expectations of a growth 
of post-material politics have not been borne out, neither have these issues 
disappeared …’6  Robinson et al cite a number of challenges to this accepted 
orthodoxy, before concluding that; ‘…the 1970s was a key moment in the spread of 
a popular, aspirational form of individualism in post-war Britain, and that this 
development is critical to our understanding of the history of the post-war years.’7 
Whatever the cause they ascribe, cultural and economic models of British politics 
tend to converge on the idea that there was a revolutionary change in the nature of 
the relationship between government and the British population during the 
Twentieth Century, with the 1970s described as the ‘Crisis of British Politics.’8 
Hobsbawm described this ‘cultural revolution’ as;  
‘… the triumph of the individual over society, or rather the breaking 
of the threads which in the past had woven human beings into 
social textures.  For such textures had consisted not only of the 
actual relations between human beings and their forms of 
organisation but also of the general models of such relations and 
the expected patterns of people's behaviour towards each other…’9   
The causes of these changes are not germane to this enquiry.  Pearce concludes:  
‘[political historians] must work alongside social, economic, diplomatic 
and industrial historians in a collaborative venture, seeing our own 
research in the context provided by that of others. …. If on the whole, 
they lack a grasp of conceptual theory, they make up for this with 
empirical rigour.  As a result, there are very few important 'schools of 
thought' among them.’10 
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The empirical analysis within this thesis suggests that the nature of the discourse 
between government and public on nuclear and other complex moral matters tends 
to retain the same characteristic paternalist reticence across the three 
periods.  Chapters 4-6 will show that the language and concepts used in camera by 
Thatcher and Callaghan in the 1970s tend to be reminiscent of that used throughout 
the Cold War and by Lloyd George in 1917 and Attlee and Churchill in the 1940s. 
As Dunleavy concludes, not all political change manifested in electoral results;11 
despite the highly publicized activities of CND, nuclear weapons policy was not a 
significant electoral issue for the 1964 General Election nor the 1983 election, the 
two periods when nuclear policy was most in the news. 
The evolution of thinking on strategic bombing – strategy and ethics 
Early hypotheses in the design of this study were that there was a link between the 
political handling of the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War and 
the public evolution of British nuclear policy and that the genesis of much of the 
British thinking about strategic bombing had actually been significantly shaped by 
the experiences of the First World War, in particular the domestic reactions to the 
bombing of London by German aircraft.  Preston’s account of the conduct of those 
raids in 1915, in the context of unrestricted submarine warfare and the use of 
poison gas in the trenches suggest that the nature of warfare had been forever 
changed;   
‘…those in high positions refused to believe in the face of all the 
evidence that Germany’s political leaders and its military 
commanders would countenance the unleashing of attacks that in 
addition to being illegal would shatter long-cherished concepts of 
honor, decency, and ‘civilized’ behavior in warfare.’12   
Preston examines this clash of concepts of civilised behaviour and the debate about 
the appropriate reactions to it, and although she does not reach a definite 
conclusion on this aspect, appears to side with Lord Derby (Minister of War in 
1917); ‘it would be better to be defeated, retaining honour, chivalry and humanity, 
rather than obtain a victory by methods which have brought upon Germany 
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universal execration.’13  Conflict between this view and the imperative to have a 
capability to retaliate in kind, however morally reprehensible, has characterised the 
British approach to strategic bombing, and to nuclear weapons, ever since.  
The history of Bomber Command operations is almost as emotive as discussion of 
nuclear deterrence, with the added complication of experience, memory, casualties 
and therefore strong emotion:   
‘Moral arguments about the conduct of strategic bombing as also, 
no doubt, about other kinds of warfare and about war in general will 
always, and desirably so, continue.  … All that historians need seek 
to do is to reveal the evidence which deserves to influence whatever 
conclusions may be reached and, perhaps, to state their own.  
Strategic arguments, on the other hand, must ultimately, in theory at 
least, be capable of being brought much nearer to accord.’14 
Frankland and Webster produced the official history of the Strategic Air Offensive 
against Germany in 1961, in a febrile atmosphere with heated historiographical 
debate about the morality of the campaign, and who had ordered and sustained it; 
‘it must be always kept in mind that the bombing directives were necessarily 
determined at the highest level, in this period by the British Chiefs of Staff and the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet.’15  If they achieved nothing else, Frankland and 
Webster stated clearly for posterity the perils of too close an association between 
policy and capability, absent strategy and understanding of strategic factors:   
‘The appreciation of the operational capacities of the force was 
greatly over-optimistic, as also was that of the vulnerability of the 
German war economy to the attacks which could be brought to bear 
against it.  Thus, with means far less effective than expected, 
Bomber Command had to undertake a task far more formidable 
than expected.’16   
In reaching his conclusions, Overy tends to consider the bombing campaign from 
the operational level,17 and extrapolates his analyses into policy, leading to the 
suggestion that ‘Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale-breaking 
instead of one of economic warfare, with the collapse of morale as a possible 
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additional bonus.’18  Overy considered the inter-war experience and suggests that 
both the RAF and the US Army Air Corps regarded strategic bombing of civilians as 
a viable means of war; quoting the US Manual of Combined Air Tactics of 1926;  
‘The objective is selected with a view to undermining the enemy's 
morale . . . Such employment of air forces is a method of imposing 
will by terrorizing the whole population of a belligerent country . . .’19   
In a comprehensive analysis of the subsequent strategic bombing campaigns, he 
concludes; 
‘In Britain the bombing of Germany could always be given a wartime 
moral justification with the argument that the German Air Force 
began the campaign against civilian targets … The morality of a 
tooth for a tooth had a raw biblical sense to it which could be widely 
endorsed even by those who only a few years before had 
campaigned for the international abolition of bomber aircraft.’20   
Overy also considered that the bombing operations had clear strategic effect in that 
they reduced German industrial output and tied up other military assets such as 
guns and aircraft that could otherwise have been employed for other military 
purposes to the detriment of the Allies.21  
Hastings considers the operations to a similar degree of detail, but has a greater 
level of consideration of the political imperatives and ramifications.  In a line 
redolent of Walzer’s ‘Hypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse, because it is especially 
important at such a time to appear to be in the right,’22 Hastings suggests that ‘Much 
of the reasoning that led to the mass morale bombing of Germany took place in the 
silence of men’s minds, and was never articulated in minutes or memoranda.’23   
Although Hastings reflects more of the political and strategic decision-making, both 
he and Overy remain pretty much agnostic about any kind of moral judgement of 
the strategic bombing campaign.  Hastings is, however, implicitly critical of the 
decision to continue into 1945; ‘But February 1945 marked the moment when 
farsighted airmen and politicians began to perceive that history might judge the 
achievements of strategic air power with less enthusiasm than their own Target 
Intelligence departments’24  Maier similarly struggled to rationalise the campaign; 
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‘Yet at the end I am forced to confront inconsistencies and beliefs that I would rather 
avoid.  Jus in bello remains at best an asymptotic guideline, never to be fully 
achieved, often to be hypocritically violated.  But what other choice to do we 
have?’25 
Howard, considering the concept of total war, concluded that; 
‘Once it acquired the capacity to destroy German and Japanese 
cities, whether by conventional or, ultimately, nuclear means, it was 
almost inconceivable that the United States would not do so. 
Whatever the military necessity or ethical justification for using the 
first nuclear weapons, American public opinion would have found it 
hard to understand or forgive its government if it had not.’26   
Total war challenges the very core of the concept of ‘civilians’ by recognising the 
ambiguity of civilian status and the non-innocent status of many alleged civilians, 
including factory workers, railway workers, dockyard workers etc.  Therefore, while 
this distinction may be absolute in pure moral terms, it is a difficult differentiation to 
make, especially in terms of a publicly acceptable and simple dialogue in a time of 
national crisis, such as a war of national survival.    
Taylor makes a similarly detailed analysis and (it feels almost against his better 
judgement) concludes that;  
‘By not [stopping bombing cities], in fact by stepping up the bombing of 
Germany’s urban populations, the British, and to some extent the 
Americans, lost the moral high ground. … All the same, there are a 
number of problems with this belief, some political and some practical. 
It is hard to believe that in the winter of 1944–45 a voluntary Anglo-
American withdrawal from city bombing would have been acceptable to 
Allied public opinion – especially after German resistance stiffened in 
the autumn, to be followed in December by Hitler’s counterattack in the 
Ardennes … and … the V-1 and V-2 raids on Antwerp, Paris, London 
and southern England, which cost thousands of civilian lives and were 
terrifyingly indiscriminate by their very nature.’27   
This strongly nuanced conclusion is typical of the majority of historical studies of this 
campaign.  Few, however, consider the relationship between public opinion and the 
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strategic direction of the campaign in detail, with Taylor’s and Howard’s asides 
above being typical of an assumed linkage. 
Biddle provides chapter and verse on the operational implications of the bombing 
campaign on Germany’s ability to continue to prosecute the war; ‘… of 19,713 88-
mm and 128-mm dual purpose flak/ antitank artillery pieces produced between 1942 
and 1944, all but 3,172 were allocated to air defense— denying the Wehrmacht a 
critical tool for the ground battle.’28  Biddle’s account of the gradual evolution of the 
RAF from a force that promised far more than it could deliver, to the Bomber 
Command of the 1000 bomber raids of 1943 et seq, is an account of bureaucratic 
ineptitude, British political fudge and individual efforts on an epic scale:   
‘During the Second World War, British and American air forces 
sought to prove the soundness of the central claim of the interwar 
years: that modern societies and economies are vulnerable to aerial 
bombardment. The claim proved weaker than expected. From the 
start its proponents faced two major problems: the vulnerability of 
bombers themselves to enemy defenses, and the inaccuracy of 
bombers operating in wartime conditions.’29   
Biddle draws together many strands of cultural influence on the formation of 
strategy, including the experience of the first World war, the impact of fictional 
accounts of air and nuclear war (especially HG Wells), the wishful thinking of RAF 
strategic and operational planning during the interwar period, and the implications of 
technology on strategy, in a way not reflected elsewhere.  It would be tempting to 
consider the 1930s a period where an embryonic theory of deterrence emerged; 
where the simple possession of the means to retaliate would deter aggression in the 
first place.  I have found no evidence of that, however; the RAF was developing its 
strategic doctrine in order to fight a war, not to deter one.    
In particular, Biddle’s account of the problems with technical fulfilment of policy 
requirements paints a devastating picture of the state of RAF offensive capability in 
1940:  the bombers had no means of precise night navigation, and had no night 
bomb sights so could not target accurately, the aircraft were not capable of 
delivering large loads, their operating range was limited and the exercise 
programmes conducted in the late 1930s were designed to emphasise the 
capabilities of the force, not consider its limitations.30  She concludes;  
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‘None of the assumptions on which British and American ideas 
rested was pulled from thin air. The airmen’s expectations— and 
hence their arguments — revealed the way in which they interpreted 
the world around them and in which they sought to promote their 
own interests.  … Likewise, their failure to see the potential 
problems and flaws in these ideas— and the ramifications that 
might flow from them— reflected the cognitive shortcuts of seeing 
what we expect to see and what is in our interest to see.’31	
The ethics of non-combatant immunity 
Other considerations of the strategic bombing campaign tend to take, literally, a 
different perspective.  There are a number of accounts of the suffering inflicted by 
bombing campaigns which tend to reach a more definitive view of the conduct of the 
bombing campaign.  Lowe concludes; ‘Perhaps the worst aspect of this policy is 
that it removed all the traditional distinctions between combatants and civilians. 
There has to be some line over which military men will not cross, even if it is an 
arbitrary one.’32 Grayling conducts an extensive analysis of the RAF campaign 
throughout the Second World War, concluding;  
‘Considered in hindsight, the degree of moral set-aside obvious 
here [the orders to the bomber crews attacking Dresden] in the idea 
of ‘hitting the enemy where he will feel it most’ – that is, a civilian 
population in an iconic city – and the calculation involved in using 
civilian lives and the precipitates of history to make a gesture in a 
game of diplomatic politics, is breathtaking.’33  
Slim assesses the bombing campaign purely in ethical terms.  He considers 
bombing in terms of Leiber’s Code (a 19th century code of moral conduct in war 
derived during the US Civil War). In describing what he sees as the paradox 
inherent in modern total war, Slim suggests that;  
‘It claims that what we fight for is of such ultimate importance that 
we have to break some of our own rules to defend it.  Indeed, the 
only way we will be in a position to reaffirm these laws and their 
moral norms in the future is by breaking them now.  The end justifies 
exceptional means.  The insight and appeal of this reasoning come 
from its ability to transform a contradiction into a paradox.  …  
Commitment to such an anti-civilian position by those who would 
normally prize the civilian ethic is made possible if one realises that 
this apparent inconsistency, this breach of values, is in fact a terrible 
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but necessary means to secure these values. ...This paradox is 
deeply resonant in human moral reasoning.’34   
Indeed, this paradox underlies much of the analysis of the strategic bombing 
campaign, and much of the subsequent analyses of nuclear deterrence.  Biddle 
concludes that ‘On 6 August, over Hiroshima, no moral threshold was crossed that 
had not been crossed much earlier in the year.’35  There is kinship between the 
morality of the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War and the 
morality of the use of nuclear weapons, and this has significant implications for 
subsequent thought about the morality of nuclear deterrence; but is the conditional 
intent to inflict non-combatant casualties morally equivalent to actually doing it?  
This thesis will not address that question, but will attempt to identify one aspect of 
Slim’s paradox – the ethical aspects of the relationship between those who make 
decisions in this highly contested moral area, and the public they serve. 
Bellamy considered much the same question and concluded that the UK 
government systematically misled the public, parliament and the Church.36 He 
concludes that the British government was deliberately misleading and not simply 
mistaken in its own arguments.  The Government was considering the ethics of area 
bombing in terms of Walzer’s ‘Supreme emergency’37 and, Bellamy concludes; 
‘[British politicians] … calculated that a significant portion of the 
British public would oppose the deliberate bombing of German non-
combatants and believed that this could undermine domestic 
support for the war. In turn, this suggests that proponents of the 
idea of supreme emergency overestimate the extent to which liberal 
societies are prepared to accept the deliberate killing of non-
combatants by their governments, and underestimate the normative 
force of non-combatant immunity.’38   
This tension, and its effect on British government decision-making, is one of the 
factors that this thesis aims to consider. 
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The political implications of nuclear strategy 
Many of the core texts considering early nuclear deterrence theory have in 
themselves become primary sources.  Kahn’s ‘On Thermonuclear War’39 and 
‘Escalation and other Metaphors’40 have been instrumental in informing two 
generations of nuclear strategy development, on both sides of the Atlantic; indeed, 
the term ‘ladders of escalation’ has become an oxymoron in strategic discourse, 
abused, misunderstood, and quoted repeatedly out of context.  ‘On Thermonuclear 
War’ is the earliest consideration of the necessity to face the possibility of a nuclear 
war and the requirement to address the implications of Russian atomic parity in 
order that deterrence would be more credible, and therefore more effective.  Implicit 
in Kahn’s original argument was the idea ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ but in a far 
more literal sense than had ever before been articulated.  These considered ideas 
challenged the Eisenhower Administration policy of massive retaliation, shocked the 
American establishment and significantly influenced Kennedy and Mcnamara in 
their redesign of the US nuclear strategy on taking office in 1960.41 
Kahn, Bundy, Brodie, Schelling, Nye and Kaplan dominated the various schools of 
thought in the USA with respect to nuclear strategies during the late 1950s and 
1960s, and their influence is still prevalent today in theories of nuclear deterrence. 
Their views tend to be couched in terms that assume that an inherent aspect of 
nuclear deterrence is being prepared to fight a nuclear war, and therefore they have 
a ‘warlike’ feel which is less evident in today’s strategists.  Following Kahn, they 
couched the key tenets of nuclear deterrence in language that would be anathema 
to a modern politician, but regardless, it remains the key tenet: ‘Nuclear weapons 
make it possible to do monstrous violence to the enemy without first achieving 
victory’42 with Kaplan advocating ‘…the threat of counterattack is the best strategy 
against the possibility of aggression.’43  Kaplan also coined the phrase ‘wargaming’, 
soon to become common currency with Kennedy’s advisors.  Schelling, as well as 
developing the concept of nuclear wargames through the 1960s, also advocated 
strongly that dialogue is a critical element of deterrence, even in the sense of 
prescribing responses;  
‘Words, apparently, do contribute … verbal activity can call attention 
to distinctions that might not have been recognized … Secretary 
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McNamara’s proposal that cities be off limits is one that, though its 
expression does not create the difference between cities and 
military establishment, can at least call attention to a potential 
dividing line …’44   
The evolution of massive retaliation, flexible response, and their associated 
countervalue and counterforce targeting can be followed through the writings of 
these ‘Wizards of Armageddon’.45  Bundy, (National Security Advisor to Kennedy 
during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962), continued thinking and publishing on 
nuclear policy and strategy, developing his thinking, along with many of his peers; 
‘The time has come for careful study of the ways and means of moving to a new 
Alliance policy and doctrine; that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an 
aggressor should use them first.’46 
In the UK, contemporary analysis of nuclear strategy was less common, although 
Lawrence Freedman provided an almost perpetual public narrative and analysis 
throughout the Cold War.  Starting from a focus on military strategy and how it 
relates to policy and to the actual conduct of warfare,47 Freedman’s thinking evolved 
at least in time with, if not ahead of, the major shifts in US and NATO deterrence 
strategy; he was instrumental in the conscious linkage of deterrence with arms 
control48 and his influence can be traced through his collaboration with the American 
strategists over 40 years.  It would be ludicrous to attempt to quantify the 
contribution made by Freedman to the study of nuclear strategy, but this thesis will 
try to consider the impact his work had on the key British policy decisions as they 
were taken.  His work ranged from direct strategic analysis of contemporary 
issues,49 often conducted in conjunction with American strategists, to transformative 
ethical considerations of nuclear strategy which consider the very clear moral 
dilemmas associated with nuclear deterrence especially countervalue targeting 
(attacks on cities as a deterrence tool) against an informed understanding of 
deterrence and warfighting strategies in the Cold War.50  Finally, Freedman’s canon 
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of work on deterrence includes, for this author, unparalleled objective analyses of 
the development of (western) nuclear strategy since 1945 and a unique perspective 
on the development of British policy and strategy over that period.51  This degree of 
objectivity is rare amongst commentaries on nuclear deterrence issues which are as 
often clouded by polemic as not.   
(Lord) Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the MOD between 1960 and 1968, 
and latterly a special adviser to Foreign Secretary David Owen in the 1970s, was 
given exceptional permission to publish an article in 1961 on ‘Judgement and 
Control in Modern Warfare’52   The article prompted questions in the House of 
Commons, with Prime Minister Mr Macmillan describing the article as a contribution 
to an ongoing discussion between highly placed officers, which he felt it would be of 
value to publish.  Once retired in 1968, Zuckerman published a book considering 
the impact of science on military and civil affairs, of which one chapter rehearsed 
the key elements of his 1961 article:  
‘Far from an all-out nuclear exchange being a rational action which 
could ever be justified by any set of conceivable political gains, it is 
highly unlikely that any country would in the pursuit of its political 
objectives, deliberately risk the destruction of its own capital city, 
leave alone the destruction of all its major centres of population; or 
risk the resultant chaos which would leave in doubt a government's 
ability to remain in control of its people.’ 53      
Stocker and Stoddart could be described as Freedman’s successors, with Stocker 
considering the decisions about the future of the British nuclear deterrent taken in 
the early 2000s in a grand strategic context in the manner of Freedman;  
‘Integration of defences (denial) into a deterrence posture offers 
several advantages, especially in circumstances where traditional 
deterrence (punishment) may be weak. By providing an alternative 
to automatic retaliation, defences could raise the nuclear threshold. 
Where an opponent may have cause (rightly or wrongly) to doubt 
one’s determination to retaliate, an ability to defeat a limited missile 
attack provides a second rationale for not mounting one. And given 
Western reluctance to countenance large-scale civilian casualties 
(as well as enemy casualties), the ability to defeat rather than to 
avenge an attack has obvious attractions.’54    
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Stoddart provides a clear narrative of the process of British nuclear policy decision-
making between the early 1960s and the decision to procure Trident.  With stoic 
objectivity, Stoddart allows an exquisite array of primary sources to imply many of 
the strategic aspects and implications of those decisions, and highlights in detail the 
degree of internal debate that informed each government decision:  
‘On seeing the first two parts of the Duff-Mason Report on 11 
December 1978, David Owen concurred that the ‘theoretical and 
practical aspects of the problem can[not] be considered in isolation 
from one another.’  He felt that they concentrated too heavily on 
strategic systems without ever deconstructing what the term 
‘strategic’ implied.’55   
Similar reflections on the evolution of nuclear strategy and the broader mechanics 
of Cold War British government are provided by Peter Hennesy’s wide-ranging 
studies.  Hennessy’s personal relationships with government ministers since 
Wilson’s time have allowed him to describe strategic decisions in the context both of 
the Cold War as it happened, and also contemporary British social history.56  He 
quotes Lord Allen, the Home Office representative on the Strath Committee;  
“I can remember sitting on a committee working out the horrors of the 
H-Bomb as distinct from the much more modest A-Bomb.  And, 
although it seemed like Never-Never Land at the time, we did work out 
these theoretical methods of keeping on the government – setting up 
organizations.  One had a feeling that, if it came to it, nothing would 
quite work out the way one was planning.  But, nevertheless, one 
simply had to plan.”57 
It is almost impossible to view nuclear deterrence from an entirely objective position; 
nuclear deterrence is almost the modern litmus test of Carr’s realism v idealism.58  
Surely nobody rational could argue that nuclear war could be anything but a 
catastrophe.  The difference in opinion between those who support nuclear 
deterrence and those who would abolish nuclear weapons is simply one of 
understanding how best to avoid nuclear war.   
Michael Quinlan sat at the heart of British government strategic evolution during the 
1980s and 1990s and, unusually, wrote extensively on nuclear deterrence.  Within 
the MOD today he is regarded as the ‘high priest’ of British nuclear deterrence 
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strategy, although he tends to be selectively quoted to make political capital, rather 
than with any deep understanding of the moral issues associated with nuclear 
deterrence that he explored from the standpoint of a practicing Roman Catholic.  
Quinlan’s personal views were published after his retirement,59 and his prolific 
letters were collected and published after his death.60  During his tenure at the 
MOD, he was substantially responsible for the 1980 Defence Open Government 
Document describing the decision to replace Polaris with Trident, and almost 
uniquely for an official, he was given permission to correspond in public as long as 
he; ‘… avoid any suggestion either that what you are now writing is ministerially 
approved or that there is a difference between what you say with ministerial 
approval and what you say on a personal basis…’61 of which more at Chapter 6 
below.   
Those who tend to see the world in realist terms tend to consider the hard power 
implications of international relations in their contemporary context, and consider 
that as long as nuclear weapons exist, deterrence is the best way of preventing their 
use, and also to deter a modern conventional great power war.  Those who believe 
that the world is more a norms and international rules-based environment tend to 
advocate for disarmament as the best way of avoiding nuclear war.   
Over 30 years of analysis, Gray derives conclusions typical of such a realist 
interpretation;  
‘It so happens that although we know nothing in detail about warfare 
in the 2020s or 2050s, we do know an enormous amount about war 
and warfare per se … it is improbable that there will be a traumatic 
breakpoint in history’s continuities, including the continuity of its 
discontinuities, in the near future’62   
and he continues; ‘But a policy that amounts to an investment of hope either that 
humankind has forsworn most forms of warfare, or, more likely, that someone else 
will be called upon to bear the security burden, is in danger of functioning as a self-
denying delusion.’63  That said, his view during the height of the Cold War was 
stoically fatalist:  
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‘The issue is not whether or not a nuclear war could be fought and 
won... Rather, it is whether defense planners have any prudent 
option other than to try…’ and he concluded; ‘To say that our 
strategy is deterrence is inadmissible - because no one … can 
guarantee that deterrence will always work, or will even always be 
relevant..’64   
This rather bleak assessment is almost the starting point for the ‘idealist’ 
counterpoint. 
Contemporary morality 
This section will introduce the key texts in this area; chapter 7 will consider 
contemporary ethical issues more closely.  The neatest paradigm in which to 
consider the use of force generally, and therefore nuclear deterrence is the Just 
War tradition.  This has four main strands in the modern western world; there is a 
pure ethics paradigm derived from deep analysis of rights theories, which 
extrapolates those individual human rights into the terminology of the Just War 
lexicon, typified currently by David Rodin and Jeff McMahan.  Between them they 
make more or less compelling arguments that in terms of individual human rights 
most forms of war, and many of the assumptions of the Just War tradition, are 
simply not morally acceptable.65  
This view has been described as functional pacifism66 by James Turner Johnson 
who tends to situate Just War thinking in the politics of its day; he could be taken to 
represent the classical ‘Just War’ tradition paradigm and many who consider current 
conflict from within the Just War lexicon would be in this camp.67  There is another 
sophisticated position that straddles these two camps, describing the tension 
between the two and suggesting that it is this ethical tension that is important; the 
dialogue and process of argument tends to keep wars moral, more or less, and this 
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is typified by Alex Bellamy,68 arguably presaged by Childress69.  Finally, there is the 
realist view of Morgenthau, Mearsheimer and, to a lesser extent, Haslam.  This 
tends to be based on the utilitarian school of moral thinking; ‘… to choose among 
several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of 
political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment man reconciles his political 
nature with his moral destiny.’70   
As before, this Realist view ‘feels’ bleak;  
‘the problem with British thinkers, according to Carr, was not just 
that they ignored power, but that they were utopians as well. He 
thought they held a hopelessly idealistic view of international 
politics. In particular, they had a normative agenda which led them 
to pay little attention to the world around them and to focus instead 
on changing how states relate to each other.’71   
None of these ideas of war and its linkage to morals are new; modern philosophy 
examines the same ideas in new ways.  Walzer’s seminal ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ 
highlights, if not actually sets, most of the parameters of the contemporary debate;  
‘A just war is one that it is morally urgent to win, and a soldier who 
dies in a just war does not die in vain. Critical values are at stake: 
political independence, communal liberty, human life. Other means 
failing (an important qualification), wars to defend these values are 
justified.’72  
This does not sit well with Rodin’s view; ‘It seems to me that it would also be 
disproportionate to use lethal force against someone who sought to deprive you of 
important political freedoms such as the right to vote or freely express your 
opinions.’73  Neither view was prevalent when most of the decisions and discussions 
under consideration were being made – they are, however, relevant now and will be 
considered in detail below. 
‘Thus there have been roughly two main types of ethical doctrine – those that are 
concerned primarily with the rightness of an act and those that are chiefly 
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concerned about the motive from which it is performed.’74  Browne’s 1945 article 
asks the same questions modern ethicists seek to answer; in essence the issues 
have not changed since St Augustine. ‘We have created a Star Wars civilization, 
with Stone Age emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology.’75  
Commenting on the Yugoslav civil war and the NATO air campaign against Serbia, 
Coker observed;  
‘For the moment, the West is still in the war business but it is 
attempting to to change its nature by fighting wars more humanely …  
They are intent on sanitising war, on purging it of those elements 
which, though once familiar and accepted without question, now cast it 
in a light that is offensive to the liberal conscience.’76  
Whilst this may have appeared to have been borne out by the conduct of that 
conflict, and subsequent Western interventions, it does tend to consider only 
discretionary conflicts to support his case; ‘Today our citizens have been 
demobilised; they are no longer required to serve in the military or to endure the 
passive stoicism in the face of great danger which was expected for their forefathers 
for much of the last century.’77  But if the state is fighting for its very survival, 
especially against a nuclear-armed adversary, there is nothing to suggest that war 
will be anything but hell, with all attendant miseries; indeed, ‘passive stoicism in the 
face of great danger’ could be interpreted as the very definition of life under the 
nuclear shadow. 
Nuclear culture 
Groom78 and Stoddart and Baylis79 provide detailed analyses of many of the factors 
considered by government in the formulation of nuclear deterrence policy, and 
these tend to highlight the apparent inconsistencies between policy decisions and 
prevailing economic or strategic circumstances, but they do not consider the 
engagement with the public in any detail, although they do identify key aspects of 
that engagement;  
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‘Hydrogen bombs and missiles brought the threat of a nuclear war 
to the forefront of public consciousness.  Perception of a Soviet 
threat had, in general terms, underlaid the intellectual debate ...’80   
Baylis and Stoddart suggest that;  
‘The British nuclear experience suggests that ideational, more than 
materialist, factors have been at the heart of British nuclear policy 
and that, in particular, the ideas and beliefs of a relatively small 
political, military, and scientific elite have been of critical importance 
in the continuing British view in the important utility of nuclear 
weapons.’81   
They argue that there are a number of essential characteristics of this nuclear belief 
system including; the Battle of Britain mindset (a final guarantee of state integrity); 
the maintenance of Britain’s status in the front rank of powers as other states 
developed nuclear weapons and; the ability to influence US foreign and defence 
policy.82  They conclude that the role of nuclear weapons and British thinking about 
them have changed over time, and that the;  
‘‘realist school of thought’ produced the ideational context in which 
the nuclear belief system in Britain became—and has remained—so 
influential, initially amongst a strategic elite who shared ‘a 
deterrence frame of mind’ and subsequently more widely amongst 
the British population as a whole.’83 
This view of the shared nuclear culture is by no means common to all analyses.  
There is often a clear division made between the ‘official’ nuclear culture and the 
more generic experience of the population at large.  Laucht defined British nuclear 
culture as; ‘the sum of all experiences with regard to civilian and military uses of 
atomic energy, including such diverse layers as science and technology (both 
theoretical and applied), society, culture, politics, identity, gender, race, ethnicity 
and class.’84   He concentrated on the ‘the practice of nuclear science and the 
social, political and cultural implications of the atomic scientists’ work.’  Hogg, in his 
detailed record and analysis of British nuclear cultural history argues that;  
‘The secret-then-public trajectory of nuclear development in Britain 
meant that the government needed to devise ways of articulating the 
necessity of a nuclear deterrent to the nation and the benefits of 
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nuclear technology for peaceful uses. This articulation took the form 
of an official narrative that encapsulated complex themes of national 
identity, prestige, duty, technological superiority and paternal 
responsibility.’85   
Although Hogg is meticulous in his treatment of popular culture, he treats 
government policy as oddly monolithic and presents little consideration of the now 
commonly acknowledged arguments within Cabinet and Parliament on almost every 
aspect of the national nuclear deterrent.   
Of particular relevance to this thesis, Hogg does not consider why there is such an 
apparent disconnect between popular nuclear culture, as he depicts it, and 
government and why there is so little interaction between governments and the 
public on this matter, although, referring to two television productions,86 he is caustic 
about the effect:    
‘Overall, the broadcast of Threads and The War Game marked a 
significant moment in British cultural history. These two films cut to 
the heart of debates over nuclear armament and civil defence in 
their realistic depictions of the hellish aftermath of nuclear war.’87   
Review of the literature (of which there is a great deal with only an indicative 
selection considered above) suggests that a number of factors have affected the 
development of the UK nuclear deterrence policy.  These include; the perceived 
strategic imperatives of the period, determined by the political conditions during the 
Cold War and technological and military factors; industrial capacity, both retention of  
the ability to manufacture high technology defence products such as nuclear 
weapons and submarines, and the limitations that the UK industrial base set upon 
that endeavor; demanding ethical issues in which evolving destructive capabilities 
were stretching and forcing rapid assessment of commonly understood ethical 
precepts and; the means of public engagement through media and press.  This 
thesis will consider these issues in the context of the time, and will not seek to judge 
actions and decisions in relation to modern criteria, but to try to understand what 
were the salient factors in the decision-making process at that time.   
To that end, the inherited beliefs and experience of the key protagonists are likely to 
be significant and the scope of this thesis will encompass these by analyzing the 
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decision making associated with strategic bombing as it developed in the First and 
Second World Wars.  This is the most demanding aspect of this study, drawing on 
poorly documented decisions from the ‘silence of men’s minds’ as Hastings so 
eloquently put it.88 
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Chapter Four:  What factors affected development of UK strategic bombing 
policy during the Second World War?   
‘… a nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will try to save 
itself by any means.’1 
Introduction 
Baylis and Stoddart conclude that there is a distinctly British nuclear deterrence 
belief system based on an evolving ‘deterrence habit of mind’.2  The assumption 
that personal views and experience are influential factors that influence key 
decision-makers’ thinking is a fundamental element of the research for this thesis.  
However, it extends that hypothesis historically to consider what effect the 
experience of the Second World War, and the factors that shaped that conflict, had 
on those making nuclear deterrence policy in the early 1950s.  In particular, in the 
context of the evolution of air warfare, it focuses on the evolution of the interaction 
between government and the public on the conduct of, and planning for, the 
strategic bombing campaign.   
Atomic weapons did not engender a sudden discussion about the vulnerability of 
non-combatants in modern war.  By the time of the Hiroshima bomb, the world had 
become sadly familiar with the results of the bombing of cities.  Aerial bombardment 
had been a source of ethical debate drawing an odd blend of public pugnacity, 
political timidity, and distaste in Britain since the First World War.  The very tenor of 
both strategic thinking and the laws of war were challenged by the experiences of 
the Great War and its emerging technologies, threatening non-combatants in a way 
inconceivable to earlier strategists and ethicists.  These technologies were refined 
between the wars and there is an almost teleological inevitability about the fate of 
Hiroshima.  There is a growing body of study into the decisions which led to the 
conduct of the ‘area’ bombing of German cities by aircraft of the Royal Air Force 
between 1943 and 1945, much of which focuses specifically on the legitimacy of the 
campaign.  
This chapter will investigate the context in which the decisions that led to the British 
bombing campaign against Germany in 1943-1945 were made, not the legitimacy of 
the campaign per se.  It will address the evolution of the technical, operational, 
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doctrinal, political and cultural factors that combined to influence those decisions, 
identify the most salient factors, and examine how those decisions and factors were 
presented to the public.   
Initial examination of these factors which influenced decisions made about strategic 
bombing during the Second World War suggests that many had their roots in the 
earliest experiences of aerial bombardment during the First World War.  The 
reactions of British politicians, military planners and the public to the bombing of 
civilians by German aircraft during the First World War created precedents for much 
of the debate to follow in the 1940s.  This chapter will demonstrate that this interplay 
of factors significantly affected the development of UK strategy and air power 
capability in the inter-war years into the Second World War, and by extension, 
British thinking on the strategic potential and ethical impact of atomic weapons.  
The First World War 
British politicians and newspapers had responded to Zeppelin attacks on London in 
the autumn of 1915 with relative restraint; one headline read; ‘Zeppelin Raid on 
London; Eight persons killed and over thirty injured.’3  The general theme of the 
public and press reaction was one of regretful bemusement at this apparent breach 
of the rules of ‘civilised warfare’.  The Guardian, quoting an American interview with 
a German airship commander who asserted that he felt deeply when ‘… he learns 
that women and children and other non-combatants are killed’ concluded that;  
‘…one of the blackest of the many crimes with which Germany has 
stained herself during this past year is that she has introduced this 
inevitably haphazard murder into warfare.   Commander Mathy … 
contents himself with treating the slaughter of women and children 
as an unfortunate and deplorable accident.  But those who sent him 
know that it is not an accident, and they do not deplore it.’4 
 A number of debates were held in the Commons over the precautions being taken 
against German air raids, but the government consistently refused to discuss details 
of capabilities, tactics or policy on the grounds such as; ‘Information as to the 
numbers, disposition, and efficiency of the guns available for anti-aircraft defence 
would be exceedingly valuable to the enemy, and cannot therefore be made 
public.’5  In what was to become characteristic of discussion of strategic bombing, 
the first government response was to plead secrecy.   
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Preston provides a blow by blow account of the Zeppelin campaign; after a six week 
campaign including 26 raids against the Capital, but with increasing fatality rates 
amongst the airship crews, the Zeppelin raids were stopped; 550 civilians had been 
killed and more than 1300 injured.6  
On the evening of 20th March 1917, the hospital ship ‘Asturias’ was torpedoed off 
Devon by the submarine UC-66 with the loss of 35 lives.  This was the latest in a 
series of attacks on British hospital ships over the winter of 1917.  Since it was 
almost impossible to defend the ships, the Imperial War Cabinet established a 
Committee under Lord Curzon to investigate options, including aerial bombardment 
of German towns in retaliation.  Cabinet discussed the issue of reprisals7 on 3rd April 
but deferred decision on this difficult issue until more definitive information about the 
attacks was known.8  On 12th April they agreed;  
‘… that the only practicable form of reprisals ... was the aerial 
bombardment of an open German town ... though most reluctant to 
embark upon a policy which might involve the killing of women and 
children, were agreed that there was no other alternative.’9   
In Parliament, the issue was more black and white; reprisals for attacks on hospital 
ships and aerial bombardment of towns were either expedient or abhorrent.  Sir 
John Lonsdale demanded ‘... what steps are to be taken to give effect to the threat 
of reprisals against Germany for torpedoing hospital ships?’10  Throughout the 
summer, Mr Pemberton Billing argued vehemently for reprisals against the renewed 
air raids; ‘There is only one way by which we shall be able to stop air raids of 
heavier-than-air machines; that is by reprisals. Whether this country likes reprisals 
or not bothers me very little.’11  Similarly, there were those such as Mr Molteno who 
were equally opposed:  
‘... does the War Cabinet think that it would be in accordance with 
the high principles of humanity if fighting men are withdrawn from 
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fighting the armed forces of the enemy to attack the civil 
population?’12  
Eight bomber aircraft of No 2 Squadron of the Royal Naval Air Service attacked the 
German town of Freiburg on the morning of 14th April dropping about thirty 65lb 
bombs and leaflets explaining why the town was being attacked.  Another attack 
was made that afternoon.13  The newspapers reported the attack specifically as a 
reprisal, the Guardian headline reading; ‘Hospital Ship Crimes; Naval Airmen Bomb 
German Town.’14  There was no comment on the British adoption of the same ‘form 
of ‘haphazard murder’’ deplored by the Guardian in 1915. After this attack on 
Freiburg, the War Cabinet seems to have been reluctant to order further reprisals 
although German submarines continued to attack hospital ships and there was a 
steady increase in German bombing of the UK.  
The first German ‘Gotha’ aircraft bombing attacks on Dover and Folkestone in May 
1917 drew an emotive press response; ‘Shrapnel for Women and Children.’15  The 
editorial continued; ‘If we thought that reprisals on undefended towns would be 
effectual in stopping German raids on our own, we might, for the sake of saving life, 
have to waste it, repulsive as the necessity might be.’16  A subsequent attack on 
London on 13 June hit a school, killing 18 children.  The debate in the Commons 
the next day contained no rhetoric, nor debate about retaliatory attacks; it 
concentrated on the defences for London (which the government still refused to 
describe) ‘... I am sure that neither my hon. Friend nor the House will expect us-to 
say what we are endeavouring to do’17 and on the matter of air raid warnings; ‘... I 
am informed that yesterday people in the West End actually took taxis to go down to 
see the raid when they heard that it was taking place.’18 The Cabinet noted that ‘out 
of all the casualties caused by the raid there was not the name of a single soldier.’19   
 Whilst the famously succinct Cabinet minutes seldom indicate the full flavour of the 
discussions, in this case the note that only non-combatants were killed would 
suggest that the issue of the targeting of non-combatants was significant in the 
Cabinet’s discussion. Cabinet agreed to discuss; ‘...reprisals for air raids, with a 
view to the investigation more particularly of the effect which the adoption of a policy 
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of reprisals would have on the aerial operations on the Western Front.’20  The press 
reporting was becoming more critical, both of the German action and the British 
response.  The Guardian headline read: ‘Many Bombs in East End; School Hit.  Ten 
Children Killed’.21 The Times editorial demanded more defences for London saying; 
‘We have constantly pointed out that aeroplane raids of this character will become 
larger and more frequent ... We may be sure that such raids will be repeated, and 
that the attacking squadrons will grow in numbers.’22   
The Guardian editorial also demanded better defences but concluded;  
‘It may be taken for granted that the Germans will repeat yesterday’s 
raid on London, if possible with exaggeration of its horrors, as often 
as they dare … It is wasting time at this stage to discuss the morality 
of the performance, for moral considerations are expressly ruled out 
of account in the calculations of the German General Staff.’23   
These appear to be early steps in a trend of the assumption of the moral vacuity of 
hostile nations by the British press.  There were, however, more radical 
recriminations with some public meetings demanding reprisals; the Times reported 
that a resolution calling for air reprisals was passed ‘amid great cheering’24 at one 
such meeting at the London Opera attended by thousands. 
The German air raids continued, with dissent growing over the apparent impunity of 
the attackers.  In late June the Cabinet Secretary received what appear to be 
coordinated appeals from meetings of residents’ groups calling;  
‘...on the Government to initiate immediately a policy of ceaseless 
air attacks on German towns and cities, in order that their 
populations may experience the effect of their own methods of 
warfare, and thus are induced to force the German authorities to 
cease this wanton destruction of life and property.’25   
Twenty-six civilians were killed on the morning of 7th July and that afternoon Cabinet 
decided that; 
‘...immediate steps must be taken to prevent a recurrence of these 
raids. Two methods of dealing with this question were discussed 
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namely:—  (1.) The maintenance of an efficient force of machines in 
England with which to repel attacks. [and] (2.) Counter-attacks to be 
made on German towns, such as Mannheim.’26   
Two squadrons of aircraft were withdrawn from the ‘front’ and deployed to enhance 
the defences of South East England.  No reprisal action was ordered. 
Cabinet was dealing with a complex problem.  There was a clear imperative to do 
something, but defences were ineffective and there was clearly a desire not to 
retaliate against non-combatants.  The majority of the Cabinet were also of the 
opinion that reprisals should only be conducted if air superiority could be maintained 
at the Front, and an effective defence could be mounted for London.  The decision 
to order reprisals depended on interrelated factors, not least of which was the 
element of last resort; there seemed to be no way to defend hospital ships or to 
defend against night attacks by bombers.  The other considerations included an 
appreciation of the military effect (would reprisals actually deter further attacks?), 
the British capability (would the British air forces be able to mount such attacks and 
continue to meet their other commitments?), the effect on morale of the British 
public, and; the moral issue of attacking non-combatants.  
The government found itself in the unenviable position of facing strenuous 
opposition whatever it decided.  Only the government had to deal with the reality of 
all of the factors – those opposed to reprisal attacks on non-combatants voiced 
highly emotive deontological positions such as ‘Does the government think that, if 
we send aeroplanes to kill little innocent German babies, that is going to help the 
situation?’27 without concern for military realities. However, the majority of MPs and 
press coverage reflected more populist demands for retaliation, without worrying 
about ethical hazards.  This dual pressure does appear to have affected 
government decisions, albeit in a rather haphazard manner.  The usual answer to 
Parliamentary questions was to plead security and to refuse to discuss the issue,28 
and on the occasions when public engagement was inevitable, the government 
approach seems to have been apologetic; in approving the Freiburg attack, the 
Cabinet decided that;  
‘This measure of reprisal should be followed by a carefully prepared 
statement of justification by the Admiralty, explaining that no further 
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reprisals would be taken as soon as the Germans ceased their 
attacks upon our hospital ships.’29   
In presentation of the strategic objectives of aerial bombardment, the government 
was perpetually defensive, vacillating between post-event apologist justification of 
offensive operations and defensive justification of failures in air defences. The 
agenda of the public debate was always set by those criticising the government 
action. 
A Cabinet report in August 1917 concluded; ‘And the day may not be far off when 
aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial 
and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of 
war.’30   Almost immediately, the Air Staff started building the concept of operations 
against populous centres arguing that, for effect, such a campaign required to be 
concentrated in terms of large numbers of aircraft attacking near-simultaneously.31  
This work led to the creation of the Independent Force whose focus was to be the 
aerial bombardment of German towns.32  In command was General Trenchard who, 
with much of the ‘traditionalist’ High Command, continued to argue vociferously 
against this objective.  He preferred a strategy of relentless offensive against 
tactical objectives near ‘the Front’, arguing ‘… the aeroplane is an offensive and not 
a defensive weapon.’33  Trenchard maintained; ‘The main object of the aerial forces 
should be action in battle, their action against the interior of Germany, although of 
undoubted importance from the point of view of economics and morale, can only be 
secondary.’34  
Although the decision to bombard German towns was taken on 2nd October, 
Winston Churchill at the Ministry of Supply was not convinced of the utility of 
bombing of civil populations:  
‘It is improbable that any terrorization of the civil population which 
could be achieved by air attack would compel the government of a 
great nation to surrender . . .  In our own case we have seen the 
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combative spirit of the people roused, not quelled, by the German 
air raids.’35   
This was at odds with the notes of Cabinet of 2nd October; ‘... it was pointed out that 
the public, and in particular the poorest classes, whose tenements are often of the 
flimsiest description, were tending to give way to panic.’36  Cabinet also decided that 
the Prime Minister should meet the editors of the principal newspapers to ‘restrain 
them from publishing detailed descriptive accounts and pictures ...’37   Similarly:     
‘... the Prime Minister impressed on General Trenchard the importance of making a 
success of the forthcoming air offensive, having regard to the effect that such a 
success would ‘...have on the moral of the people at home.’38 
The inter-war years 
The doctrine of strategic aerial bombardment was championed by the Italian 
General Giulio Douhet, whose 1921 book ‘The Command of the Air’ challenged the 
accepted morality and rules of conventional war;  
‘…the battlefield will be limited only by the boundaries of the nations 
at war and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of 
them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy.  There 
will be no distinction any longer between soldiers and civilians.’39    
More pertinent for Britain, Douhet’s general views were similar to those of Lord 
Trenchard.   On assuming command of the newly formed Royal Air Force in April 
1918, Trenchard had adopted the concept of targeting populous industrial centres 
as the raison-d’etre of the new force and a central plank in his argument for its 
continued independence from the other two forces.40   
Douhet’s ‘big idea’ was that the use of long range bombers to attack industrial and 
population centres would strike a nation’s will to fight so decisively that it could win a 
war independently of the successes of the other military forces:  
‘First would come explosions, then fires, then deadly gases floating 
on the surface and preventing any approach to the stricken area.  … 
By the following day, the life of the city would be suspended … A 
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complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in 
a country subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air.’41 
The Hague Conference of 1923 attempted to draw up rules of air warfare, but none 
of the attending powers ratified the Commission’s Draft;  
‘Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military 
objective … The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or 
buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land 
forces is prohibited.’42   
The Hague Convention of 1907 which predated aerial warfare had, however, been 
ratified and stated; ‘The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.’43  In a debate 
occasioned by an explosion and large and fatal leak of phosgene gas (already 
proscribed) from a German factory, Lord Halsbury bemoaned the nature of potential 
gas attacks on civilian populations, and the inability to prevent them; ‘The War 
proved that a determined attack could always get through. There may be casualties, 
but the attack will get through.’44  He had already considered reprisal: ‘It is poor 
consolation that the only answer we can find to the destruction of half civilisation is 
that we should be able to destroy the other half.’45  But he continued; ‘We are not in 
a position for reprisals ... We have not got the machines.’46 
Inter-service views 
The debate within the British government and the RAF about the purpose of air 
forces was continuous and Trenchard was an adamant advocate;  
‘… the object of all three Services is the same, to defeat the enemy 
nation, not merely its army, navy or air force.... Air power can 
dispense with that intermediate step, can pass over the enemy 
navies and armies, and penetrate the air defences and attack direct 
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the centres of production, transportation and communication from 
which the enemy war effort is maintained.’47   
This could be interpreted as a means of avoiding the hideous attrition associated 
with trench warfare experienced by all of the Chiefs of Staff during the First World 
War.  A more cynical interpretation might be that it was an attempt to preserve the 
independence of the RAF by articulation of a unique role.   
At this meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, Trenchard, now the Chief of the Air Staff, 
considered arguments for and against aerial bombardment of military targets within 
cities.   
‘... Among military objectives must be included the factories in which 
war material is made, the depots in which it is stored, the railway 
termini and docks at which it is loaded or troops entrain or embark, 
and in the general means of communication and transportation of 
military personnel and material.... What is illegitimate, as being 
contrary to the dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of 
a city for the sole purpose of terrorising the civilian population.  It is 
an entirely different matter to terrorise munition workers (men and 
women) into absenting themselves from work or stevedores into 
abandoning the loading of a ship with munitions from fear of attack 
upon the factory or dock concerned.  Moral effect is created by the 
bombing in such circumstances but it is the inevitable result of a 
lawful operation of war - the bombing of a military objective.’48 
Trenchard’s view was not shared by the other two services. 
The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) wrote in response;   
‘... it is taken for granted that direct air attack on the centres of 
production, transportation and communication must succeed in 
paralysing the life and effort of the community and therefore of 
winning the war.  No evidence has so far been produced that such 
bombing in the face of counter attack will have such a result.’49   
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) was similarly critical;  
‘...whilst the Memorandum sets out to show that all the objectives 
suggested are legitimate military ones, the result in practice would 
be that, though the objective might be a given boot factory, the 
actual target would be the town in which the factory happened to be 
located, and the victims would be its unarmed inhabitants.’ He 
concluded; ‘In war, concentration of effort alone can bring about 
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success, and my main anxiety, after studying the Air Staff 
Memorandum, is lest the acceptance of the views advanced may 
lead us in exactly the opposite direction.’50   
Both CNS and CIGS criticised Trenchard’s proposals because there was no 
empirical evidence of the effect of bombing and because it did not appear to comply 
with Clausewitzian notions of strategy.51  This was egregiously service-biased and 
narrow-minded.  The result of concentration of effort in an industrial-age war, had 
been the defensive entrenchment of the autumn of 1914 and the inability to break 
the deadlock.  The First World War had demonstrated the fundamental impact that 
even the primitive aircraft of the era had had, and neither the Royal Navy nor the 
British Army seem to have been willing to explore the inevitable potential.  Ethically, 
both CIGS and CNS had reservations, probably with good cause. 
Trenchard’s evolving doctrine was exploring the boundaries of contemporary ethics.  
The concept of what is now complacently referred to as ‘collateral damage’ was 
novel, and there is little to suggest that the doctrine of ‘double effect’ was generally 
understood; it was certainly not common currency.  In an almost unique but oblique 
reference to the concept in 1918, Jourdain quoted the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
‘...[who] distinguishe[d] between the wounding and killing of non-combatants 
incidental to the bombardment of a fortified town as 'sometimes inevitable.’52  The 
doctrine of ‘double effect’ suggests that the tactical benefits of this incidental effect 
may be exploited morally, but may not be the purpose of the action that causes 
them; thus the casualties caused by bombardment may be excused (but not 
legitimated), but must not be the purpose of the bombardment.  In this context, the 
principle of proportionality also emerged – the double effect cannot be so 
overwhelming that the excusable casualties outweigh (or are disproportionate to) 
the tactical benefit sought.  
The bleakest aspect of Trenchard’s proposal was the apparently amoral synopsis 
with which it concluded; 
‘There can be no question, whatever views we may hold with regard 
to it, that this form of warfare will be used.  ...  whatever be the views 
held as to the legality, or the humanity, or the military wisdom and 
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expediency of such operations, there is not the slightest doubt that 
in the next war both sides will send their aircraft out without scruple 
to bomb those objectives which they consider the most suitable.’53   
The 1935 RAF War Manual stated ‘Although the bombardment of suitable 
objectives should result in considerable material damage and loss, the most 
important and far-reaching effect of air bombardment is its moral effect.’54  Naturally, 
this debate was conducted in the utmost secrecy and not in the public domain. 
Fiction had already outstripped military capability; in 1908 HG Wells had written 
‘The War in the Air’ which had seized the public imagination, describing a world war 
in which aerial bombing would destroy every major city and bring about ‘universal 
social collapse.’55  He followed this up in 1914 with ‘The World Set Free’56 in which 
atomic57 bombs are used to devastate cities during a putative world war set in 1956.  
In 1926 the novel ‘1944’ portrayed gas attacks devastating London. In 1932 the film 
‘Things To Come’58 presented the viewer with inexorable waves of enemy aircraft 
destroying British civilisation.  
Each of these portrayals of future war had a pervasive sense of the inevitable 
vulnerability of the civilian.   There was an appreciation that technological advances 
had moved warfare away from the relatively localised carnage of the battlefield 
where only combatants were at risk, to a future where civilian populations could 
become the object or more or less legitimate unintended casualties of aerial attack.  
It was in this mindset that Prime Minister Baldwin famously argued in Parliament 
that;  
‘I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there is no 
power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever 
people may tell him, the bomber will always get through … The only 
defence is offence. You have to kill more women and children more 
quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.  I just 
mention that . . . so that people may realize what is waiting for them 
when the next war comes.’59   
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This fatalistic view was archetypical of the generation that had lived through the 
horrors of the First World War and found itself preparing for a second.  Writing in 
1944, Spaight concluded; ‘If there was one subject upon which there was almost 
universal agreement before the war, it was, first, that another war would be the end 
of civilisation, and, secondly, that aircraft would be the prime agents in the 
causation of that end.’60  Modern analysis tends to concur;  
‘That bombing would be an integral part of future war had been 
taken for granted by most Europeans in the late 1930s; it would 
have seemed almost inconceivable that states should willingly 
forego the most obvious instrument of total war.’61   
If the British public and their leadership had not understood fully the potential for 
attack by aerial bombardment, the bombing of towns during the 1937 Spanish Civil 
War and the 1938 Japanese attacks on China seemed to vindicate Baldwin’s 
prediction.  The Times reported under the headline ‘The Tragedy of Guernica: Town 
destroyed in Air Attack.’62  A week later, the Guardian reported; ‘Sky Black with 
Rebel ‘Planes’;  
‘Fire enveloped the whole city.  Screams of lamentation were heard 
everywhere and the people, filled with terror, knelt, lifting their arms 
to heaven as if to implore divine protection.  The ‘planes descended 
to 200 meters letting loose a terrible machine gun fire.’63   
In the Commons, Sir Archibald Sinclair suggested that ‘… [Guernica] was not a 
case in which civilians were killed in the course of ordinary bombardment, but was a 
deliberate effort to use air power as an instrument of massacre and terrorism.’64  In 
the Lords the following day, Viscount Cecil denounced the raid as; ‘... one of the 
most horrible things that have ever been done’65 and the Bishop of Winchester 
concluded ‘... an appalling outrage against all the laws of civilisation ... horror has 
been piled upon horror in this war ...’66   
The Times editorial of 28th April suggested that bombardment might not cause the 
social breakdown that Douhet had suggested;  
‘The planning of the attack was murderously logical and efficient.  Its 
aim was unquestionably to terrorise the Basque Government into 
surrender by showing them what Bilbao may soon expect.  Yet so 
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far from having that effect, it may even defeat its object. It may 
merely inspire the proud democrats of Vizcaya with a passionate 
determination to fight to the end...’67 
While the immediate response from the Basques was resolute, Bilbao did fall to 
Franco’s forces before it was bombed, arguably due to fear of the repeat of the 
devastation visited upon Guernica.68  Cabinet on 28th April did not discuss Guernica, 
although two telegrams from the British Ambassador to Spain which had arrived 
overnight occasioned a protracted discussion about the naval situation off Bilbao.69  
A week later, the Foreign Secretary reported that the bombing ‘... had been 
received with the utmost horror in America, where it was regarded as a practice for 
the bombing of London and Paris.’70   
Guernica was bombed by less than 50 aircraft suited to short range attacks with 
small bomb loads, escorted by six modern single-seat fighter aircraft.71  The 
Japanese bombing of Canton and Chungking in the summer of 1938 served to 
exacerbate fears of bombing.  Chamberlain reported to the Commons;  
‘As a result of the raids, approximately 450 were killed and 1,000 
wounded, and considerable damage was caused to private property … 
whatever may have been the objects aimed at, most of the bombs fell 
on places which cannot be considered as of military importance.’72   
The Guardian described the raids in a dispassionately objective report;  
‘...Bombs fell a mile away from the government buildings and half a 
mile from the railway station.  There are no factories or anti-aircraft 
posts within a mile, but several schools, hospitals, hotels, as well as 
slums in the area.’73 
The impression that London was vulnerable to this type of attack from German 
forces in 1938 was a serious overestimate of the capabilities of the Luftwaffe, but 
that mindset seems to have skewed much of British decision-making about the 
German threat and the British capability.  During 1938, the military situation was 
regularly analysed for the government by the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and in their 
report on 13th September, they advised;  
‘...[German] AA defences and Air Raid precautions are  believed to 
be in a high state of efficiency and readiness, and the large number 
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of German aerodromes confers great flexibility on her air forces 
which could concentrate at short notice in any area required.’74 
’... ‘It must be remembered that Germany’s air power is at present 
considerably greater than our own. …’75 
‘In view of the political objections to the initiation of any action by the 
Allies which might be misrepresented as an attack upon the civil 
populace, and the fact that the great initial advantage in air striking 
power which Germany possesses constitutes a potential menace to 
the security of this country, we consider that on balance we should 
be unwise to initiate air attacks upon industrial targets in 
Germany.’76 
One modern commentator concludes that ‘Air raid phobia – a combination of the 
perceived offensive advantage in the air and the overestimated German air power – 
was what powerfully deterred British intervention [at Munich]’77  It certainly seems to 
have figured in the post-Munich debate in both houses of Parliament.   
‘I think that perhaps the greatest tribute which can be paid to the 
work of the Prime Minister lies in the fact that this Debate is taking 
place to-day under the peaceful conditions that now obtain, and not 
to the accompaniment of the roar of falling bombs, the fear of which 
was so present in the mind of every one of us, on whatever side of 
the House we sit, a few days ago.’78   
Perhaps more illuminating is Viscount Sankey;  
‘I was sorry to read in a paper of repute the other day that had it not 
been for Mr. Chamberlain's intervention German aeroplanes would 
have been raining bombs over London. Yes, but it might have added 
that British aeroplanes would have been raining bombs over 
Cologne and Berlin ...’79   
Sankey reflected both the fear of German attack, but also the prevalent ignorance of 
the real state of RAF capability to retaliate.  One modern analyst concludes ‘In 
1939, the British people expected both to be bombed and to bomb others.’80 
Cabinet, informed by the COS papers, shared the fear that the Germans were able 
to inflict significant British casualties, but also believed that the UK had inadequate 
defences and was not in a position to retaliate in kind at all.   
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The 14 RAF contingency Air Plans for Europe prior to the outbreak of war included; 
‘Plans for attacking enemy’s manufacturing resources in the Ruhr, 
Rhineland and Saar (WA5)... Plans for attacking enemy’s air 
manufacturing resources in Germany (WA6)... Plans for the attack 
on specially important depots or accumulations of warlike stores 
other than air, in enemy country (WA8) ... Plans for attack on 
enemy’s headquarter and administrative offices in Berlin and 
elsewhere (WA13).’81  
This was very much in line with Trenchard’s view that the aircraft should be used for 
offensive operations, and complied with the letter of the 1923 Convention.  
Unfortunately, despite the doctrinal emphasis on bombing of strategic targets in the 
enemy homeland, the RAF did not have the capability to achieve any of these 
plans; the RAF had no long range aircraft capable of substantial bombloads; there 
was no tactical doctrine for the protection of bombers against fighter defences and, 
crucially, there was no means of accurate navigation over long distances other than 
visual; clearly this was even more limiting at night.  How this gap between doctrinal 
aspirations and the realities of capability evolved is examined by Biddle82 and is not 
pertinent here; the implications of the difference between pre-war expectation and 
the reality, however, is critical to the evolution of British thinking on, and conduct of, 
strategic bombing. 
The Second World War 
At the start of the Second World War, there was little appetite for British forces to be 
involved in bombing operations against civil targets.  Echoing the articles of the 
1923 Air Power Convention, which had been unanimously confirmed by the League 
of Nations in 1938, Chamberlain had told the Commons;  
‘In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians as 
such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations. ... In 
the second place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be 
legitimate military objectives and must be capable of identification.  
In the third place, reasonable care must be taken in attacking these 
military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian population in 
the neighbourhood is not bombed.’83   
On 1st September 1939, President Roosevelt issued a public appeal to hostile 
governments;  
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‘…publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no 
event and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from the 
air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon the understanding 
that the same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all their 
opponents.’84   
The British government responded publicly;  
‘…it was already the settled policy of his Majesty's Government, should 
they become involved in hostilities, to refrain from such action and 
confine bombardment to strictly military objectives on the 
understanding that those same rules will be scrupulously observed by 
all their opponents.’85   
Given the fear of the perceived German offensive dominance, this position suited 
the British strategically as well. 
In the debate in the Lords on 13th September, Lord Mottistone sought a perpetual 
commitment to this position; ‘do [the government] adhere absolutely to this 
document?’86 arguing that; ‘This mutual destruction can have no effect on the result 
of the war’ and constructing his case against bombing cities on this assumption.  In 
reply, Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary) only indirectly challenged the assumption 
that bombing cities was of no value; 
‘It is also quite obvious that with the advance of science, and ... the 
fusion of all the activities of a nation, military, civil and industrial, into 
one gigantic war effort, the distinction to be drawn between 
combatant and non-combatant becomes vastly more difficult to 
draw in these days, and to maintain.’87   
Halifax continued; 
‘…the restrictions that His Majesty’s Government have imposed 
upon the operations of their own forces were based upon the 
condition of similar restraint being observed by their opponents, and 
His Majesty’s Government must hold themselves completely free, if 
such restraint is not in fact observed, to take such action as they 
may deem appropriate.’88 
It was this open right of retaliation that was picked up and supported in the press 
the following day, as well as a swipe at the immorality of the German actions;  
‘... Until the proposed atrocities are actually committed, the British 
Government, with the French, will certainly not depart from the 
assurance that both have given to the President of the United States 
that they will ‘confine bombardment to strictly military objectives on 
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the understanding that those same rules will be scrupulously 
observed by all their opponents.’  But Lord Halifax, in replying to 
Lord Mottistone yesterday, gave a clear warning that the promise is 
only binding under the condition stated.  If the enemy do not in fact 
observe the same restraint, then we must retain our own complete 
freedom of action.’89   
This debate, of course, echoes almost exactly the 1917 reprisal debate.  Lord 
Strabolgi supporting Mottistone, was concerned about the descent from a high 
moral intent as war progressed;  
‘... we are only in the early days of this war. Passions have not, on 
the whole, been aroused, and those of us who remember what 
happened in the last war will be well aware that, before very much 
longer, natural but bitter feelings will arise in people's minds and 
there will be demands for reprisals and demands for giving what is 
called ‘a taste of their own medicine’ to our enemies and so on.’90   
He was quite right; the War Cabinet decided on 10th May that the government would; 
‘now publicly proclaim that it reserves to itself the right to take any action which it 
considers appropriate in the event of bombing by the enemy of civil populations.’91  
The proclamation was reported verbatim in the Times the following day.  The fight 
for the moral high ground over the bombing of non-combatants had already started. 
By the start of the Second World War, the pervasive view held by the public and in 
government was that bombers would always get through and were capable of 
wreaking such damage on a society that they could cause its breakdown.  There 
was very clear aversion to this being a tenable means for Britain to wage war, both 
in government, in the press coverage, and in the public at large but it appears that 
Strabolgi was right in his assessment that as the war progressed, its realities would 
overcome these moral restraints.     
During the Battle of Britain, Churchill (ever the pragmatist) had already perceived 
that the only way to take the offensive against Germany was; ‘…an absolutely 
devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the 
Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm him by this means, without which I 
do not see a way through.’92  The Defence Committee of the War Cabinet discussed 
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retaliatory bombing of German towns in September 1940 when the focus of German 
air attack shifted from RAF airfields to towns and cities:  
‘The Prime Minister said that his inclination was to announce that 
the Germans were dropping parachute mines indiscriminately on 
the civil population of this country, and that, consequently, we 
intended to retaliate on German cities … [Air Chief Marshall] Sir 
Cyril Newall; ...strongly favoured a continuation of our policy of 
attacking military objectives with bombs.  Many of these objectives 
would be near centres of population, and by attacking them we 
should affect the morale and living conditions of the German 
public.’93   
Churchill subsequently wrote;  
‘About the same time the enemy began to drop by parachute 
numbers of naval mines of a weight and explosive power never 
carried by aircraft before. Many formidable explosions took place. 
To this there was no defence except reprisal. The abandonment by 
the Germans of all pretence of confining the air war to military 
objectives had also raised this question of retaliation. I was for it, but 
I encountered many conscientious scruples.’94   
This suggests, in a way that official records might not, that there were extensive 
discussions involving ‘scruples’. 
Newall’s intervention suggests a very particular interpretation of Chamberlain’s 
1939 assurance that British forces would never be ordered to bomb civilian targets; 
the civilian casualties and effect on morale and living conditions would not be the 
purpose of the attacks, merely a side-effect of attacks on military targets.  This was 
a simple but carefully constrained extrapolation of the ‘double-effect’ doctrine 
advocated by Trenchard in 1928. 
Although not present at this session, Attlee was a member of the Defence 
Committee and later wrote of the decision to bomb cities;  
‘Of course the ultimate responsibility for the bombing policy lay with 
the Cabinet, and I don’t seek to evade it, but I thought that 
concentration on strategic targets such as oil installations would 
have paid better ... But how much was effected by the bombing of 
the cities – which contained armament factories of course – is a 
question.  The German morale stood up to it pretty well.’95   
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British morale stood up to the Blitz pretty well too. Indeed Churchill records meeting 
survivors of a bombing raid during a visit in September 1940;  
‘When we got back into the car a harsher mood swept over this 
haggard crowd. ‘Give it ‘em back,’ they cried, and ‘Let them have it 
too.’ I undertook forthwith to see that their wishes were carried out; 
and this promise was certainly kept.’96   
Throughout the war, Bombing Policy was dictated by the Defence Committee of the 
War Cabinet.97  A February 1942 Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) 
memorandum describes exactly how policy was made;  
‘The general aims of bombing are laid down by the Defence 
Committee with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. These aims are 
embodied in a directive which is sent to Bomber Command together 
with the recommendations of the Air Staff regarding the particular 
objectives which should be attacked in order to achieve the aims.’98 
Three years later, Commander in Chief of Bomber Command Air Marshall Harris 
was characteristically blunt about this level of specific direction and the lack of 
independence of his command;  
‘On policy and strategy I take my instructions at present from the 
D/CAS … In fact I now hold only the tactical, technical and 
administrative command of a force where operations are otherwise 
dictated, virtually ad hoc, by the climate, the Air Ministry, SHAEF 
and enemy reactions - in that order of impact and import.’99   
Despite the apparently well-defined pre-war doctrine and the fourteen bombing 
plans, initial efforts were not well coordinated.  The primary bombing targets were 
oil, the aircraft industry, the aluminium industry and railway communications.  In 
Cabinet, Eden and Alexander had argued for the bombing of the German people, as 
some form of retribution, and in January 1941 the priority was shifted to oil, with 
large industrial cities and communications as alternatives.100  After two months, the 
priority shifted again to submarine building yards and ancillary industries, factories 
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assembling long range aircraft and naval bases in Germany and occupied 
territory.101   
In July 1941, the Air Ministry produced ‘Bomber Command’ a 130-page pamphlet 
describing Bomber Command’s Offensive against the Axis to date.  Clearly it is 
propaganda; British crews are capable of considerable physical and mental 
endurance; brave yet cautious; cool, yet daring.102 The pamphlet describes the 
British bombing effort;  
‘Bomber Command was to leap across the protective barrier of his 
armies and strike at his vital centres, so as to destroy his factories 
and oil refineries and to disrupt his communications – in a word, to 
dislocate and bring ruin to his military economy.’103 
‘Many a tribute was paid to the accuracy of our bombing.  It was 
said on all sides ... that the British only attacked military objectives 
and that anyone not living in their neighbourhood was in no 
danger.’104   
Less straightforward, the pamphlet also addresses morale; ‘What then has been the 
effect of our raids on the morale of the Germans?  The importance of this aspect of 
our bombing attacks on them needs no emphasis...’105  This statement explicitly 
makes the assumption that bombing legitimately targets the morale of the 
population.   
JM Spaight had been a senior civil servant in the Air Department, retiring in 1937 as 
Principal Assistant Secretary.  He had published regularly on air warfare, becoming 
an acknowledged authority,106 and collaborated with Liddell-Hart in the production of 
the 1938 series ‘The Next War’, writing ‘The Next Air War’.107  Although never 
writing for the Air Ministry in an official capacity, Spaight remained remarkably well-
informed and he continued to publish throughout the Second World War.  In a 1940 
article he wrote;  
‘Night-flying raiders groping for a particular factory or military 
establishment will probably have to plaster the whole area with 
bombs.... The indiscriminate bombing which such a method of trying 
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to hit a given objective would involve is hardly a practice which 
either side will be eager to initiate. Not only would the effect upon 
neutral opinion be unfavourable to the belligerent who began it, but 
the result would inevitably be to stiffen the determination of the 
nation which figured as the first victim of such an attack.’108   
At the time, this was entirely coherent with the bombing policy declared by the 
British government and followed by the RAF. 
Prior to the war, Cabinet had been concerned about the vulnerability of British 
civilians to indiscriminate German bombing.  The intent for British strategic bombing 
was in accordance with Trenchard’s view that the bomber would ‘... attack direct the 
centres of production, transportation and communication from which the enemy war 
effort is maintained.’109  There was a clearly articulated expectation that precision 
bombing would enable this policy while minimising civilian casualties, and this was 
the public policy.  Debilitating casualties in daylight operations forced 
acknowledgement of the vulnerability of the RAF bombers and a switch to night 
operations which were fraught with navigation problems. This in turn precluded the 
precision required to attack specific targets in order to realise Trenchard’s ambition. 
Instructions to Bomber Command in July reflected this reality; ‘... you will direct the 
main effort of the bomber force, until further instructions, towards dislocating the 
German transportation system and to destroying the morale of the civil population 
as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular.’110  Detailed instructions 
followed; 
‘... successful attack of a specific target at night can only be 
undertaken in clear moonlight.  It follows therefore, that for 
approximately 3/4 of each month it is only possible to obtain 
satisfactory results by heavy, concentrated and continuous bombing 
of large working class and industrial areas in carefully selected 
towns.’111  
This view was supported in Cabinet throughout the summer:  ‘Mr Butler said that the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs felt strongly that no departure should be made 
from our present policy of attacking civilian morale in Western Germany.’112  That 
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said, however, the War Cabinet also decided not to retaliate against Italian air raids 
on Alexandria Harbour, concluding ‘...that these were not directed against the 
civilian population but had been aimed at the harbour which was a legitimate 
target.’113 
A report to the Air Staff in August 1941 detailed the lack of bombing precision with 
only between 10% and 40% of bomber aircraft actually reaching the designated 
target, and of those, only 30% managing to drop their bombs within 5 miles of the 
target.114  After that report; 
‘… primary targets selected for night bombing were marshalling 
yards, centres of rail and water transport, submarine bases and 
shipbuilding yards [and after February 1942]  night bombing [was] 
devoted primarily to selected industrial areas, attacks on particular 
factories being attempted only when conditions are perfect.’115   
A memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air in February 1942 recommended;  
‘a greater bombing effort be made against Germany for the following 
reasons (i) This is the time of year to get the best results from 
concentrated incendiary attack... (iii) The coincidence of attacks with 
Russian successes would further depress German morale ... (iii) A 
new navigation aid is about to come into service... I therefore 
recommend (a) that the heavy bomber force be employed without 
restriction until further notice on the attack of industrial areas and 
selected precise targets in North-West Germany...’116   
It stipulated Essen, Cologne, Duisburg, Dusseldorf and Gelsenkirchen as the 
primary industrial areas to be targeted.   
Accordingly, the Bombing Directive of 14th February 1942 instructed; ‘It has been 
decided that the primary objective of your operations should now be focussed on 
the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of the industrial 
workers.’117 Portal (Chief of the Air Staff) wrote the next day to his staff:   
‘Ref the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear that the aiming 
points are to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards 
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or aircraft factories where these are mentioned in Appendix A.  This 
must be made quite clear if not already understood.’118 
Spaight’s commentary on the ‘War in the Air’ had been updated in 1941:  
‘... the incursions of the Royal Air Force into Germany and of the 
Luftwaffe into Britain have steadily increased in frequency and 
vigour. Those of the British airmen have been aimed exclusively at 
impairing Germany's military strength. Oil refineries, synthetic oil 
plants and petrol storage depots have been among the chief 
targets... [RAF] pilots and bomb-aimers had been trained to a pitch 
not even approached by those of the Luftwaffe. Precision of aim was 
inculcated and practised. Long periods were spent in the search for 
and exact location of targets. If the designated objective could not 
be found, and if no alternative target could be bombed with 
reasonable precision, no attack was launched.’119 
However, whilst this was consistent with the declared policy, it was no longer an 
accurate reflection of the operations themselves.   
In his analysis of the relations between the press and the government ministries, 
one commentator describes a relationship evolving rapidly.  For the first time, the 
government had to deal with ‘the media’; newspapers, radio and, particularly 
demanding, the newsreels;   
‘The newsreels were regarded as extremely important forms of 
information by the government, thanks to their potent combination of 
words and moving images. Worried that the newsreels might display 
material that would make the government uncomfortable, the 
Ministry of Information was ordered to make newsreels a top priority 
case... All of which demanded that the censor had to see material 
before it was edited and once it was assembled in final form. ... In 
turn, this probably made newsreel companies more likely to lean 
towards the official interpretation of events in order to smooth the 
passage of their product.’120 
Connelly describes serious tensions between the Ministry of Information and the 
Service Ministries, particularly the Air Ministry, with one meeting with the BBC in late 
1941 leading the BBC to conclude that there was ‘...an embarrassing lack of 
coordination on the presentation of the British bombing war. The BBC delegates 
were immediately aware of an argument that had been going on behind the 
scenes.’121  However much the BBC understood the tensions between declaratory 
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and operational policy, they did not publicise them.  The British media of the day 
were resolutely behind the bombing campaign, but they understood it was being 
conducted against military targets.    
Under the headline ‘Bombs on Berlin’, The Daily Mirror had reported on the RAF 
raid on Berlin in September 1940; ‘Typical of RAF bombing operations, the raid was 
made by a force of bombers which delivered their attack with great precision.’122  
The editorial went on to demand that an offensive policy was the only one 
acceptable;  ‘The air war is no time for lecturers and gloved persons wishing to live 
up to a high standard of ancient chivalry.  The invention of the bombing plane 
abolished chivalry for ever.  It is now 'retaliate or go under'.’123  The broadsheets 
were no less committed to supporting the efforts of Bomber Command; ‘... In war, 
reprisals can be exacted only for want of a policy ...The purpose of bombing, as of 
all military action, is to bring the war to a successful end as quickly as possible.’124  
This of course, is a complete derogation from the position described as ‘haphazard 
murder’ by the Guardian in September 1915.125  The press had achieved the 
descent from moral high ground to amoral pragmatism that had so concerned Lord 
Strabolgi in only 18 months. 
There is little evidence of objections at this stage, and what there was, was 
disregarded.  When asked in November 1941 about the ‘Committee for the Abolition 
of Night Bombing’ the Home Secretary responded ‘I have no reason to suppose that 
this misguided propaganda is attracting or will attract any serious attention.’126 In a 
similar exchange earlier in 1941, when the Pacifist MP Richard Stokes had 
protested and indicated his intent to raise the matter formally, the response was; 
‘That is exactly what Hitler would like.’127 This suggests that the dominant view was 
that to question the morality of the bombing campaign would in turn harm the British 
war effort. 
However, the Archbishop of Canterbury, opening the Upper House of the 
Convocation of Canterbury on 27 May 1941 stated;  
‘... It is one thing to bomb military objectives, to cripple the industries 
on which the prosecution of the war depends, and, alas! in so doing 
it may be impossible to avoid inflicting loss and suffering on many 
civilians.  It is a very different thing to adopt the infliction of this loss 
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as a deliberate policy.  ... I do not believe that the great majority of 
British folk, even in the bombed areas, really want such a policy.  It 
is to be hoped that the Government will resist any pressure and 
make it clear that they will adhere to their declared policy.’128   
This moral endorsement was obviously absolutely conditional on the assumption 
that the RAF was engaged in precision bombing and that civilian casualties were 
the unavoidable by-product. 
In May 1942, Mr Justice Singleton was commissioned to conduct an independent 
investigation into the effect of the bombing policy;  
‘In the light of our experience of the German bombing of this 
country, and of such information is available of the results of our 
bombing of Germany ... If an industrial area, which has as its centre 
important factories engaged on war work, is taken and dealt with 
thoroughly by concentration of bombing better results are likely to be 
achieved.’129   
Singleton recognised that the technical limitations highlighted by the Butt report had 
a serious impact;  
‘... Unless and until a greater measure of accuracy in target finding 
can be reached it will probably prove to be good policy to keep 
chiefly to targets which can be found fairly easily.  This course limits 
the number of targets considerably but it is much better to treat a 
second-rate target thoroughly than to fail in an attack on one of a 
higher calibre ... it is concentrated bombing that is needed, and 
systematic bombing.’130   
And he summarised; 
‘... the effect on Germany’s war production and effort will be very 
heavy over a period of twelve or eighteen months, and such as to 
have real effect on the war position.’131   
Area bombing? 
Singleton’s report provided independent verification of an earlier Joint Intelligence 
Committee report which had also considered the salient factors affecting the 
bombing mission: damage to factories, the hold-up of a number of fighter aircraft on 
defence work, by keeping occupied a large number of men and guns on anti-aircraft 
work and on searchlights and a very large number on air raid precautions and the 
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lowering of morale.132 The Chiefs of Staff were able to draw on monthly estimates of 
the effects of bombing on Germany’s war effort, and the Bombing Policy was 
regularly altered accordingly.  Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s scientific advisor, 
supported area bombing;  
‘Investigation seems to show that having one's house demolished is 
most damaging to morale.  People seem to mind it more than having 
their friends or even relatives killed.  At Hull signs of strain were 
evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished.  On 
the above figures, we should be able to do ten times as much harm 
to each of the 58 principal German towns.  There seems little doubt 
that this would break the spirit of the people.’133  
His position was supported fully by Sinclair (Secretary of State for Air); ‘... we see no 
reason to doubt that within eighteen months, and with American help, the degree of 
destruction which Lord Cherwell suggests is possible can, in fact, be achieved.’134 
Having considered the salient tactical factors in his assessment of the effect of the 
bombing, Singleton had concluded; ‘The question of morale is a much more difficult 
one with which to deal.  There has been no break of morale in this country, although 
some people think that there was a danger of it locally on one or two occasions 
when bombing suddenly ceased.’135  British Air Intelligence had surveyed the effect 
of the German bombing campaign on the UK in August 1941 and concluded that ‘no 
town in England has suffered a breakdown in morale.’136   
Between 1941 and 1944 the capabilities of Bomber Command had increased with 
aircraft now capable of carrying over five tons of explosives into Germany.  
Singleton continued;  
‘Now we expect to be able to deliver to Germany in the future a 
much greater weight of bombs than we received.  … I doubt whether 
our bombing ability is, or in the near future can be, sufficient to bring 
about a break in morale in this way alone.  Herein again arises the 
importance of increased accuracy.  I prefer to think of the effect on 
morale combined with the other factors and envisage the bombing 
of an industrial area with important factories in the centre, rather 
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than the bombing of houses, and I think better results will be 
achieved thereby.’137 
This sophisticated position, very precisely between the deliberately indiscriminate 
bombing of cities for the purpose of ‘dehousing’ and the precision bombing of 
‘military-industrial’ targets, is probably the most accurate depiction of British 
Bombing policy after 1942.  It is exquisitely poised on the knife edge of the ‘double 
effect’ and collateral damage issue discussed above. 
There was a very small minority of MPs who queried the policy of area bombing as 
the British campaign developed.  In 1941 Richard Stokes MP, had dismissed night 
bombing as ‘contagious lunacy.’138 In March 1943, he pressed home his questions; 
‘...my constant objection has been to what I call indiscriminate night bombing – and 
bombing must be indiscriminate at night...’139  He challenged Balfour (Under-
Secretary of State for Air) to reconcile ‘his statement [about not bombing 
indiscriminately] with the statement of the Secretary of State for Air that we have 
obliterated 160 acres of built-up area – working class dwellings – around Essen in 
our attempts to hit Krupp’s works.’  Balfour replied;  
‘Of course, war is cruel and destructive, and the destruction of 
property and cities is inevitable, but again, I give the assurance that 
there is no change in our policy, that our purpose is to destroy 
Germany’s industry, transport and war industry and war potential, 
and that we are not wantonly bombing women and children for the 
sake of doing so.’ 140 
Stokes pushed his point again two weeks later, asking Sinclair ‘whether on any 
occasion instructions have been given to British airmen to engage in area bombing 
rather than limit their attention to purely military targets?’ to which Sinclair replied; 
‘The targets of Bomber Command are always military, but night bombing of military 
objectives necessarily involves bombing the area in which they are situated.’ 141 
Air Marshall Harris, CINC Bomber Command, was perturbed at the difference 
between public and operational policy; ‘I personally thought this was asking for 
trouble; there was nothing to be ashamed of, except in the sense that everybody 
might be ashamed of the sort of thing that has to be done in every war, as of war 
itself.’142  The Air Staff responded that;  
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‘No attempt has been made to conceal from the public the immense 
devastation that is being brought to the German industrial cities... 
the widespread devastation is not an end in itself but the inevitable 
accompaniment of an all-out attack on the enemy’s means and 
capacity to wage war. ... It is, in any event, desirable to present the 
bomber offensive in such a light as to provoke the minimum of 
public controversy and so far as possible to avoid conflict with 
religious and humanitarian opinion. Any public protest, whether 
reasonable or unreasonable, against the bomber offensive could not 
but hamper the Government in the execution of this policy and might 
affect the morale of the aircrews themselves.’143 
From time to time, the priority was afforded to other targets such as supporting the 
D Day landings and Ministry of Economic Warfare priorities such as oil refineries or 
ball bearing production, but it was Singleton’s position that Harris argued with Portal 
in late 1944;  
‘The main concentration has been against the Ruhr whenever the 
conditions made this economical.  The targets selected have been 
oil targets, rail centres, canal systems and the major centres of 
population.  …Area bombing must enter into any scheme, because 
in bad weather we have to use sky markers, we must have a large 
target … and we necessarily in those conditions paint with a large 
brush.’144 
Harris subsequently wrote that; 
‘... the policy of destroying industrial cities, and the factories in them, 
was not merely the only possible one for Bomber Command at that 
time, it was also the best way of destroying Germany’s capacity to 
produce war material.  The morale of the enemy under bombing could 
be taken as an imponderable factor.’145   
He was clearly committed to the policy of area bombing of industrial targets; in this, 
he was inclined to follow Trenchard’s 1928 doctrine, and he does not appear to 
have been philosophically committed to morale as a target.  In his efforts to destroy 
industrial capacity, the workforce would become casualties.   
Opposition to the RAF strategic bombing campaign 
In 1944, the small, but vociferous, opposition to the bombing campaign published 
‘The Seed of Chaos’.  This pamphlet described the campaign as ‘obliteration 
bombing’ and quotes a ‘foreign observer’ writing for the News Chronicle;  
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‘... the principle behind your raids is to make sure of hitting important 
targets by wiping out the whole area in which they lie ... This is 
obviously the only way to get results in a highly industrialised 
country like Germany, but it also has the advantage of producing an 
automatic effect on the population... There is a definite point at 
which the weight of bombs dropped in a certain area in a certain 
time produces no longer a fitful feeling of alarm ... but an unbearable 
strain, more or less approaching panic...’146  
Of course, this is very much the position that Portal had already taken with 
Bottomley, and was exactly in accord with Harris’s understanding of his directives, 
but it was not a position that the British government wanted to acknowledge openly. 
Shortly afterwards, Spaight published a remarkable book analysing the bombing 
campaign; ‘Bombing Vindicated’.  In it, he considered this domestic opposition;  
‘Unfortunately, the German propagandists were able to count upon 
a certain amount of support in their campaign from within this 
country of free speech.  That it was the support of only a tiny fraction 
of the population was shown when, on 29 April 1942, Mr Rhys 
Davies, a Pacifist Member of Parliament, questioned the Secretary 
of State for Air about the recent raid on Lubeck and implied in a 
supplementary question that the air offensive should be stopped.  
There was a resounding cheer throughout the House of Commons 
when Sir Archibald Sinclair replied: ‘The best way to prevent this 
destruction is to win the war as quickly as possible.’  A few weeks 
later, another Socialist Member, Mr RR Stokes, was asking about 
the recent ‘thousand-bomber’ raids and their utility.’147   
Spaight virtually dismisses Davies and Stokes as a pacifist and socialist respectively 
and not representative of the population.  But what is most interesting about his 
book for this study is that it exists at all. 
The book is a well-informed and entirely sympathetic portrayal of the public 
bombing policy, associated with a successful campaign narrative.  In effect, it 
addresses the opposition argument, in terms in which Ministers might not want to 
become embroiled; it is the government case by proxy.  Spaight observes that:   
‘What has really happened is that air power has killed absenteeism 
in war.  ... We are all in the thick of the trouble now.  Naturally, to 
those who have not grown accustomed to being no longer 
absentees it is nothing but an intrusion, a trespass, a violation, an 
outrage, when war thus invades their hearths and homes.  It is more 
than that – it is an abomination, a needless cruelty, a grim and 
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mocking travesty of war, when bombs come crashing down on their 
houses, when people are killed in their sleep, when death and ruin 
overwhelm their world.  This, they cry, is not war – it is murder.  But 
it is war – the new kind of war.  It is wrong, horrible, unendurable, 
but it was inevitable. It was inevitable that the air offensive against 
an enemy’s source of armed strength should come and with it the 
incidental killing of non-combatants.’148 
This is what Harris had wanted Street to admit and Sinclair to announce, but he was 
not politically astute enough to recognise that the official position could never reflect 
this bleakly amoral position. 
The lessons learned from the strategic bombing campaign  
In the event, predictions of the crushing moral effect of aerial bombardment were as 
overstated as the 1937 Times Guernica editorial had suggested; instead of 
Douhet’s social breakdown, the populations of the cities that did endure persistent 
attacks drew together and perversely gathered strength in a phenomenon still 
known 70 years later as the spirit of the ‘Blitz’.  The German attacks of 1940-1941 
never achieved the levels of destruction that the Royal Air Force would inflict two 
years later.  Even the most destructive operations of the European war, the 
protracted attacks on Hamburg, Berlin and Dresden, did not realise Douhet’s social 
breakdown.  That said, immediate post-war analysis suggested that the effect on 
German morale of these devastating attacks had been significant; 
‘It’s much blacker than Speer paints it,’ [Erhard Milch, the State 
Secretary for Air] told the members of his ministry. ‘If we get just five 
or six more attacks like these on Hamburg, the German people will 
just lay down their tools, however great their willpower.’149   
The actual effect of the bombing campaign, as opposed to that perceived in the UK 
in 1946, is immaterial to this study, but Milch’s observation was reported in time to 
inform the next iteration of strategic planning.  Those making decisions about 
Britain’s atomic weapon capabilities in the decade after the end of the bombing 
campaigns of the Second World War had all held senior positions during the 
Second World War.  The lessons that they derived from that conflict would inevitably 
colour their thinking as they shaped atomic policy.   
The British Authorities started the Second World War with an exaggerated fear of a 
German strategic bombing campaign and sought to avoid provoking it.  That said, 
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this does not appear to me to be an early example of a coherent deterrence 
strategy.  Although Attlee later considered that the 1930s ‘strategic bombing had 
been hailed as the great deterrent to war and had failed,’150 Trenchard, Baldwin and 
Halsbury were not considering deterrence by posing a capability to respond in kind; 
simply that attacks on cities were inevitable in future conflict and, in order to defeat 
an enemy, Britain must be able to inflict and survive such damage.  Similarly, 
deterrence was not discussed in the Commons debate on Munich in September 
1938 – the assumption was that war would inevitably entail bombing of cities.  The 
RAF strategic bombing campaign was the manifestation of that thinking. 
The capability offered by strategic bombing, realised much more by the RAF than by 
the Luftwaffe, pushed the boundaries of the laws and ethics of war – as the 1940 
Daily Mirror headline suggested; Maybe Everybody is a Victim.151   
Initially, the RAF campaign was limited by the inadequate preparations made 
between the wars.  Having started with an exaggerated expectation of precision 
bombing of military targets, Cabinet accepted less discriminate bombing of areas in 
which military targets were situated and then specifically directed operations against 
the morale of the German civilian population.  The issue of unintended civilian 
casualties caused by attacks on military targets forced consideration of the 
legitimacy of targets located within residential areas.  The directives to Bomber 
Command were explicit – the primary objective of operations was to be focused on 
the morale of the enemy civilian population.  Despite diversions into oil and other 
‘panacea’ targets, this was essentially the policy until the end of the war.  Ministers 
consistently denied this in Parliament and in public. 
It is clear from the public interventions of religious leaders and the paucity of 
philosophical debate on the topic beforehand that ethical issues of proportionality 
and non-combatant immunity were novel, highly contentious and only marginally 
developed.  An embryonic, but highly articulate and energetic opposition emerged 
during the war – not simple pacifism but a much more sophisticated opposition to 
the specifics of modern warfare.  The men at the highest levels of government had 
to address these issues, in the context of a war of unprecedented potential which 
posed an existential threat to the UK.  They chose to avoid the inevitably 
contentious and morale-sapping public debate about the difference between 
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‘unintended but inevitable casualties’ and deliberate targeting of non-combatants.  
They clearly believed they had no option if they intended to continue to prosecute 
the war; they lied. 
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Chapter Five:  From the Second World War to Continuous At Sea Deterrence 
If the early leaders of Britain’s nuclear enterprise learnt anything from the 
experience of the Second World War, it was that ‘total’ war could threaten the whole 
fabric of the state and society.  The previous chapter suggests that the importance 
of maintaining a plausible position of moral authority was considered critical in 
keeping public morale engaged in the war effort, even if the enemy engaged in 
immoral attacks on the British population.  This moral authority was directly linked to 
the technical capabilities and strategies to be used; common ethical considerations 
would limit the extent of destruction acceptable to the public, even if such limits 
were detrimental to the war effort. 
The wartime government had skirted around this issue; in 1945, Attlee’s 
Government was faced with the significant challenge of developing weapons 
specifically designed to destroy entire cities, and strategies to use them, without 
alienating the public.  How this was achieved is the subject of this chapter.   
The genesis of the British atomic energy project 
In April 1937, opposition leader Clement Attlee requested the Foreign Secretary 
(Lord Halifax)  to take immediate steps to address a protest to Franco and Hitler 
over the Guernica bombing.1  Eight years later, as the Prime Minister of the newly 
elected Labour Government, Attlee was faced with leading the UK into the atomic 
age when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6th August 1945 and 
the second on Nagasaki three days later.  Japan unconditionally surrendered on 
12th August 1945. Despite a thread of modern historiographical analysis that seeks 
to demonstrate that there were other factors which affected Japan’s decision to 
surrender such as the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9th August 1945, for the 
victorious allies, there was no question that the atomic bombs had caused the 
capitulation.2   
Attlee intuitively understood the central premise of deterrence.  In August 1945, he 
wrote to the Cabinet;  
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‘We recognised or some of us did before this war that bombing 
could only be answered by counter bombing.  We were right … The 
answer to an atomic bomb on London is an atomic bomb on another 
great city. … Even the modern conception of war to which in my 
lifetime we have become accustomed is now completely out of date 
… We should declare that this invention has made it essential to 
end wars. The new World Order must start now.’3   
A month later he wrote to President Truman in much the same vein;  
‘The emergence of this new weapon has meant, taking account of 
its potentialities, not a quantitative but a qualitative change in the 
nature of warfare. …. I have so far heard no suggestion of any 
possible means of defence.  The only deterrent is the possibility of 
the victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor.’4   
Attlee’s insight was not initially shared by the Chiefs of Staff; in response to a 
Cabinet request to consider whether the ‘… introduction of atomic explosives 
open[s] up an era of destruction on a scale never before considered feasible, or is it 
merely an intensive development of the existing concept of war …’5 the Admiralty 
response to the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the atomic bomb would not on its 
own be decisive and that it was merely a bigger and better bomb.6  This rather 
missed the point that Attlee seems to have intuitively grasped; one ‘bigger and 
better bomb’ carried by a single aircraft could inflict as many casualties as one of 
the massed raids of the latter part of the Second World War.  The atomic bomb 
realised the vulnerability of cities and populations that had so agitated Attlee after 
Guernica; one bomber could always get through.  Atomic weapons therefore 
provided an affordable means for a perpetual capability to threaten cities that 
otherwise would have required a war economy fully mobilised for production of huge 
numbers of heavy bombers.  
Initially, Attlee considered international control of atomic energy essential to the 
maintenance of peace.  He told Parliament; ‘… I declared the intention of His 
Majesty's Government to devote all their efforts to making the new discovery serve 
the purpose of world peace and to co-operate with others to that end.’7 In a personal 
memo he subsequently drafted for the Cabinet, he enlarged on this; ‘All nations 
must give up their dreams of realising some historic expansion at the expense of 
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their neighbours.’8 The UK and US conducted simultaneous negotiations throughout 
the autumn of 1945, looking both at international control, culminating in the 
Washington Declaration of 15 November 1945, and at cooperation in the 
construction of national stockpiles of atomic weapons, culminating in an Anglo-
American Memorandum of Understanding on 16 November 1945.9  In extreme 
secrecy, Attlee and a small Cabinet Committee (GEN 75) commissioned a report 
from the newly appointed Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE), which 
initially reported that:  
‘It is difficult to conceive of a system of international control without a 
system of international inspection and this has always been a point 
of special difficulty, both because its effectiveness is in likely to 
remain in doubt, and because of its unpalatability to national 
opinion. … The political difficulties in the way of securing the 
adoption of any of the foregoing schemes and of assuring their 
efficacy are very great and might at first sight seem insurmountable.  
But the consequences of making no agreement at all are so grave 
not only for the security of all countries but for our present 
civilisation itself, that it appears imperative to devise a system of 
control.’10 
 GEN 75 met to discuss international control on average twice a week throughout 
October 1945 and the final ACAE report of 29 October 1945 concluded that 
international control was impracticable and that; ‘No international agreement, 
therefore, is likely to be successful which attempts to restrict the freedom of any of 
the major powers to produce atomic weapons. ....’ The report went on to 
recommend that; ‘The United Kingdom Government should itself undertake the 
production of atomic bombs as a means of self-defence as soon as possible.’11  A 
week later GEN 75 agreed that;  
‘It was useless to suppose that if a war once began, any agreement 
not to use the atomic bomb would be observed.  The sanction 
proposed would never be effective in deterring a country which was 
in danger of being destroyed in a war begun without the use of 
atomic weapons. ... we must, therefore, base our foreign and 
																																								 																				
8 ATTLEE, C. The Atomic Bomb: Memorandum by the Prime Minister.  GEN 75/1, 28 Aug 1945. TNA 
CAB 130/3. 
9 The ‘Groves-Anderson’ Memorandum, 16 November 1945 reproduced in GOWING, M. 1974. 
Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy 1945–1952, vol. 1, London, Macmillan. 
P85 
10 ANDERSON, S. J. Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy; Memorandum on International Control of 
Atomic Energy 5 October 1945. TNA CAB 130/3. 
11 CABINET OFFICE GEN 75/10 International Control of Atomic Energy; Report by Officials 29 
October 1945. TNA CAB 130/3. 
	 90	
defence policy on the assumption that if another war took place, 
these weapons would be used.’12   
Accordingly, GEN 75 initiated the British atomic energy programme.  This conflict 
between what was clearly a genuine aspiration for a system of ‘Utopian’ 
international control, and the ‘hard power’ realism of development of a national 
atomic capability is present throughout Cabinet discussions of the early meetings of 
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission at which the Lilienthal Report and 
subsequent Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy were discussed 
and rejected in 1946.13  It has been an underlying tension in the formulation of 
British nuclear deterrence policy ever since. 
This decision was not specifically to develop a British atomic weapon, however, 
merely to develop the facilities to produce the materials required, but the bomb was 
an implicit objective.  Gowing describes the decision to embark on a British bomb 
project as ‘axiomatic.’14  These men simply assumed that the UK was a top-rank 
world power with significant strategic and commercial interests. The concurrent 
(non-atomic) meetings of the Defence Committee in 1946 indicate the breadth of 
the UKs interests at this time; from Greece and Denmark to Palestine and India, the 
UK had strategic interests across the World;15 it was unthinkable that Britain should 
be without atomic weapons.  The other common theme of those Defence 
Committee meetings was that of severe austerity and reductions in defence 
manpower, equipment and spending; with Bevin arguing that ‘… the proposed cuts 
in the armed forces faced him with grave difficulties in obtaining the support which 
he thought necessary as a backing to the conduct of the government's foreign 
policy.’16,17 
Once the decision to proceed with a British atomic energy project had been made, 
the focus shifted to its management; Cabinet discussed national control of research 
and production, Ministerial responsibility, the creation of the appropriate advisory 
bodies and the executive control of the research, even the site of the proposed 
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research establishment and its organization and financial structure.  Privately, Attlee 
subsequently explained that he viewed a British bomb as;  
‘…essential.  We had to hold up our position vis-à-vis the 
Americans.  We couldn’t allow ourselves to be wholly in their hands 
and their position wasn’t awfully clear always … we had to bear in 
mind that there was always the possibility of their withdrawing and 
becoming isolationist once again.  The manufacture of a British 
bomb was therefore at that stage essential to our defence.’18 
In January 1946, the team to lead the development of a UK weapon was appointed 
– Air Chief Marshal Portal was to be the ‘Controller of Production Atomic Energy’ in 
overall charge of developing the project; Christopher Hinton (an ICI specialist in 
munitions production) in charge of the construction of the ‘pile’ and; John Cockcroft 
(scientist and engineer) as the Director of the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment.  Portal’s initial report to GEN 163 (a smaller group of Ministers than 
even Gen 75, which did not include either Dalton (Chancellor) or Cripps (President 
of the Board of Trade)) in January 1947 recommended that;  
‘… a decision is required about the development of atomic weapons 
in this country. The Service Departments are beginning to move in 
the matter and certain sections of the Press are showing interest in 
it.’19   
Portal’s paper went on to offer three options; do nothing, proceed within legacy 
procurement arrangements, or design a specific structure for the design and 
development of atomic weapons.  The paper’s conclusions were couched in terms 
to encourage the latter, especially in terms of the ability to maintain secrecy.  GEN 
163 formally agreed the development of a British atomic bomb, but merely reflected 
the growing consensus among ministers and officials;  
‘This consensus was largely unspoken, but in Whitehall there was 
hardly a single dissenter. Attlee, Bevin, Portal, the Chiefs of Staff, 
Chadwick and many others were of one mind. Churchill too, although 
he was not consulted, had made no secret that this was his view.’20 
Importantly, GEN 163 also agreed the structure of the organization to build the 
bomb.  Security was to be draconian and Hinton’s organization, responsible for the 
production of the radioactive core of the weapon, was not even made aware of the 
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major bomb project (High Explosive Research) set up under William Penney (a 
physicist recently returned from the USA).  Penney’s presence in the Armaments 
Research Division was a cause for some press speculation, with Chapman Pincher 
wondering if his appointment heralded the start of the British atomic weapon 
development programme.21  Secrecy was maintained within the respective official 
arms of the project through the Official Secrets Act, and Portal’s 
compartmentalization of the various activities.  Media interest was discouraged 
through the use of the D (Discretion) Notice system. 
The D-Notice system has no statutory basis and was developed in the early 20th 
Century in order to prevent the press from publishing information which might be of 
value to a future enemy; it has been the ‘preferred interface of UK Government and 
Media’22 and has proven a successful for over 100 years and persists today.  D-
Notice 25 inhibited publication of any articles or broadcasts on British atomic 
weapon activities from 1945 until its replacement in 1971 by a standing D-Notice 
which in turn was replaced in 2000 by Defence Advisory (DA) Notice 02;  
‘It is requested that disclosure or publication of highly classified 
information about nuclear and non-nuclear defence equipment or 
equipment … should not be made without first seeking advice. … 
Release of highly classified operational plans and security 
arrangements could potentially jeopardise the safety and security of 
our nuclear forces and reduce their deterrent value.’23 
Famously reticent at the best of times, Attlee actively minimised discussion of a 
British atomic bomb, but that was equally true of all aspects of defence; in the 
Lords’ discussion of the 1948 Defence White Paper, Viscount Bridgeman lamented; 
‘Our only information is still derived from the New Statesman and Nation and, so far 
as I understand, has not been confirmed or denied, either here or in another 
place.’24  There was no public engagement, nor was the wider Cabinet informed. In 
a manner that was to become typical of the release of British atomic project 
information, Cabinet and the Commons were informed of the existence of a British 
project later in 1948, not because they were democratically elected representatives 
with a right to know and a duty to oversee, but because there were concerns that 
there might be a leak and they would find out by some other route. 
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In the Commons debate on the Defence White Paper in March 1948, one MP had 
pointed out the inconsistency in making the strategic bomber force the major 
striking force, calling it ‘…a most wasteful force in terms of economic and industrial 
work, and is also a most expensive and an inefficient force for doing damage to the 
enemy...’25  However, he had failed to consider his question holistically and what 
might make such a force capable of doing damage to an enemy, such as atomic 
bombs.  Commander Noble (MP) stated that ‘I believe the general public to be a bit 
ostrich-minded on the subject of atomic warfare.’ He then went on to reflect that 
‘…the prospect of reducing the differences on the Atomic Energy Commission of the 
United Nations seemed definitely worse than a year ago… feel the time has come, 
or is coming, when the Prime Minister, or perhaps the Foreign Secretary, should tell 
us exactly how we stand.’ Noble continued; ‘I wonder how many of us … asked 
ourselves how we should defend these islands and the Commonwealth in the event 
of atomic war?’26  Even during these debates, the evidence that the UK was 
developing an atomic bomb capability was mounting, but was not apparently 
connected with the concept of a British deterrent.  Attlee responded only to the 
points on international control and blithely ignored any hint of a British atomic bomb 
project and the defence implications of atomic warfare. 
In the event, the Defence Minister, AV Alexander announced in a response to a 
question about development of the most modern weapons two months later; ‘… all 
types of modern weapons, including atomic weapons, are being developed.’27  
Press coverage of the announcement was muted, hardly surprising since the D-
Notice Committee had spent much of the previous meeting agreeing the terms of 
the new D-Notice 25 that would cover ‘Location and progress of work UK on 
development and production of atomic weapons, their design, size and other 
details, materials used, storage locations, identification of individuals with work on 
atomic weapons’28.  The government sent the D-Notice to the newspaper editors the 
day before Alexander’s statement. 
In the absence of an official atomic narrative, the British public and media had 
simply been using their imagination, fuelled by both fact (mostly from American 
atomic literature) and fiction. 
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The public atomic narrative 
Early in 1946, Father Siemes’s eyewitness account of the aftermath of the attack on 
Hiroshima was published in the Irish Monthly.  It was a miserably objective account 
of destruction, mass-selfishness and, occasionally, individual altruism of survivors.  
It recounted some lucky stories but graphically described a society destroyed to 
extent that civilised behaviour was almost eradicated within days, and a near-
immediate reversion to a state of nature followed;29   
‘Thousands of wounded who died later could doubtless have been 
saved if they had received proper treatment and care, but rescue work 
in a catastrophe of this magnitude had not been envisaged; since the 
whole city had been knocked out at a blow.’30   
It was followed in August 1946 with the publication of Hersey’s book ‘Hiroshima’ in a 
dedicated issue of the ‘New Yorker’; ‘The response was sensational and the text 
was republished in full by several newspapers, ABC radio broadcast a reading of 
the entire text over four nights, and the book version of the text became an 
immediate best seller.’31 
It was less of a sensation in the UK; the Guardian carried a description of the New 
Yorker story on 3rd September, concluding that ‘One hopes that before long all over 
here, and in the world generally, will have the opportunity to read these pages.  Man 
has either to abolish war or to accept Hiroshima’s fate for his own city in the 
future.’32  The BBC broadcast a reading of the text in four episodes on the Third 
Programme on the evenings of the week of 14 October 1946.  The Observer’s critic, 
WE Williams, complained that the programme;  
‘… proved heavy going.  In print [Hersey’s] narrative manages to 
conceal some of its weaknesses – its redundancies of testimony for 
instance and its excessive poverty of language.  The reader’s eye, 
adjusting the mind to such deficiencies, can select what is to be 
skimmed and what is to be pondered.  But a reading aloud, even by six 
voices, denies us this selectivity … I thought the wireless version of 
‘Hiroshima’ inordinately long-drawn-out.’33   
																																								 																				
29 SIEMES, P. T. 1946a. The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima: An Eye-Witness Account. The Irish Monthly, 
74, 93-104. 
30 SIEMES, P. T. 1946b. The Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima: An Eye-Witness Account (Continued). The 
Irish Monthly, 74, 148-154. P151 
31 SHARP, P. 2000. From Yellow Peril to Japanese Wasteland:  John Hersey's "Hiroshima". Twentieth 
Century Literature, 46, 434-452. P434 
32 GUARDIAN. Hiroshima. 3 September 1946, p.4 col 1. 
33 OBSERVER. Travelling Third - Marathon. Observer, 20 October 1946, p.2. 
	 95	
A month later, he complained that; ‘Matters of immense topical interest do not 
necessarily make good radio.’34  It appears that the Observer, although it did 
provide a critique on contemporary coverage of atomic issues, was more interested 
in style than substance.  ‘Hiroshima’ was repeated in one broadcast on the BBC 
Light Programme on 30 November.  Penguin published the British edition of 
Hersey’s book in November 1946, but to considerably less popular reaction than in 
the USA. 
The dichotomy between the bombing of Hiroshima and the results of the Nuremberg 
trials, which concluded in August 1946, was not lost on some of the public who 
wondered how; 
‘… the interests of peace or justice … could ever be served by the 
massacre, in circumstances of unspeakable horror, of tens of 
thousands of defenceless women and children?  … We are … 
continually being told that it is no defence of the soldiers and sailors 
at Nuremberg that they were merely obeying orders; in fact that they 
should have disobeyed orders which were clearly opposed to 
humanity and the laws of war.  What then about the airmen who 
were ordered to drop this token of progress on the nurseries and 
maternity homes of Hiroshima?’35 
These were the same sort of strongly emotive binary moral terms in which in 
parliament in 1939 Lords Mottistone and Strabolgi and, in 1917 Mr Molteno, had 
opposed strategic bombing or reprisals against civil populations, and similarly 
difficult to refute without a complex ethical debate centering on deontological and 
consequentialist precepts. After the experiences of the strategic bombing campaign 
of the Second World War, this was not a debate in which Attlee’s government was 
prepared to enter in 1946. 
Early days of the British nuclear enterprise 
At the end of the Second World War, Britain’s nuclear expertise had resided almost 
exclusively inside the Manhattan Project in the USA.  With the 1946 McMahon Act, 
the US almost immediately inhibited any prospect of information or technology 
sharing with others, including any further exchange with those who had contributed 
to the wartime atomic bomb project.36  There was a significant shortage of specialist 
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scientists and engineers; the British atomic projects were competing against each 
other in the same pool with all other elements of defence research, and those who 
might have been available were put off by the obsessive security restrictions.  This 
secrecy exacerbated further the bureaucratic tensions inherent in the structure that 
had been established by Portal which straddled both the Ministry of Defence (from 
whom the atomic bomb project was completely hidden) and the Ministry of Supply, 
for whom Portal technically worked, although he reported directly to the Prime 
Minister.37  Penney struggled even to recruit draughtsmen and secretaries.38  To say 
that the development of the British atomic bomb had been achieved on a shoestring 
budget would be to assign a rather sanguine interpretation of the resilience of the 
project.  The casting of the plutonium core of the bomb to be tested at Monte Bello 
in 1952 was conducted by the project director who had never cast anything, 
because his specialist had caught the wrong train and they could not wait for him to 
arrive.39   
When the time came to test the British atomic bomb, Churchill (once again Prime 
Minister) was typically adamant about the need for close control of all information 
released:  
‘The Prime Minister said that he would personally approve any 
communiques or statements which it was desired to issue to the 
Press. Apart from these, nothing whatever should be said to the 
Press and nobody should be given any discretion at all to make any 
statement of any kind. In matters of this kind the less said the better, 
and all enquiries for further information should be met with a blank 
refusal.’40   
A government statement was issued in February 1952, only once the convoy of 
vessels involved in the test had departed the UK.  The statement simply said that 
the UK would test an atomic bomb at some point that year, and that the test would 
be in Australia.  The vacuum in public information had led to a flurry of speculation, 
particularly in the foreign press which was unencumbered by the D-Notice system.  
A bomb, however, is only one element of a system; it requires delivery platforms, 
and the personnel to man them. While the decision was being made to pursue a 
British atomic weapon, the only readily available delivery platform options were 
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heavy bomber aircraft. Air Staff Operational Requirement OR229 for a replacement 
for the Lancaster and Lincoln bombers was placed by the RAF in early 1947, with a 
due delivery date of 1957. ‘A medium range bomber landplane capable of carrying 
one 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) bomb to a target 1,500 nautical miles (1,700 mi; 2,800 km) 
from a base which may be anywhere in the world.’41 Although a capability to deliver 
an atomic bomb was not specified in the design, it was implicit.42  As above, the 
usually perspicacious Commons do not seem to have made the connection 
between the small production run of OR229 and atomic weapons.  
The austerity that afflicted the other branches of the armed forces at this time limited 
development and production of these aircraft, and it was 1957 before the first fully 
operational combination of the first UK atomic bomb (Blue Danube) and Valiant 
aircraft of 138 Squadron arrived at RAF Wittering, still in extreme secrecy.  By that 
stage however, technology had advanced; the missile rendered the bomber 
obsolescent as a single strategic deterrence delivery platform, and in October 1957 
the launch of Sputnik very publicly made the point to the West. It was this 
remorseless technological advance, in particular the advent of the hydrogen bomb 
and its seemingly limitless destructive potential that energised a coherent 
opposition.  
The political decision making which led to the British hydrogen bomb project was 
conducted in complete secrecy, with Churchill establishing his own reduced Cabinet 
Committee (GEN 465) to discuss the factors and options. The Committee agreed 
that: 
‘…we should need to get clear the fundamental issues of foreign 
policy and strategy which were raised by the latest developments … 
[including] in the light of the new information about the hydrogen 
bomb, the following points:- 
(i) The likelihood of war. 
(ii) The form which war was most likely to take if it came. 
(iii) the changes which would need to be made in the pattern of our 
defence arrangements, active and passive, in order to adjust them to 
meet the most likely contingency. 
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(iv)  The extent to which we should ensure against the possibility that 
war might take some other form than that which now seemed most 
likely.’43 
In April 1954, the Committee agreed that ‘… Cabinet should at an early date 
consider whether the United Kingdom should embark on a programme of research, 
development and production of hydrogen bombs.’44  In the subsequent Cabinet 
Committee on Defence Policy (DPC; a slightly larger forum, but still not the full 
Cabinet) in May 1954, discussion centred on defence expenditure and discussed, 
against an accepted demand for £200M pa reductions in defence expenditure, the 
Hydrogen bomb project expenditure.  Churchill summed up:   
‘… influence depended on possession of force.  If the United States 
were tempted to undertake a forestalling war, we could not hope to 
remain neutral. … If however we were able to show that in a few 
years’ time we should be possessed of great offensive power, and 
that we should be ready to take our part in a world struggle, he 
thought it would not be impossible to reconcile reductions in defence 
expenditure with the maintenance of our influence in world 
councils.’45 
Cabinet agreed on 22 March 1954 that;  
‘(a) A general statement on the strategic importance of the hydrogen 
bomb would certainly provoke a demand for a full debate.  (b) It was 
desirable that, at the appropriate moment, the public should be made 
aware of the full implications of the development of the hydrogen 
bomb. But the timing of this disclosure should be carefully judged.’46   
Although Cabinet was discussing hydrogen bomb issues in extreme secrecy, in 
March 1954 the US publicly announced the detonation of the first weaponized 
hydrogen bomb, the Castle Bravo test.47  The announcement, accompanied with 
graphic photographs of the first hydrogen bomb test which had been conducted in 
1952, caused an upsurge of interest in nuclear weapons.  The Daily Mirror carried a 
front page photograph of the explosion under the headline ‘The Monster’.  On the 
centre pages the headline was; ‘The Horror Bomb’ and the leader read;  
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‘… The ball of death, poised on a stem of fire, has thrust through the 
clouds to 40,000ft - half as high again as Everest, the world's 
highest mountain.’  It continued; ‘… there was left a crater three and 
a half miles across and 175ft deep, big enough to hold a seventeen 
storey building.  Everything within three miles of the explosion was 
completely wiped out.  Damage was 'moderate' up to seven miles 
away.  'Light' damage was recorded up to ten miles.  … Scientists 
say that a bomb detonated 2000ft above a city would create a much 
greater area of total damage..’48 
The initiative for proactive engagement over a public announcement had been lost. 
Crossman (Labour MP and diarist) noted on 6th April 1954, ‘Actually of course the 
American bomb has been manufactured since 1950 and the announcement that the 
Russians had detonated theirs occurred on August 8th last year.  But it's only during 
these last ten days that the country has become H-bomb conscious…’49  Macmillan 
noted that; ‘It is obvious that there is tremendous interest, almost panic,  in many 
parts of the world, about the Hydrogen Bomb.’50  This was the only time prior to 
2017 that the Doomsday Clock had been advanced to 2 ½ minutes to midnight.51 
Under the headline ‘Churchill Confesses’ the Daily Mirror pilloried Churchill’s prior 
UK knowledge of the hydrogen bomb tests and reported that; ‘… last night about a 
hundred [Labour MPs] put their names to a motion demanding government steps to 
OUTLAW THE BOMB and to BAN FURTHER EXPLOSIONS’ and asserted that 
there were;  
‘… murmurs of protest from the Labour side when Sir Winston 
replied that if such a request would lead to these results, we ought 
to be careful about asking the question.’’52 
The Labour Party called an adjournment debate in Parliament, ostensibly to support 
an immediate summit with the UK, USA and USSR to discuss means to control 
hydrogen bomb development, and Attlee provided a generous and bi-partisan 
speech which was well-received by the House, albeit challenging the assumption 
that the hydrogen bomb was a deterrent to war on the basis it was too powerful.  
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But Churchill resorted to a rather churlish attack on Labour’s record.  Macmillan 
noted;  
‘The press has been bad - though not quite as bad as I feared.  The 
D Telegraph loyal; the Times insufferably pontifical; the Express and 
Mail in full support; the Chronicle and M Guardian fair; the Daily 
Mirror vile.  Yet with all the criticism, I feel that the main strategic 
purpose has been secured.’53 
In May, the Chiefs of Staff reported to the DPC that;  
‘…the world situation has been completely altered by recent progress 
in the development of nuclear weapons.  … A provisional estimate of 
the effect of 10 bombs dropped one each on 10 selected cities in the 
United Kingdom indicates that, … the death roll would be [between] 5 
millions [and] … 12 millions … Our defence system within the 
foreseeable future will not be able to provide the complete protection 
necessary against air attack employing weapons of mass destruction. 
… We must be prepared for the United Kingdom to receive such 
damage from nuclear bombardment in the opening days of a war that 
it cannot continue to function as a main support area.’54 
It was July before Churchill actually informed the full Cabinet that Britain had 
already embarked on the development of the hydrogen bomb; the reaction of the 
Cabinet was to walk out:  
‘[Churchill] told us that the decision had been made to make the 
hydrogen bomb in England and the preliminaries were in hand.  Harry 
Crookshank at once made a most vigorous protest at such a 
momentous decision being communicated to the Cabinet in so 
cavalier a way, and started to walk out of the room.  We all did the 
same and the Cabinet broke up - if not in disorder - in a somewhat 
ragged fashion.’55   
Cabinet reconvened the next day and the minutes record that; ‘The Cabinet 
resumed their discussion of the question whether our atomic weapons programme 
should be adjusted as to allow for the production of thermo-nuclear bombs in this 
country.’56  Macmillan’s diary records;  
‘We began on the Hydrogen Bomb.  PM said that only the first 
preliminaries were decided.  It was, we recognised, a hideous 
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decision.  … A short but valuable discussion followed.’57 
The main discussion points raised included;  
‘… additional financial commitment …Was it morally right that we 
should manufacture weapons with this vast destructive power?  There 
was no doubt that a decision to make hydrogen bombs would offend 
the conscience of substantial numbers of people in this country. … 
The point was again made that there was no difference in kind 
between atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons; and that, in so far as 
any moral principle was involved, it had already been breached by the 
decision of the Labour Government to make the atomic bomb.  It was 
also argued that the moral issue would arise, not so much on the 
production of those weapons, but on the decision to use them: … if 
we were ready to accept the protection offered by United States use 
of thermo-nuclear weapons, no greater moral wrong was involved in 
making them ourselves. 
… No country could claim to be a leading military Power unless it 
possessed the most up-to-date weapons; and the fact must be faced 
that, unless we possessed thermo-nuclear weapons, we should lose 
our influence and standing in world affairs.  
… Doubt was expressed about the feasibility of keeping secret, for 
any length of time, a decision to manufacture thermo-nuclear 
weapons in this country.  It was therefore suggested that thought 
should be given to the question of how a decision to manufacture 
these weapons should be justified to public opinion in this country and 
abroad.’ 58 
These key questions would inform policy development for the remainder of the 
1950s.  The defence budget was under perpetual strain, as described above, and 
the cost of nuclear weapon development has been a significant factor and point for 
debate ever since.  The moral question was raised formally in Cabinet for the first 
time, although clearly the Ministers and officials felt it keenly.  Indeed, the Cabinet 
Secretary’s notes of the meeting record; ‘PM: Must take a decision in principle; not 
necessarily today; doesn’t depend on technical detail; mainly a moral question.’59  
Macmillan had noted in his diary that; ‘... Churchill broods a good deal about the 
atomic and hydrogen bomb.  The destructive power of the latter is frightful.  All 
London in one night.’60  This moral reasoning appears to have been deeply personal 
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and not deliberately informed through any engagement with independent 
philosophers. 
The implications for British influence in the World were clearly articulated, and 
sustained the belief that nuclear weapons conferred status that would otherwise be 
denied to the UK.  The Chiefs of Staff reported;  
‘The danger that the United States might succumb to the temptation 
of precipitating a ‘forestalling’ war cannot be disregarded.  In view of 
the vulnerability of the United Kingdom we must use all our influence 
to prevent this;’61  
This is a clear indication of the genuinely strategic implications of this oft-derided 
motive for an independent British nuclear deterrent. 
The Cabinet endorsed the plan to continue development of an independent British 
hydrogen bomb and the British project was announced to the House in March 1955.  
In the meantime, work had begun to address some of the issues raised by the 
hydrogen bomb threat.  The COS report in May had highlighted that; 
‘A small number of the latest nuclear weapons can achieve a 
devastating effect … Moreover, during the next decade, means of 
delivery against which there is no foreseeable defence will be 
developed.  These two factors are creating a new military situation 
which will reduce progressively the value of certain conventional war 
preparations and weapons.’62  
Informed by this paper, the DPC reviewed the strategic assumptions underlying the 
current defence policy and the scale and pattern of military (and civil) defence 
programmes.  The DPC concluded ‘Our primary aim must be to prevent a major war. 
To that end we must strengthen our position and influence as a world Power and 
maintain and consolidate our alliance with the United States.’63   
To that end, the DPC proposed 15% cuts to the army and navy, and changes to the 
air defence structure of the RAF.  It then continued:  
‘The policy outlined in this report will clearly need most careful 
presentation to the public. Many people are preoccupied with the 
destructive power of the latest atomic weapons. Fewer perhaps have 
yet recognised that the development of these weapons may have 
made major war less likely. The public as a whole will therefore find it 
difficult to understand why, as the destructive power of air attack 
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increases, we propose to cut down our fighter and anti-aircraft 
defences and reduce the scale of our expenditure on Civil Defence. 
These and other changes recommended in this report certainly could 
not be defended in isolation. Public acceptance of them can only be 
secured if they are presented as parts of a coherent plan based on 
the recognition that no purely defensive policy could ensure the safety 
of these islands and those who live in them and that the main weight 
of our defence effort must now be concentrated on building up the 
deterrent strength which will prevent the outbreak of a major war.’64   
The report could not have been more explicit on the need for a coherent public 
engagement plan and it proposed a special Defence White Paper in the autumn of 
1954 in order to present a full statement of the new defence policy as a whole.   
The DPC report also highlighted the issues associated with civil defence in the 
event of a nuclear attack.  It pointed out that;  
‘We cannot assume that it will be possible to maintain central 
government control from London … [we] should devise alternative 
means of maintaining the essential machinery of government with 
maximum flexibility and devolution … It will not be realistic to attempt 
to provide shelter for the civil population … except for certain priority 
classes, no considerable section of the population could be moved 
from the main target areas … plans should aim at maintaining 
skeleton services without relying on the repair of the extensive 
damage that must be expected …’65 
The Joint Intelligence Committee and GEN 465, under the guidance of the Cabinet 
Secretary, commissioned a study to consider the effects of a nuclear attack on the 
UK, a requirement that was endorsed by Macmillan and Churchill in December 
1954.66 
This report (known after its author as the Strath Report), painted a bleak picture of 
the British state after a nuclear attack: 
‘In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the 
same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control 
would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander 
would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the 
administration of government. He would, if called upon, exercise his 
existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, 
he considered necessary to restore order. He would have to direct the 
operations of various civil agencies, including the police, the civil 
defence services and the fire service. In areas less badly hit the civil 
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authorities might still be able to retain control but only with the support 
of the armed services.’67 
The importance of this report for Defence Planning is difficult to over-emphasise.  
The phenomenon of the failure of civil society was abbreviated to ‘breakdown’ and 
became the object of very highly classified study in itself:  
‘…breakdown might be defined as occurring when the government of 
a country is no longer able to ensure that its orders are carried out.  
This state of affairs could come about through breakdown of the 
machinery of control … or through through the breakdown of 
morale.’68   
At the very highest levels of discretion and secrecy, it informed decision-making in 
Whitehall, but was never disseminated further.  Despite the very clear DPC 
recommendation, no public engagement was undertaken.  In particular, the Strath 
report was not distributed to the Local Authorities where it was assumed that it 
would stimulate questions about shelter policy and evacuation, which the 
government was ill-equipped to answer.69  Defence planning continued to develop 
nuclear deterrence as the core of British defence policy, culminating in the Sandys 
Defence review of 1957.  The Strath Report, which in effect, went underground in 
Whitehall, drove expenditure away from civil defence - what was the point? - and 
was very influential for decades to come.  As described above, the issues Strath 
had described so graphically were central to Peter Watkins’s film The War Game a 
decade later, but remained a truly wicked issue for government.  The Thatcher 
government was to run afoul of the exactly those issues nearly 30 years later; and 
to a very great extent, they remain pertinent today. 
Early Opposition 
There had been ‘peace’ movements in Britain since the end of the First World War.  
They tended to be small and regional but came together in their opposition to the 
strategic bombing campaign of 1943-45.  Although the post-war Labour Party in 
government had commissioned the British atomic energy project, it was 
fundamentally split on the issue of atomic weapons, a division that surfaced as one 
of a number of issues which became characterised by the Bevanite/ Gaitskellite 
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divide after the party’s defeat in the general Election of 1951.70 The Peace Pledge 
Union (PPU) established a non-violence commission ‘to study and discuss the 
possibility of direct action to seek withdrawal of American forces, stoppage of the 
manufacture of atomic weapons in Britain, withdrawal of Britain from NATO, and 
disbandment of the British Armed Forces.’71  Although the PPU itself achieved little 
public traction, a number of these groups started to cooperate and the National 
Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT) managed to draw 
together a number of regional groups opposed to nuclear testing.  Opposition within 
Parliament to manufacture and possession of atomic weapons was not really 
organised until the debate about the British hydrogen bomb in 1954 which led to the 
Hydrogen Bomb Committee:  
‘This was not specifically unilateralist; it was an attempt to see 
nuclear weapons as a problem of foreign policy.  …  It later led to 
CND, however and at that time I felt that British renunciation of 
nuclear weapons would not of itself contribute to the solution of the 
problem.’72 
This movement was lent momentum by the Suez Crisis and the invasion of 
Hungary, and it was given specific focus by the prevalence of nuclear weapons in 
the defence policy announced in the Sandy’s Defence Review of 1957.  The Labour 
Party struggled to define its position on atomic weapons.  Bevan, a committed 
campaigner for unilateral disarmament, sponsored a motion at the 1957 Labour 
Party Conference calling for unilateral action to end the British atomic weapons 
programme.  In the event however, in a now infamous volte-face, when it came to 
the conference, he actually said:  
‘I know that you are deeply convinced that the action you suggest is 
the most effective way of influencing international affairs. I am 
deeply convinced that you are wrong. It is therefore not a question 
of who is in favour of the hydrogen bomb, but a question of what is 
the most effective way of getting the damn thing destroyed. It is the 
most difficult of all problems facing mankind. But if you carry this 
resolution and follow out all its implications and do not run away 
from it you will send a Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, 
naked into the conference chamber.  Able to preach sermons of 
course; he could make good sermons.  But action of that sort is not 
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necessarily the way in which you take the menace of this bomb from 
the world …’73 
Bevan’s motives remain the stuff of historiographical debate.  In the event, ‘it was 
his ghost which would continually return to haunt the relationship between Labour 
and CND throughout the next thirty years…’74 
The day after Bevan’s speech, the USSR launched Sputnik 1, demonstrating 
missile technology that almost instantly made Britain’s bomber-based atomic 
deterrent obsolescent.  In December 1957, Harold Steele, a Quaker backed by the 
‘Direct Action Committee’ (DAC), tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the first British H 
Bomb test.  The DAC established an objective of non-violent civil disobedience, and 
after successful demonstrations at potential missile bases, their first major project 
was a march from London to Aldermaston, planned for Easter 1958. 
The 1957 Reith Lecture Series titled: ‘Russia, the Atom, and the West’75  was given 
by George Kennan, ex-US Ambassador to Moscow.  It was an examination of 
contemporary strategic factors, and as with any complex argument, the points 
Kennan made were deeply nuanced and interrelated.  Selective quotation could, 
and did, support less scrupulous arguments for either side of the disarmament 
debate.  But the public was able to listen to the full series, and make up its own 
mind; potentially fully informed of the issues. 
The government simply did not engage with the CND movement and although set-
piece events such as the Aldermaston marches seized the popular imagination at 
the time, their impact on opinion was not long lived, and nor was there much 
political momentum generated.  The Times, in an unusual editorial, considered that;  
‘The nation is engaged on a great debate.  It is a debate on 
fundamental issues … the outcome of which, it can for once be said 
without extravagance, depends our civilisation. ...  Only if there were a 
sudden wave of hysteria, or a complete national loss of judgement, 
could any future enemy or present ally fail to see the essential 
determination of Britain.  The temper of the great national debate is, 
therefore, all important.  It is not a debate to be carried on with 
histrionics or dramatics.  And let it be said that Mr MACMILLAN, Mr 
GAITSKELL, Mr BEVAN and other political leaders have brought to it 
a seriousness and purpose that has lost nothing by remaining quiet.’76 
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In March 1958 the Home Secretary, Butler, appeared on BBC’s investigative 
television programme ‘Panorama’ to discuss Soviet Nuclear testing.  As the Times 
put it; ‘He exposed himself to a crossfire of questions from five accomplished 
controversialists who bitterly oppose the Government’s basing of defence policies 
on the big bombs...’77  Already, television was portraying this complex issue in a 
manner designed at least as much to provoke dramatic argument on camera as to 
elicit public understanding of the issue. 
The Executive Committee of what became CND met in Jan 1958.  The first meeting 
was held a month later in Westminster Hall.  Although the meeting had been noted 
in the Times diary page78 and was very well attended, it was not reported in the 
Press.  After the resounding success of this inaugural meeting, the executive 
committee revised its initial policy statement and published;  
‘...  We shall seek to persuade the British people that Britain must: 
a) renounce unconditionally the use or production of nuclear 
weapons and refuse to allow their use by others in her defence; 
b) use her utmost endeavour to bring about negotiations at all levels 
for agreement to end the armaments race and to lead to a general 
disarmament convention; 
c) invite the cooperation of other nations, particularly non-nuclear 
powers, in her renunciation of nuclear weapons.’79 
From the start of the movement, there was a tension between the executive of the 
CND which was convinced of the need to influence the political process through the 
conversion of the Labour Party to a unilateral disarmament position, and many of 
the ‘rank and file’ and the DAC who saw the ‘movement as essentially extra-
parliamentary.’80  On 4th April 1958, 4000 anti-nuclear demonstrators met in 
Trafalgar Square to march to Aldermaston in a march organised by the DAC and 
blessed by the CND.   The report in The Times the following day was a simple 
record of fact; there was no hyperbole and it was ostentatiously non-partisan.  It 
concluded; ‘The politicians, who have a vested interest in mass movements, have 
been disturbed lately by the signs of an emotional popular approach to the problems 
of nuclear weapons …’81  The Daily Mirror report was more focused on the walkers, 
observing that neither Canon Collins, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo nor Dr Soper (high 
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profile CND activists) had actually completed the march but had remained at home 
and rejoined in Reading.82 
In 1959, 20,000 met the march from Aldermaston at Trafalgar Square in London but 
CND was unable to convert this hard core of activists into a coherent political force.  
The Berlin Crisis of June to November 1961 raised international tension and when 
both the USA and USSR resumed nuclear testing in the middle of the crisis, they 
lent the nuclear war issue a real air of urgency.  Anti-nuclear demonstrators took full 
advantage of this and the non-violent direct action (NVDA) of the Committee of 100, 
a radical group led by philosopher Bertrand Russell, led to 30 of the leadership 
being imprisoned for a month.  In 1962, five of the leaders were imprisoned for 18 
months for breaches of the Official Secrets Act.83 
Arguably, the influence of CND 'peaked' in early 1960. CND's own magazine 
‘Freedom’ called upon activists to ‘make this [the 1960 Easter demonstration] the 
biggest demonstration Britain has ever seen ... In this way we might finally get rid of 
nuclear weapons.’84 The Labour Party Conference of 1960 adopted a resolution 
supporting unilateral nuclear disarmament.  CND General Secretary Peggy Duff 
described the vote as 'one of the highlights of our campaign', whilst John Cox, (later 
CND Chairman), said that : ‘For a while it seemed that CND would soon succeed in 
changing the country's nuclear policies.'85  Driven by a few of the largest Trades 
Unions, against vehement opposition from the leadership and the constituencies, 
there was a serious division within the Labour Party with Gaitskell and Callaghan 
advocating the pro-NATO anti-unilateralism line, and Foot, Crossman and Barbara 
Castle supporting the CND position.  
The combined block vote of the TGWU, AEU, USDAW, NUR and ETU defeated 
two-thirds of the Parliamentary Labour Party and a majority on the National 
Executive Committee, despite Gaitskell's speech which culminated: 
‘What sort of people do you think we are?  Do you think we can 
simply accept a decision of this kind?  Do you think we can simply 
become overnight the Pacifists, Unilateralists and fellow-travellers 
that other people are? ... I ask delegates who are still free to decide 
how they vote to support what I believe to be a realistic policy on 
defence, which could yet so easily have united this great Party of 
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ours, and to reject what I regard as the suicidal path of unilateral 
disarmament which will leave our country defenceless and alone.’86   
After concerted effort on the part of the Labour Party National Executive over the 
next 12 months, the vote was reversed the following year.87  Although the matter at 
hand was the vote for unilateral nuclear disarmament, Crossman was convinced 
that the crux of the issue was more about whether the ‘…Labour party can be run 
by personal or collective leadership.  That's the real issue - not defence.’88 and told 
Gaitskell as much on the night after the vote.  Whether Gaitskell took Crossman at 
his word or not, ironically, the defeat in Scarborough actually strengthened 
Gaitskell’s position as leader of the Labour Party and his overwhelming victory 
against Wilson in the ensuing leadership contest prevented the more left-wing and 
pro-disarmament lobby from attaining executive power or fatally dividing the party 
prior to the 1964 general election.89  In the event, Gaitskell died aged 56 in January 
1963 and was replaced by Wilson. 
The second generation of the British strategic nuclear deterrent  
Throughout the 1950s, British efforts to establish a national atomic deterrent 
capability had progressed, despite significant cost constraints.  There were 
significant technical problems with developing weapon delivery systems on both 
sides of the Atlantic; although the short range British missile ‘Blue Steel’ missile was 
successfully deployed, the longer range missile ‘Blue Streak’ was cancelled in 1960.  
The British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG) was established in July 1959 
to ‘…consider how the British controlled contribution to the nuclear deterrent can 
most effectively be maintained in the future, and to make recommendations.’90  Its 
activities illustrate inter-Service rivalry and ineptitude that would be comic, were it 
not serious.  At the first meeting, the next step identified was to;  
‘get an assessment of the technical possibilities for future weapon 
systems and to consider to what extent their likely operational 
characteristics meet our requirements.   …  (a) missiles launched 
from land sites; (b) missiles launched from submarines or surface 
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craft; and (c) missiles launched from aircraft.  Our enquiry will need to 
cover ballistic and other types of bombardment missiles.’91   
The briefing for Vice Chief of the Air Staff for the October 1959 meeting included an 
exhaustive critique of the Admiralty classification of targets, level of damage, 
missiles on station, serviceability, stockpile, strategic warning, number of 
submarines, costings, communications and navigation, and it concluded ‘Our 
calculations show that up to 14 submarines might be required, not the 9 stated in 
paragraph 8.’92  This appears to have been an early shot in an inter-Service 
competition that would characterise the next 3 years of British nuclear deterrent 
planning. 
The 1959 draft interim report concluded that the programme to replace free-fall 
bombs (Blue Danube) with the air-delivered short range Blue Steel missile would 
remain credible only for a short period.  It would require replacement with one of a 
number of future possibilities; Blue Steel mark II, Blue Streak (longer range ground-
launched ballistic missile), or Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles.  The 
criteria for assessment were: Were missiles required due to the vulnerability of 
manned bombers?  Would ballistic missiles continue to be less vulnerable than 
cruise type missiles?  Would the UK geographic position mean missiles needed a 
mobile platform?  What would be the earliest date by which aircraft or submarine 
systems could be deployed, allowing for assistance from the USA?  Was there a 
gap between this date and the end of service life of the V-bombers, and; if so, were 
underground missiles the right way to bridge the gap? 93  There was then a series of 
separate meetings considering the merits of Polaris, Blue Steel and Blue Streak.  
By April 1960, the group’s revised interim report considered that;  
‘… from the mid-1960s onwards, the only weapons system which 
would give a reasonable assurance of maintaining a significant 
deterrent capability in all circumstances would need to consist of 
ballistic missiles launched from either seaborne or airborne long 
endurance mobile platforms.’94 
With the cancellation of the Blue Streak project because of cost and increasingly 
apparent  vulnerability (silo-based weapons in the UK could not be sited far enough 
apart for survivability against attack without encroaching on built-up areas),95 and 
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subsequent cancellation of the the US ‘Skybolt’ programme, which Britain had 
joined after Blue Streak,96 British plans for an independent nuclear deterrent 
appeared to have been left in disarray. 
There is a view that this public perception (on both sides of the Atlantic) may have 
been managed, rather than real.97  The British government had known since before 
the original agreement that Skybolt was a risk; at the time of signature, it was a 
research and development project, and its cancellation was the termination of that 
project – not an operational US weapon system programme.  The BNDSG had 
been scoping the generic technical requirements for a nuclear deterrent system that 
would remain in service and credible into the 1970s, and invulnerability to surprise 
attack was an increasingly significant factor in the conceptual discussions.98 Since 
Lord Selkirk (First Lord of the Admiralty) had received a briefing on the Polaris 
submarine-launched intermediate range ballistic missile system during a visit to the 
USA in 1958,99 the Royal Navy had been exploring the potential for a submarine-
based deterrent.  The Royal Navy continued to analyse Polaris, generating a 1961 
report by Flag Officer Submarines which suggested the Royal Navy could purchase 
and operate submarines armed with Polaris missiles.  Although finding little support 
amongst the Chiefs of Staff at the time, the report was presented to the BNDSG and 
Defence Ministers.100 
The US government was seeking an operating base for their own Polaris 
submarines on the west coast of Scotland, as part of an overall ‘deal’ for provision 
of US assistance to the British deterrent modernisation.  Macmillan noted that he 
had met with the Chiefs of Staff in February 1960 where they had suggested 
abandonment of Blue Streak in favour of an alternative mobile missile system, the 
most likely option being Polaris.  After consideration, the Chiefs of Staff and 
government decided to continue with air launched systems to exploit the remaining 
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service life of the V-bomber force101 and this culminated with signature of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and USA on 6th June 1960.   
As part of the deal, Cabinet agreed in principle to the provision of the operating and 
maintenance facilities on the Clyde for US Navy Polaris submarines.102  Integral to 
these ongoing negotiations was that: ‘… [UK] proposed to the United States 
government that they should offer us a simple option to buy POLARIS submarines if 
at any time we wished to do so, in return for the facilities we provided in 
Scotland.’103  
Contained with this (very high level) contingency planning, was a consideration of 
the public messaging that would be required if the USN were to station Polaris 
submarines on the Clyde; the main points of concern were the level of control of 
Polaris missile launch that the British government could exert, and a comparison of 
the vicinity of US population centres with nuclear operating and storage facilities.  In 
the event, the US was unwilling to compromise on the control of launch at sea, and 
the Cabinet agreed; ‘…it would be preferable that the proposed public statement 
should not indicate that there could be no certainty of consultation in an 
emergency.’104   
Young considers two explanations for the apparent ineptitude of the British handling 
of the indications of the impending cancellation of Skybolt in 1962, suggesting that 
the UK was either muddled or mischievous; ‘There is clear evidence that London 
was regularly and fully informed about Skybolt’s progress, and had no shortage of 
alternatives, one of which was greatly preferred…’105The ‘mischief’ thesis is that the 
enthusiasm for Skybolt was simulated in order to bring about the eventual supply, 
under conditions of reluctantly- recognised obligation, of Polaris.  This would be a 
very sceptical interpretation of the events of late 1962, which led to the agreement 
in Nassau for the UK to purchase Polaris.  A third alternative would be 
straightforward internecine inter-Service competition in a virtual re-run of the 
debates of the 1930s; with the Royal Air Force holding out for the air-launched 
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Skybolt which would perpetuate the independent striking force nature of the 
Service.   
Certainly, Macmillan gives no hint of a developing crisis in his diaries prior to his 
departure for Nassau, and after the UK/US talks on the subject in March 1960 he 
seems to have regarded Skybolt and Polaris both as viable options;  
‘We have also got out of the Americans a very useful exchange of 
notes about SKYBOLT and POLARIS.  They undertake to let us 
have the vehicles (by sale or gift), we making our own nuclear 
heads.  This allows us to abandon Blue Streak (rocket) without 
damage to our prospects of maintaining - in the late 1960s and early 
1970s - our independent nuclear deterrent.’106  
This rivalry was portrayed in the press in early October; ‘The triform structure of 
Britain's armed forces is being seriously challenged for the first time since a 
separate strategic air arm came into being 45 years ago, and the infighting shows 
signs of becoming savage.’107 The article acknowledged the inevitability of 
obsolescence of an air-launched strategic nuclear deterrent;  
‘The proponents of land-based air power are canvassing the 
ingenious concept of 'patrol aircraft' ...  Naval strategists reply that 
this is simply a device to prolong the Air Force monopoly of the 
deterrent, and that the patrol aircraft would be hopelessly vulnerable 
…’ 108 
This suggests that the Services had resorted to seeking to use public opinion to 
influence this dispute and, ironically, appears to be the only public engagement by 
any official body. 
Confusion and speculation about the fate of Skybolt increased through the autumn 
of 1962: The Defence Correspondent of the Times wrote;  
‘It appears that the Defence Department has decided that Skybolt is 
not strategically worth its probable cost but whether this view is to be 
over-ruled on political or strategic grounds by the White House or 
State Department remains to be seen.  What is certain is that a 
decision of some sort will have to be made soon.’109   
3 days later, on 11th December the Diplomatic correspondent wrote;  
‘These Anglo-American talks in London, it is emphasized, are a 
normal prelude to the NATO meeting this week in Paris, but the 
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discussions between the two Ministers on the future of Skybolt, 
which is now due to pass from the development to the production 
stage, have already stolen all the limelight, even if they do not take 
up all the time at all the talks.’110   
And on 13th December, the Defence Correspondent wrote;  
‘Declarations attributed to the Ministry of Defence that the cancellation 
of the Skybolt programme might mean a radical reappraisal of British 
defence policy have caused no dismay amongst Americans here.’111  
Macmillan noted on 16th December, on the eve of his trip to Nassau, that ‘... I got 
back to a meeting on Skybolt and Polaris which lasted till late in the evening.  We 
shall have a difficult time with the Americans in Nassau.’112  Clearly he was 
expecting to negotiate hard, but the tenor of his thoughts on Nassau suggest that 
rather than the public debate about purchase of American air-launched or 
submarine launched systems, the real debate was about command and control of 
those nuclear forces: 
‘Broadly, I have agreed to make our present bomber force (or part of 
it) and our Polaris force (when it comes) a NATO force for general 
purposes.  But I have reserved absolutely the right of HMG to use it 
indefinitely 'for supreme national interest'.  These phrases will be 
argued and counter-argued.  But they represent a genuine attempt 
(wh Americans eventually accepted) to make a proper contribution 
to interdependent defence, while retaining the ultimate rights of a 
sovereign state.  This accepts the facts of life as they are.  But I do 
not conceal from myself that the whole concept will be much 
knocked about by controversy at home.  The Cabinet (wh [sic] met 
on the Friday morning and was kept fully informed throughout) did 
not much like it, altho' [sic] they backed us up loyally...’113 
The arrangements made by Macmillan and Kennedy at Nassau to enable the British 
purchase of the US submarine launched ballistic missile Polaris were agreed by 
Cabinet on 3 Jan 1963 and the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed in April 1963.  
Macmillan was unsure of the reception his ‘deal’ would receive;  
‘Whether Parliament and the country will think we have well or badly 
I cannot tell yet.  Yesterday's press was quite good (except of 
course Lord Beaverbrook's) Today's (Sunday's) is very bad.  The 
Opposition will attack our whole record on defence … The 'Patriots' 
(led by Lord Beaverbrook and the isolationists) will accuse us of 
																																								 																				
110 TIMES. No Decision Until Bahamas Meeting. 11 Dec 1962, p.10. 
111 TIMES. Skybolt Excluded from US Strategic Plan:  British Defence Policy thrown into the Melting 
Pot., 13 December 1962, p.8, ibid. 
112 MACMILLAN, H. & CATTERALL, P. 2011. The Macmillan Diaries Vol II, London, Pan Macmillan. 
P526 
113 Ibid. P528 
	 115	
'selling out Britain'.  No one will find it profitable to take a fair and 
balanced view.’114   
In the ensuing debate, he was to be proved generally right.  In the meantime, the 
World moved on.  Far from highlighting the dangers of nuclear weapons, the Berlin 
Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to suggest that deterrence worked 
since the superpowers were seen to back away from the ‘brink’ and the compelling 
urgency that had given such an edge to the CND campaign seemed to ebb.  	
Cuban Missile Crisis 
One area where prominent political leadership and careful government public 
presentation of British nuclear deterrence policy and strategy might be expected to 
be uniquely salient would be in the midst of an international crisis with a nuclear 
dimension.  To date, fortunately, there has been only one, and political leadership 
and careful government presentation in the UK were conspicuously lacking.   
The first Macmillan knew of the Cuban Missile crisis was in the evening of Sunday 
21st October, when he received from President Kennedy a short account of the 
serious situation which was developing over Cuba.  This was followed by a visit 
from the United States Ambassador, David Bruce who provided by hand a ‘long 
letter from President Kennedy, as well as a great dossier to prove that … there had 
now been secretly deployed in Cuba a formidable armoury of MRBMS and IRBMs 
which were a pistol pointed at America … and which could not be tolerated.’115  
Having spoken with Home (Foreign Secretary) and Maudling (Chancellor) 
Macmillan spoke with President Kennedy by telephone after his televised 
presidential address to the nation on Monday 22nd October.  The full text of the 
address was published on Tuesday 23rd in most of the British press, with no 
apparent context or input from the British government.   
The Times simply reported the full text of the address, the Daily Express reported 
the speech but also ran front page coverage of the deployment of US forces into the 
Caribbean, the evacuation of families from the US base at Guantanamo Bay, and 
the surprise apparently expressed by members of the Cabinet at the lack of notice 
given to the UK.116  The Guardian also reported the full text under the headline 
‘Soviet Deception on Cuba’ but also ran a front page story; ‘Missile Bases Built up – 
1500 mile range claimed’ and an editorial comment; ‘Caribbean Storm Warning.’117   
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The Guardian editorial wondered why the USSR had built missile bases on Cuba 
and speculated that they may have done so ‘…primarily to demonstrate to the US 
and to the world the meaning of American bases close to Soviet territory.’ 
Cabinet met on the morning of 23rd and considered that the; 
‘…country would expect to be informed at once of the government’s 
reaction to President Kennedy's speech. It was agreed that in any 
immediate comment on the situation Ministers should take the line 
that the government were deeply concerned at the provocation 
presented by Soviet action in Cuba, that they had been kept fully 
informed by the United States authorities, that they would give full 
support to the United States in the forthcoming debate in the 
Security Council and that the United Kingdom representative was 
being instructed accordingly; and that they had no objection to the 
imposition of the blockade since British ships had already been 
instructed not to carry arms to Cuba. … There would be serious 
repercussions in Parliament. The Leader of the Opposition, who had 
been informed of the situation on 21st October, had given no 
undertaking to refrain from condemning the United States action and 
some of his supporters would almost inevitably do so.’118 
Parliament was in recess until 25th October when the Queen’s Speech would open 
the next session.  There was no discussion of a proactive public statement. This 
may be due to a fundamental assumption that informing the country of the 
government’s reaction to Kennedy’s speech was synonymous with informing 
Parliament, and in any case, the government had nothing to say; ‘Summing up the 
Prime Minister said that it was clear that no decision on policy could be taken until 
some firmer indication had been obtained of the probable nature of Mr. 
Khrushchev's reaction to the United States blockade of Cuba.’119  The Foreign 
Office did issue a short statement;  
‘Her Majesty’s government feel deep concern at the provocative 
action of the Soviet Union in placing offensive nuclear weapons in 
Cuba.  Mr Gromyko lately gave the most positive assurance that the 
weapons which the Soviet Union was supplying to Cuba were purely 
defensive.  The Soviet Union has been guilty of deception as well as 
guilty of deliberately opening up a new area of instability.  
Instructions have been sent to Sir Patrick Dean (permanent British 
Representative to the United Nations) to support the American 
request to the security Council that they should make 
recommendations to end this danger.’120   
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As a statement of fact, the Foreign Office statement lacks little, but it leaves the way 
ahead to the imagination of the reader, or the editor. 
In contrast to the restrained and very factual reports of Tuesday 23rd October, 
Wednesday’s Daily Mirror reported under the headline; ‘US Hunts Target No1 – The 
Red Rocket Runner’; 
‘American warships … are lying in wait for the Soviet rocket carrying 
freighter Polotavia’.  Also on the front page, it reported that leave 
had been stopped for all Soviet armed forces personnel, and on the 
back page reported ‘a massive strike force of American jet fighters is 
being assembled here for patrol missions over Cuban waters.’121   
The editorial comment ‘Courage, but is it wise?’ considers that Kennedy has acted 
with great courage over Cuba but then concludes; 
‘What Kennedy has done is to bring the cold war to a head.  Now it 
is Mr Kruschev’s turn to try to frighten us.  He has begun by alerting 
the Red Army.  We shall hear warlike words.  He may take action in 
Berlin. … for although Mr Kennedy had every right to declare a 
blockade, … the repercussions may be world-wide.  If they are, they 
cannot fail to affect us.’122 
On 25th October, Cabinet met once more and decided; ‘…it did not seem that there 
was any action that the Prime Minister could usefully take at the present juncture; 
an early visit to Washington, for example, could easily be misinterpreted as a 
mission of appeasement.’123  There was no discussion on public messaging.  That 
afternoon, Parliament met and Macmillan made a statement to the House simply 
outlining the facts and presenting an oddly ambivalent position of tacit, but not 
explicit, support to the American position.  He advocated support to the UN efforts 
to resolve the situation, but when challenged by Gaitskell, refused to be drawn to 
overt support for the US actions: 
‘In the Security Council, the United States representative has made 
a strong appeal for a resolution which calls for the dismantling and 
withdrawal from Cuba of all nuclear missiles and offensive weapons 
and for international supervision of this process by a United Nations 
Observer Corps. The resolution also urgently recommends that the 
United States and the Soviet Union should confer promptly on 
measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the 
western hemisphere and the peace of the world, and to report 
thereon to the Security Council. … As the House knows, Sir Patrick 
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Dean, speaking on behalf of Her Majesty's government, gave his 
support to this resolution…. The British government are, of course, 
concerned that this new threat to security should be dealt with as 
rapidly as possible and will add their support to any measures which 
genuinely lead to that end. They trust also that, based upon some 
alleviation of the present state of tension, it might be possible to 
move into a wider field of negotiation.’124 
The Cabinet next met on 29th, after the Crisis had been substantially defused by 
Kruschev’s agreement to withdraw the missiles. The Chiefs of Staff did not record 
discussions of the implications of the crisis during October 1962 and the only 
Cabinet meetings were as described above.  The Parliamentary discussion on 
Macmillan’s statement was curtailed by the demand by Black Rod to attend the 
Queen’s Speech; drawing a ribald; ‘To hell with the Lords’ from Jon Rankin (Labour 
MP for Glasgow Govan).   After the prorogation, the debate was not resumed.  
There is a perception in the 21st century that this was a week of near panic in the 
UK with government and public assuming a nuclear war was imminent and 
preparing accordingly.  In the USA; ‘There was some panic. People ran to grocery 
stores and took the bread and the milk and, you know, once the speech was given, 
we all said, 'Oh, my God.' And it was the scariest week of our lives.’125  This is not 
reflected in the contemporary British press; the Daily Mirror reported on Thursday 
25th October that sixth-formers at Midhurst Grammar School held a two-day strike, 
including a ten-minute vigil at the local war memorial. Other public reactions listed 
included a 600-strong CND demonstration outside the American Embassy, student 
protests at Manchester, Hull, Leicester, Birmingham and Swansea, and a Company 
Director who was keeping his children home from school.126  
On the 26th, after reporting the exchanges in the Commons, the Daily Mirror 
commented that; ‘The Cuban crisis has brought the world to the brink of war.  Yet 
there is hope that the shock will inspire Kennedy and Kruschev to negotiate more 
realistically than they have done in the past.’127  The Cuban missile crisis was less 
than two years after the 1960 CND Aldermaston March and the associated mass 
demonstrations, but does not appear to have seized the public imagination, except 
perhaps in retrospect.  In this sense, the lack of government intervention was 
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successful in minimising the domestic impact of the Crisis, but there is no hint in the 
record that this was a deliberate objective. 
Labour Party in government 
By the time of the General Election in 1964, CND was virtually a spent force and 
unilateral disarmament was never really a significant election issue.  The 1961 
Labour Party conference had rejected unilateral disarmament, although it had 
supported ‘…an end to British nuclear testing, as well as no first use of nuclear 
weapons, and abandonment of the British deterrent.’128  Despite a corresponding 
election manifesto commitment, Wilson’s Labour government did not renegotiate the 
Polaris Sales Agreement, although under the Labour government, Britain built and 
deployed only four of the planned five Polaris submarines.   
The 1964 Labour manifesto had stated that; ‘[Polaris] will not be independent and it 
will not be British and it will not deter … We shall propose the renegotiation of the 
Nassau agreement.’129  Wilson instigated a Cabinet Committee to consider Defence 
Policy (MISC 17) which met at Chequers in November in order to consider defence 
policy, which perforce needs must establish the position on the nuclear deterrent.  
This discussion started; ‘Having decided in principle to continue the Polaris 
programme, the major question which faced us … was how to get rid of Macmillan's 
commitment to put the submarines into the [NATO Multi-Lateral Force] MLF,130 
since we were to meet President Johnson in Washington a fortnight later.’131 The 
MISC 17 meeting132 comprised discussion of numbers of Polaris submarines 
already under construction and developed into a consideration of different 
mechanisms of command and control for this force under NATO and national 
arrangements; ‘Instead we would propose the establishment of an Atlantic Nuclear 
Force133 to which we would commit all our nuclear weapons ... Johnson agreed to 
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drop the MLF in favour of the ANF.  Within a year the ANF had also sunk without 
trace, because nobody wanted it.’134  Healey seems to have been surprised that; 
‘…our decision to keep a British nuclear deterrent was never 
contested; opposition focused on our agreement to host the 
American Polaris submarines at Holy Loch.  I had never hesitated to 
justify our policy on nuclear weapons, and had explained NATO's 
nuclear strategy in detail in the House of Commons.’135 
The volte-face on the manifesto commitment on Polaris was carefully wrapped into 
detailed discussion of the Atlantic Nuclear Force at every opportunity.  As Healey 
observed, Wilson was treated surprisingly gently by the Press, even by the 
standards of the time: the Observer considered that; 
‘By committing himself to the principle of an Atlantic Nuclear Force, 
Mr Wilson may have got rid of the albatross of the independent 
deterrent.  But by trying to avoid the unpopularity involved in 
scrapping the Polaris submarine programme, he has denied himself 
the opportunity of also urging the case for accepting America's 
nuclear strength as sufficient protection for Europe…’136 
In the run-up to the 1965 Defence White paper, the Guardian considered;  
‘Are Labour’s first measures - completion of four Polaris submarines, 
the ANF, and the Asian nuclear umbrella - consistent with its election 
pledges?  Some critics have taken them as going in the opposite 
direction.  Why build any Polaris submarines?  The answer is that 
these four must be paid for anyway and that they can help to prepare 
for nuclear interdependence.  … Mr Wilson said that Labour would 
complete any submarines that had gone beyond the point of no return 
- the point that is, at which to cancel or convert them would cost about 
as much as completing them.  Since then the proposal for an Atlantic 
Nuclear Force has been evolved.  …  But does not the ANF in turn 
create extra nuclear weapons?  Is it not a reversal of Labour's 
pledge?  No: it is a step towards the right objectives.’137 
This ‘point of no return’ argument was not in fact true; Healey had been briefed on 
his arrival at the MOD that only two SSBNs were under construction and that all of 
them could be converted to the hunter-killer role at no significant cost.  At Wilson’s 
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request, Wilson, Healey and Walker had kept this from MISC 17.  Healey 
subsequently explained that;  
‘[Healey] thought that in this uncertain world into which we were 
moving, a few Polaris submarines would be worth more than the 
same number of hunter-killers, both because they would give Britain 
more influence, particularly in Washington ...  Moreover their running 
costs would be only £4million a year - about two percent of the 
defence budget.’138   
He had made this argument to the Commons in Opposition in March 1963, before 
publication of the Manifesto and, obviously prior to but not at the MISC 17 meeting 
in November 1964. 
Defence Policy and the withdrawal from East of Suez 
The issue of maintenance of the British position as a world power dominated the 
foreign and defence policy of both Macmillan’s and Wilson’s governments, even as 
they oversaw the retreat from East of Suez.139  Darwin describes this as: ‘… an 
attempt, inevitably muddled and incoherent, to come to terms with a further 
contraction of British world power, an attempt however to stabilise Britain's world 
position to retain its basic elements, not to abandon it altogether.’140   In this, 
possession of nuclear weapons was perceived as a potential surrogate for empire; 
nuclear ownership was regarded by successive governments as a pre-requisite for 
remaining in the front rank of world powers:  ‘The issue is not Europe v East of 
Suez, the problem is whether we are an island off the north-west coast of Europe or 
a world power...’141 
British military commitments in the Middle and Far East were almost continuously 
reviewed during the financially straitened 1960s, and nuclear capabilities were not 
considered as distinct or significant factors. They were simply aspects of existing 
commitments to be assessed alongside other political and strategic issues:  
‘The Akrotiri base [Cyprus] is used for the four Canberra strike 
squadrons which we have declared to CENTO [The Central Treaty 
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Organisation]:142  they are the only CENTO forces with nuclear capability 
and virtually the only forces declared to CENTO other than those of its 
regional members ...’143 
There was no strategic imperative for nuclear weapons specifically in order to 
defend British interests East of Suez, although there had been a discussion in 1965 
in Wilson’s MISC 17 which considered the need to provide nuclear weapons for 
British forces potentially facing a nuclear armed enemy in the Far East (China).  
This concept was dismissed in the feasibility stage when it became obvious that it 
would involve ‘…the whole of our future nuclear policy and [require] further study as 
regards both feasibility and cost in relation to the total defence budget.’144 and ‘to 
suggest any change in our plans now might hamper the development of proposals 
for the control of nuclear forces in Europe.’145  By 1968, having told President 
Johnson ‘At the root of this is a still rather confused groping for the real role that 
Britain ought to be playing in the world,’146  Wilson’s government came down firmly 
on the assumption that; ‘Our standing in the world depended on the soundness of 
our economy, and not on a world-wide military presence.’147  This clearly did not 
allude to the retention of nuclear weapons as status symbols.  It did, however, set 
the tenor of subsequent public strategic discourse, looking towards NATO and the 
defence of Europe as the key defence role, and to ‘soft power’ for Britain’s world 
role. 
The 1970s – Continuous At-Sea Deterrence 
Much of the protest effort and public defence discussion during the late 60s and 
early 70s was focused on the war in Vietnam, with CND developing and using many 
of the tactics of civil disobedience and non-violent direct action that had been 
evolved through the anti-nuclear demonstrations of the 1958-63 period.  The Polaris 
submarines were duly constructed and deployed, with Continuous at Sea 
Deterrence being established at noon on 30th April 1969 when HMS Resolution 
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relinquished ‘Ready’ status to HMS Renown.148  Since then, at least one SSBN has 
been perpetually ‘Ready’. 
In terms of public nuclear policy engagement, the 1970s were a quiet decade, until 
the Soviet deployment of SS20 in 1979, but the evolution of nuclear deterrence 
policy and strategy during that time had been rapid and considerable, and secret 
developments would have significant repercussions for public policy.  As predicted, 
missile technology had rendered a purely air-delivered deterrent critically vulnerable 
to pre-emptive strike (attack on the ground), and the emergence of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) defences had threatened to render the British Polaris system 
incapable of guaranteeing to destroy Moscow’s leadership centres in a unilateral 
strike.  In extreme secrecy, successive governments since Wilson’s had maintained 
Project Super Antelope (later Chevaline) which was designed to enhance the 
payload delivered by British Polaris missiles in order to overcome this shortcoming.  
Such discussions had to remain out of the public eye (indeed, they were kept to the 
very smallest circles even within the Cabinet) because to admit that such a 
development was necessary would call into question the credibility of the 
deterrent.149 
The 1979 Labour Party General Election Manifesto stated;  
‘In 1974, we renounced any intention of moving towards the production 
of a new generation of nuclear weapons or a successor to the Polaris 
nuclear force; we reiterate our belief that this is the best course for 
Britain.  But many great issues affecting our allies and the world are 
involved, and a new round of strategic arms limitation negotiations will 
soon begin. We think it is essential that there must be a full and 
informed debate about these issues in the country before the 
necessary decision is taken.’150   
There was an element of sophistry about the government position during this time.  
In particular, as Lord Owen argues, ‘Callaghan wanted to be more open about 
issues, in ’78 I think, and the Cabinet Secretary argued him out of that position.’151 
																																								 																				
148 During the Cold War, Ready Status meant the SSBN was at a few minutes notice to fire (Quick 
reaction Alert (Nuclear)).  This profile was amended by successive defence reviews after the end of 
the Cold War and the notice to fire is now measured in days, but the Ready SSBN remains in all 
respects prepared to launch within the notice deemed appropriate by the government.  
149 This is a fascinating discussion, based on the premise that in order to deter the USSR, the UK had 
to be able to threaten to destroy Moscow with a unilateral strike.  This ‘Moscow Criterion’ had been 
the benchmark for the credibility of the deterrent throughout the life of the Polaris system, and 
argument about its continued relevance coloured both Chevaline development and discussion about 
the Polaris replacement.  See: STODDART, K. 2008. Maintaining the ‘Moscow Criterion’: British 
Strategic Nuclear Targeting 1974–1979. Journal of Strategic Studies, 31, 897-924. 
150 LABOUR PARTY. 1979. The Labour Way is the Better Way [Online]. London: Labour Party. 
Available: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab79.htm [Accessed 23 Sept 2015]. 
151 LORD OWEN Interview with A Corbett 16 Apr 2015. 
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Discussion within the Cabinet was being pushed by the need to make a decision on 
a replacement for Polaris.   
In 1977, Callaghan had established a ministerial Nuclear Policy Group comprising 
the Foreign Secretary (David Owen), the Defence Secretary (Fred Mulley) and the 
Chancellor (Dennis Healey) to consider the options for replacement of Polaris.  In 
October, that group reached ‘… general agreement on the desirability of 
maintaining an independent UK nuclear deterrent but the view was strongly 
expressed that the criterion on which the effectiveness of our existing deterrent was 
judged - namely its capacity to penetrate the ABM defences around Moscow and 
destroy 40% of the Moscow region - should be re-examined.’152  In a prescient 
move, they also agreed that;  
‘We shall need to take decisions on the renewal or replacement of 
the British [Tactical Nuclear Forces] weapons in the next year or two 
since their present life is limited to the early 1980s.  These decisions 
will be influenced not only by the Alliance's study on the 
modernisation of TNF but will also take account of national factors 
such as the political implications of embarking on a replacement 
programme, costs and availability of scientific resources.  … 
Ministers will not need to take decisions for another year or two.’153 
Faced with the latter recommendation, Ministers decided not to take decisions for 
another year or two. 
In November 1977, the Cabinet Secretary advised Callaghan that it would be 
necessary to consider the following for a replacement for Polaris; 
‘(a) The politico-military requirement (for what purposes would we 
want to have the system?) 
(b)  The main criteria (given the purposes, what must the system be 
able to do?) (The criteria for deterrence are already being studied by 
a group set up, in accordance with Ministers' instructions, to examine 
the continuing validity of the Moscow criterion for the effectiveness of 
the British deterrent.) 
(c)  The main characteristics (how best to do the task, taking account 
eg; of technical and resource factors.) 
Experience suggests that studies and decisions on these basic issues 
could take one or two years.’154  
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154 CABINET OFFICE A06085 Nuclear Matters 28 Nov 77 Loose Minute from Cabinet Secretary to PM  
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Two groups had been set up by the Ministerial group, one looking at the Moscow 
Criterion, headed by the Chief Scientific Adviser to the MOD, Ronald Mason, and 
one looking at technical and system options, headed by Anthony Duff.   
The Foreign Secretary, Owen, felt strongly that a like-for-like replacement was not 
necessary and, with the help of a small think-tank within his Private Office he 
produced an extensive (classified) document for Callaghan’s Nuclear Policy Group 
arguing for a different strategic nuclear deterrent – one based on submarine-
launched cruise missiles.  This challenged the assumptions and recommendations 
of the Cabinet Office studies and Owen felt that he could not have such a document 
produced within by FCO because ‘… they didn’t agree with me and anyhow they 
were all hung up on all that sorts of thing.  I said to him [Callaghan] that I had largely 
put up this in order to have a proper debate.  He was very encouraging.’155  
There was an element of very careful management about the government position 
during this time; the Terms of Reference for the study groups stated;  
‘No decision on the future of the deterrent is needed during the 
lifetime of the present Parliament.  The purpose of this study is to 
examine and report on all the factors which the next Government, of 
whichever political Party, will need to take into account when reaching 
that decision.  Its purpose is solely to provide the basis on which a 
fully informed decision can be taken by the next Government.’156   
Two months later, the Defence Secretary, Mulley (one of three Ministers who knew 
of the Duff and Mason studies), answered Parliamentary Questions on studies into 
missile systems; ‘We have no plans to develop a cruise missile or a successor to 
Polaris. … I have made it clear many times that we stand by the commitment in our 
election manifesto not to proceed with a new generation of nuclear strategic 
missiles.’157  Mulley’s language was very carefully negotiated158 in order to answer 
the questions without appearing to admit to a contravention of the manifesto 
commitment.  In April 1979 Hennessy reported in The Times a;  
‘…private but outspoken dispute with an all-party select committee of 
the Commons by his refusal to permit serving officers, civil servants 
and government scientists to give evidence about the options for a 
third generation British nuclear deterrent to replace the Royal Navy’s 
Polaris submarine squadron.’159   
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This tight control of the knowledge of the existence of the Duff and Mason studies 
had no basis in security, merely in the presentational difficulties these studies would 
have caused for the Labour government. 
Callaghan’s government laid competent groundwork for the continuation of the 
British strategic nuclear deterrent.  This was completed, in violation of the spirit, if 
not the letter of the manifesto commitments on which it had been elected.  In 
particular, the commissioning of the Duff and Mason Studies was a significant move 
‘towards the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons or a successor to 
the Polaris nuclear force’ and the debates engendered by Owen’s Cruise Missile 
papers tested many of the assumptions that informed the case for Trident; but the 
wider Cabinet, and the public, was perforce ignorant of these developments.  
Similarly, in what could have been presented as a coup for British defence on a par 
with Macmillan’s Polaris negotiations, Callaghan had agreed in principle to the sale 
of the US Trident C4 system on similar terms with President Carter during their 
meeting in Guadeloupe in January 1979, but was unable to announce this during 
that Parliament.  Owen was certain that had Labour won the 1979 election, 
Callaghan would have moved to replace Polaris with Trident:  ‘…he definitely 
wanted to keep the nuclear deterrent and he would have argued, as Prime Minister 
that we should do Trident and he told me really that he felt that the weakness in my 
case was that … we couldn’t have a deterrent that was based on unproven 
technology.’160 
Much like Wilson’s government 15 years earlier, Callaghan’s government had been 
elected on a mandate not to evolve the next generation of the British strategic 
nuclear deterrent, yet once in office both had identified pressing imperatives that 
required the reversal of this position.  Wilson appeared able to do so relatively 
openly, although it required some terminological inexactitude on the status of the 
Polaris submarines to do so.  Callaghan’s government maintained the strictest 
secrecy over the Duff and Mason Studies, and exploited very carefully worded 
statements in public and Parliament in order to sustain the fig leaf of the 1974 
manifesto commitment.  The 1979 Labour Manifesto opened the way for a 
successful Labour government to exploit the activities of Callaghan’s cabinet 
committees; ‘We think it is essential that there must be a full and informed debate 
about these issues in the country before the necessary decision is taken.’161
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Chapter Six:  The Decision to replace Polaris 
Initial discussions on Trident  
Mrs Thatcher’s government was elected in May 1979 with a manifesto pledge to 
make significant increases in the level of defence spending:  
‘During the past five years the military threat to the West has grown 
steadily as the Communist bloc has established virtual parity in 
strategic nuclear weapons and a substantial superiority in 
conventional weapons. Yet Labour have cut down our forces, 
weakened our defences and reduced our contribution to NATO. And 
the Left are pressing for still more reductions. … The SALT 
discussions increase the importance of ensuring the continuing 
effectiveness of Britain's nuclear deterrent.’1 
The Conservative government decision on ‘ensuring the continuing effectiveness’ of 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent was substantially informed by the Duff-Mason report 
which, exceptionally, Callaghan had instructed to be handed over to the incoming 
Prime Minister.  Mrs Thatcher also received private assurances from President 
Carter that he would honour the arrangement he had come to with Callaghan in 
which the USA would be prepared to negotiate the sale of Trident C4 with MIRV 
technology, but Carter wished this kept private until SALT II was ratified.  The 
decision for the replacement of Polaris was managed by yet another small group of 
Ministers (MISC 7), once more in extreme secrecy from both public and the 
remainder of the Cabinet; in his initial briefing on the handling of nuclear deterrence 
matters, the Cabinet Secretary asked Mrs Thatcher if she ‘propose[d] to confine it to 
yourself and the three Departmental Ministers directly concerned?’2  She did.  
Simultaneously, the government was establishing its position on the Long Range 
Tactical Nuclear Forces and the SALT II treaties which were key to NATO’s evolving 
nuclear strategy. 
SALT II was a bilateral arms control agreement between the USA and USSR, and 
the UK’s interests were mostly in ensuring that the agreement neither included 
British weapons in the totals, or inhibited transfer of nuclear technology form the 
USA to UK.  Early advice to Pym (now Secretary of State for Defence) on the Long-
Range Tactical Nuclear Forces suggested that; 
‘… a deployment of GLCMs in the UK could well offer an additional 
focus for demonstrations by CND-style and perhaps 
environmentalist critics.  This likelihood, and the desirability of 
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2 CABINET OFFICE Memorandum (Hunt (Cabinet Secretary) to Prime Minister) A09454 'The Future of 
the Deterrent' dated 4 May 79. TNA 19/14. 
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keeping its impact to a minimum, must feature among the factors 
affecting the selection of sites and planning of dispersal patterns 
and any off-base exercises.  (We would also need to have it in mind 
in framing a public presentation of decisions, for example perhaps in 
stressing Vulcan replacement rather than dramatic novelty.)’3  
Pym seems not to have taken this advice to heart;  
‘His reaction was not quite that he saw no difficulty, but that he saw 
none of an order which should be allowed to deflect us from a 
GLCM deployment if that was otherwise clearly the right course on 
the grounds of national security.’4   
As will be shown below, Pym was in fact convinced that the public would need to be 
educated about the case for the replacement of Polaris, but his successes were 
limited and the challenges manifold. 
Cabinet Office preparations for Mrs Thatcher’s first MISC 7 on 24th May 1979 
emphasised, on the one hand, the absolute imperative for secrecy, and on the 
other, the need to consult more widely in order to further inform the decision.  The 
initial briefing by the Cabinet Secretary (John Hunt) to the Prime Minister on the 
nuclear deterrent outlined the history of the Polaris force, its vulnerability to the 
evolving ABM systems, and the Chevaline project, including its £935M cost.  It 
considered the ongoing UK/US collaboration on the Polaris project and predicted 
that the missiles, systems and submarines will remain sound until the mid-1990s.    
'... it should therefore be possible to maintain the present force in 
operation until the mid-1990s, albeit with increasing costs and 
technical problems, ...  If we are to develop a successor system, it will 
need to enter into service by the mid-1990s.'5   
In his follow-up briefing, Hunt succinctly elaborated the key themes of the Duff 
Mason report and highlighted the key decisions necessary.  He also observed that 
the;  
‘… general approach is on orthodox lines, but it represents an 
attempt, for the first time in recent years, to work out a concept for the 
United Kingdom deterrent.  ... Given the context in which the study 
was commissioned, the absence of any conclusions is deliberate; the 
intention was to provide Ministers with arguments on either side of the 
basis of which they could reach a decision in principle.’6  
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4 Ibid. paragraph 2 
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This clearly suggests that the Cabinet Office viewed the key decisions about Polaris 
replacement as not technical in nature, but intensely political.  Hunt then explicitly 
linked the technical with the political; '... what constitutes unacceptable damage and 
thus what would deter attack on the United Kingdom are essentially matters of 
political judgement.'   He described the close linkage between the targeting 
requirement (Chevaline was procured to meet the perceived need to be able to 
threaten Moscow),7 necessary performance criteria and therefore cost; 'The cost of 
continuing to provide this capability in a successor system is likely to be very high.'8    
It is in Hunt’s paper that the close link between highly classified nuclear targeting 
considerations, and public statements about policy and system procurement are 
first highlighted for the Conservative government. 
Discussion of the Polaris Successor continued throughout the Autumn in MISC 7, 
with the main issues being technical.  Although there was no debate in the 
committee about whether the UK required a nuclear deterrent, there was a very 
pertinent exchange debate between Mrs Thatcher and Hunt’s replacement as 
Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, in her preparations for a November meeting 
of MISC 7.  In his initial preparatory briefing for the PM for this meeting, Armstrong 
had written:  
‘In considering this report I believe that the Ministerial Group will wish 
to concentrate on three questions.  These are:- (a) Should there be a 
British strategic nuclear deterrent in succession to Polaris? … ’  Mrs 
Thatcher noted by hand on the brief; ‘We have decided there should.’9   
Despite this definitive clarification, Armstrong’s subsequent briefing on suggested 
conduct of the meeting returns to the issue repeatedly, suggesting he views it as an 
important aspect of the decision; and it is worth considering in substance;  
‘This is a key meeting.  The likely decisions will affect our most 
important means of defence over the next 40 years and thereby the 
basis of our international military posture … 
2.  …  The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for 
Defence have (I understand) reached effective agreement on the 
formula proposed by Sir John Hunt ... under which the Defence 
																																								 																				
7 For detailed consideration of the ‘Moscow Criterion’ and its impact on nuclear deterrence policy in the 
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Nuclear Weapons 1976-1983, Palgrave Macmillan., BAYLIS, J. & STODDART, K. 2012a. The 
British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Status (Part Two). Diplomacy & 
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Budget … to 1983-83 is fixed at the (lower) Treasury figures and the 
cost of replacing Polaris is treated as a charge on the Contingency 
reserve.  This will not have been reported to the Cabinet by 5th 
November.  ... 
3.  You may wish to conduct the meeting in three stages: 
(i) Procedural points 
(ii) The answers to the three questions in my minute of 29th October -  
(a) Do we retain our strategic deterrent? 
(b) What should it be capable of doing? 
(c) Which weapon should we choose? …. 
5. Your Luxembourg speech made pretty clear that we could continue 
with our deterrent after Polaris; and it was MISC 7's starting point, at 
its first meeting in May, that the Government was fully committed to 
doing so.  But the Chancellor was not invited to that meeting; and the 
seriousness of the issue is such that your colleagues should at least 
be invited to reaffirm that we do wish to stay in what is, for us, a pretty 
big league. Mr Pym could be invited to begin, on the basis of his 
paper.   
6.  That paper deals summarily with the question, on the basis of 
previous discussion.  Are you content to do that?  Or do you want to 
invite the Committee to go over the fundamental questions again?  
[Mrs Thatcher in hand wrote ‘NO’ against this question] I suppose 
these questions are: What good has it done us so far to be in the 
strategic deterrent league?  Given the decline in our world position in 
other respects, will it do us enough good to stay in the league from 
the 1990s to justify the cost of the burden this programme represents 
in the meantime?  How important is it for us, and for our NATO Allies, 
that we should continue to maintain our own strategic deterrent 
capacity?  How conceivable is it that we may want to use, or to able to 
threaten to use, a British strategic deterrent independently of the 
United States, either in our national interest or in that of the NATO 
Alliance?  In terms of cost-effectiveness as a contribution to our own 
and our Allies’ security, is this preferable to use of a corresponding 
amount of resources on more conventional weapons?  ... I suspect 
that answer to all these questions is in effect that, having been in the 
league for thirty years, it is inconceivable for a Government committed 
as this is to the maintenance of national defence to take a decision 
which would irrevocably take us out of that league.  But it may still be 
right to have asked, and agreed upon answers to, questions of this 
kind.’10 
At paragraph 2, Armstrong draws attention to the financial manipulation that was 
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required to obscure necessary ‘long lead’ financial commitments for the Polaris 
successor from Cabinet.  Such ‘economy with the truth’11 was not new; after all Mrs 
Thatcher’s government had inherited the Top Secret Chevaline programme and its 
huge (and as yet undisclosed) budget, but the suggested use of the Contingency 
reserve would perpetuate this ‘economy’ within Cabinet and, by extension, 
Parliament that had characterised British nuclear policy decision-making since 
Attlee.   
Paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 readdress his basic question – should there be a 
replacement?  Armstrong outlines a series of not unreasonable questions and 
concludes paragraph 6 with the point that even if the answers to these are not in 
fact core to the decision to replace Polaris, the government would do well to have 
articulated the factors and considered how to respond when others (inevitably) 
asked the questions.  These questions were regularly reflected in the increasingly 
polarised discourse on nuclear deterrence for the remainder of the Parliament. 
By early November, MISC 7 discussion was focused on the relative merits of 
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems and submarine launched 
cruise missile (SLCM) systems.  Air launched cruise missiles had been ruled out as 
an option for a strategic nuclear deterrent at the September meeting.12   The 
decision to procure Trident C4 was taken in the delayed MISC 7 meeting in 
December, although the minutes of that meeting remain classified13 and it is not 
clear if Armstrong’s fundamental questions were addressed.  They certainly played 
no part in government preparation for the subsequent parliamentary scrutiny 
processes, nor the public discourse.  A Guardian article of 1 November 1979 ‘UK 
Ready to Buy Trident Missiles’ speculated; 
‘… if Mrs Thatcher and her Ministers do endorse the Trident plan next 
week, its public debate is likely to be vigorous …  The Government is 
bound to be challenged as to why Britain still needs an ‘independent' 
nuclear deterrent, why the Polaris system cannot be modernised and, 
above all, why the deterrent force should not consist of much cheaper 
nuclear armed cruise missiles of the kind we are in any case 
proposing to have based in this country … as part of the collective 
plan to modernise NATO's so-called theatre nuclear weapons.’14   
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The same article stated that a; ‘decision has been taken at the Ministry of Defence 
that Britain's independent nuclear deterrent should be replaced by a fleet of five 
submarines carrying American Trident missiles fitted with British warheads.  A 
recommendation will be submitted next week to a special Cabinet sub-committee, 
chaired by Mrs Thatcher, which is expected to endorse the plan.’15  Outside MISC 7, 
extreme secrecy was being exercised until a decision had been made and publicity 
became inevitable.  Armstrong briefed the Prime Minister on efforts to stem the leak, 
assessing that there was little an able defence correspondent could not have picked 
up, but ‘… What is new, and in the light of President Carter's message extremely 
damaging, is  the reference to the fact that the subject is shortly to go a Committee 
of Ministers ...’16  Negotiations with the US authorities were ongoing throughout the 
Autumn and in August, Wade-Gery of the Cabinet Office led a visit of a small team 
of officials to Washington to agree the outline of the deal with President Carter’s 
deputy National Security Advisor Dr Aaron.   
The guidance on the publicity to be afforded this visit was classified Top Secret UK 
Eyes Alpha.  This was the same classification as the MISC 7 main working papers 
considering detailed UK nuclear policy and capabilities, SSBN patrol reports and 
Polaris targeting instructions.  Top Secret is defined as: the ‘… most sensitive 
information requiring the highest levels of protection from the most serious threats.  
For example where compromise could cause widespread loss of life or else threaten 
the security or economic wellbeing of the country or friendly nations.’17  UK Eyes 
Alpha further limits access to UK nationals only. 
Whilst the UK considered the Polaris Successor in utmost secrecy, NATO was 
dealing with proposals to modernise the Alliance theatre nuclear weapons 
capabilities as a response to the Soviet deployment of SS20 intermediate range 
nuclear missiles into Eastern Europe.  Despite considerably more public debate 
across Europe about the NATO strategy, the British government persisted in 
dealing with these issues as substantially unrelated to the strategic deterrent and 
the Polaris successor decision.18  This myopic insouciance is all the more surprising 
given the advice received from Quinlan (MOD Deputy Under Secretary (Policy)) in 
July and the degree of sensitivity to security aspects of the negotiations for Trident. 
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The NATO Theatre Nuclear Forces issue 
The Soviet Union had begun deploying medium-range SS-20 ground-launched 
ballistic nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe between 1976 and 1978.19 The Soviet 
move was carefully calibrated in order to challenge the cohesion of the Alliance on 
this highly emotive issue and was accompanied by an aggressive Soviet media 
campaign highlighting the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe 
and an offer to reduce tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, if no new NATO 
systems were deployed.  The challenge to Alliance cohesion was readily perceived; 
Pym advised Mrs Thatcher that;  
‘The modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear forces is of high 
importance to NATO defence.  It has moreover become of political 
significance reaching beyond the strictly defence considerations; it is 
now a key test of NATO's collective will to ensure its security.’20   
As the autumn progressed, it became apparent that the Netherlands was 
particularly disposed towards immediate arms control measures based on the status 
quo ante, effectively fixing the tactical nuclear warhead balance at a point that 
included the Soviet SS20s.  This was not a dominant view in the Alliance, but the 
Dutch Parliament openly discussed the issues and the anti-nuclear and 
environmentalist lobbies picked up on the issue.   
NATO’s response options were being considered in the newly formed High Level 
Group (HLG), within which UK and US officials identified that the Dutch position 
would be the key to acceptance of the ‘Integrated Decision Document’.  The US 
deputy National Security Adviser, David Aaron, toured the capitals of the putative 
host nations (UK, Federal Republic of Germany, Holland, Belgium and Italy) 
lobbying for a robust response to the Soviet campaign.  British officials informed him 
that ‘… while public presentation was perhaps less of a problem in the UK than in 
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some other countries, it nevertheless needed to be handled carefully and the 
question of the basing facilities was particularly sensitive.’21  The HLG plan was 
considered by MISC 7 in early December and it was agreed that the Defence 
Secretary would make a statement on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG) to Cabinet on 13th December prior to Mrs Thatcher’s visit to 
Washington on 17th December.  Armstrong suggested that this might be an 
opportune moment to inform Cabinet of the decision to procure Trident, but 
highlighted the American desire for continued discretion.22   In the event, Pym 
reported the NPG outcome to Cabinet, but not the Trident decision.  NATO 
announced the ‘twin track’ decision on 12th December.  US Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance announced; ‘I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable 
achievement and that the free people of the alliance will show overwhelming 
support for the decisions made here today.’23  Vance misjudged European public 
opinion; according to one CND history;  
‘… even as the decision was being announced, 40,000 people were 
gathering at the NATO headquarters in Brussels to protest; the 
antimissile movement turned out to be the greatest wave of protest 
that had taken place in western Europe since World War II.’24   
The CND campaign selectively used information from this speech, disparaging the 
deployment of Pershing II and GLCM as ‘first strike’25 weapons, but ignoring, as 
Vance put it;  
‘The modernization decision that we have made here also makes it 
possible for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In 
addition to this reduction, for each of these weapons we deploy, we 
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will withdraw one existing weapon from Europe. Thus, far from 
increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our decisions will 
result in a significant reduction in the size of NATO's overall nuclear 
stockpile in Europe.’26 
NATO deployment of Cruise missiles, at the same time as the decision to replace 
Polaris, was to prove a demanding period for British nuclear policy formulation. 
Mrs Thatcher met with President Carter in December and verbally agreed the 
outline terms of the arrangement.  The formal exchange of letters was further 
delayed at Carter’s request in order to avoid ramifications for the SALT II treaty 
which was about to be ratified – he was concerned that the USSR would seek 
further concessions if it was announced that the UK would deploy Trident.  
Specifically, he also requested that the proposals should not be put to the British 
Cabinet.  When asked if the negotiations on the exchange could continue in the 
meantime;  
‘Dr Brzezinsky [US National Security Advisor] indicated that this would 
be negotiable, provided that discussion was confined to the same 
restricted group of as had been involved hitherto.  It would not, 
however, be possible for technical discussions to proceed without 
extending the circle of those involved, which the President did not 
want to do.’27,28  
This note was classified Top Secret, and the implicit ramifications of a leak for SALT 
II seem to vindicate that level of discretion, although it does say little for the 
perception of British security that Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff were explicitly 
excluded.  In Spring 1980, there was a further delay to the announcement as the 
US administration sought to avoid perceptions of over-reaction to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.29   
Public engagement 
Pym had long advocated a more open public approach and debate in the Commons 
and an adjournment debate on nuclear defence issues had been scheduled for 24th 
January.  Pym opened the debate by indicating that it was the first such since 1964 
and that he would concentrate on nuclear issues and nuclear policy.  He considered 
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that; ‘the arguments surrounding nuclear strategy neither should be, nor can be, 
taken for granted.  They require constant rethinking and restating, and I feel sure 
that it is right for the House to play its part in that process.’30  Having opened with a 
brief precis of NATO strategy, in a ‘world where nuclear weapons exist’, against a 
‘potential adversary who has built up … a vast – and offensively structured – 
apparatus of military power…’ Pym described NATO’s modernisation programme, in 
particular the need for a modern capability to strike the Soviet homeland from within 
Europe.  He informed Parliament of the decision to base 160 American ground-
launched cruise missiles in the UK, and sketched over the arrangements for political 
control of these missiles.  He covered the UK contribution to NATO deterrence, and 
then described the technical aspects of the systems involved. 
Pym also described the Chevaline upgrade to the Polaris system and, for the first 
time, the £1000M cost was publicly disclosed.  He carefully avoided any reference 
to specific Anglo-American negotiations and agreements, referring only to the 
commitment of the US to cooperate in provision of UK strategic nuclear deterrent.  
In closing, he described the likely costs of replacement of Polaris in language that 
suggested it was an inevitable expenditure; ‘That is, of course, still a massive 
demand on our limited resources, but we must keep it in the perspective of what 
modern defence inescapably costs.’31  When faced with questions, he indicated that 
cruise missiles had been considered and rejected as strategic deterrence options, 
and that there was no fixed timetable for the decision on the Polaris replacement.   
Mr Rodgers, the Labour defence spokesman, mocked the ‘enthusiasm of the then 
Opposition for debating such matters and their lack of enthusiasm as displayed 
since May 1979.’32  He then looked forward to the work of the Defence Select 
Committee in enabling the Commons to have a better-informed debate than would 
otherwise be the case.  Rodgers queried ‘…whether it is wise to replace Polaris at 
all.  To me, that remains an open question which should be subject to debate.’33  
The Labour MP John Cartwright followed this with: 
‘The Secretary of State for Defence put a rather different point of 
view on 18 December. He said, ‘I want the greatest possible 
discussion about the matter.’  … We are left with a gap in our 
information, and that cannot be filled in the time available to the new 
Select Committee on defence. .... The House will fail in its duty to 
the nation if the Government are not pressed to provide the basic 
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information needed to decide whether their judgments are correct.’34 
The Times reported the exchanges under the headline; ‘More Information Must be 
Given’35 though this reflected more the tenor of the debate than an editorial opinion 
at that time.  The Daily Express was more partisan; ‘Maggie’s Cold War – H 
Weapons give boost to Polaris Fleet’36  enthusiastically reporting the increase in the 
capability of the Polaris fleet and the plan to position Cruise Missiles in the UK. The 
Times considered the subsequent House of Lords debate under the headline 
‘Implications of decision to buy Trident’37 and cited six Lords who argued against it, 
including Lord Carver (ex Chief of Defence Staff).  Viscount Trenchard, the Minister 
of State for Defence, was quoted at length, which provided a balanced account of 
the Lords’ debate, but with no editorial comment per se.   
Inevitably, increased public interest and debate ensued, although they were 
substantially unencumbered by government intervention.  In public correspondence 
reminiscent of Spaight’s during the Second World War, the recently retired Chief of 
Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Cameron refuted arguments made against Trident 
by Lord Carver in letters to the Times38 but there was limited government 
intervention in the public discourse. CND had been nearly moribund since the mid 
1960s.  In the late 1970s anti-nuclear opposition had experienced a resurgence in 
interest across Europe, the USA and USSR because of NATO’s discussions about 
tactical nuclear forces and the increasingly bellicose rhetoric of the USSR and USA. 
Regardless of official distinctions, NATO Tactical Nuclear Forces and the Polaris 
Successor were regarded as a single issue by CND. 
The Polaris Successor Decision 
During the Ministerial discussion about how to announce the Polaris Successor 
decision which had been running throughout June and July, there had been an 
extended debate on how much about the decision itself, the nuclear deterrent and 
the Trident system, to reveal publicly.  In keeping with his long standing opinion, 
Pym advocated an official publication which set out as much of the arguments and 
case for the Successor as possible.  Pym’s original draft of a public ‘Open 
Government Document’39 (substantially written by Quinlan) was circulated to the 
Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Chancellor on 10th June.  
																																								 																				
34 Ibid. col 711 
35 TIMES. More information must be given., 25 Jan 1980, p.8. 
36 DAILY EXPRESS. Maggie's Cold War. 25 January 1980, p.1. 
37 TIMES. Implications of decision to buy Trident. 26 February 1981. 
38 CAMERON, A. C. M. 1980. Maintaining Britain's Nuclear Capability. Times, 9 May 1980. 
39 MOD Memorandum Pym (MOD) to Prime Minister MO 18/1/1, 'Polaris Successor' dated 10 Jun 80. 
In: MOD (ed.). TNA PREM 19/417. 
	 138	
Whitelaw responded: ‘My only question is whether in these circumstances we are 
wise to expose as many of the details as you do.  You may feel it is essential.  I do, 
however, have the feeling that in this field it is wise to give as little information as is 
possible.’40  Carrington was generally content but suggested amending the text on 
the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to remain sensitive to the NPT 
Conference later in 198041 and Howe sat on the fence; ‘… I am inclined to wonder 
whether it is really wise to say quite so much.  We would expose a lot of flank.  On 
the other hand, I recognise that Francis Pym is committed to publishing some 
account of the basis for our decision, and to say too little would be counter-
productive.’42  The Prime Minister agreed with Pym’s intent, but also with the need 
to provide rather less information.43   
Obviously the Labour opposition knew that a decision on a replacement for Polaris 
must be looming, even if they knew no details, and regularly pushed for a debate 
prior to any decision. On 10th July 1980, just prior to the summer recess of 
Parliament, The Leader of the House was repeatedly pressed to declare a date for 
a debate on the Polaris Successor, to which he repeatedly responded that he had 
received no request for a debate on nuclear policy. 
Ideally, the announcement was to be timed to enable the formal notification of key 
NATO allies in particular France, West Germany and Italy, once formal agreement 
with the USA have been achieved.  Although the original MOD intent had been for 
the Prime Minister to announce the decision to the House, in the event, she decided 
that the Secretary of State for Defence should make the announcement.44  Despite 
the careful choreography, things did not quite go according to plan.  Early in the 
morning of 15th July, two days before the planned announcement in the UK of the 
exchange of letters, the UK Embassy in Washington reported that the Senate 
Republican Leader, Senator Baker, had informed ABC television that the US 
administration had agreed to sell Trident to the UK.45  In order to avoid the 
embarrassment of having Parliament find out such a crucial decision from foreign 
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media, the timetable for informing Parliament had to be rushed forward, and 
Cabinet needed to be informed beforehand.   
The full Cabinet was therefore informed, in a manner reminiscent of the way Attlee 
informed his Cabinet in 1948 of the effort to build a British atomic bomb, and of 
Churchill’s announcement of the H-bomb project in 1955, on the morning of 15th 
July 1980.  Nott recounted the meeting; 
‘… we were simply informed by the Prime Minister that a decision had 
been taken in conjunction with the Americans to modernise the 
deterrent with the introduction of Trident.  I was shocked that the 
cabinet had neither been given any facts nor consulted on the issue.  I 
protested.  I said that I thought it was an unsatisfactory way of 
conducting the Government's business, not least because this was a 
matter of fundamental national importance.  ... The whole matter took 
up about ten minutes of Cabinet time.’46 
Pym then made the statement to the House, on the afternoon of 15th July and the 
announcement benefitted from the previous careful Cabinet Office planning, 
involving simultaneous briefings of the media, and a side debate among officials 
about whether the MOD needed to have ‘more written material prepared (eg some 
sort of 'Daily Mail' counterpart to the 'Daily Telegraph' style of the Departmental 
Memorandum).’47  Pym’s statement included the cost effectiveness of Trident, UK 
independent operational control, the industrial impact of 70% of the costs being 
spent in the UK, and portrayed Trident as;  
‘an essential reaffirmation of our national commitment to security 
and to co-operation with our allies under the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The United Kingdom's continuing possession of a strategic nuclear 
capability remains a major element in our deterrent strategy, and a 
major contribution to the defence of Western Europe. … It is 
designed solely to preserve peace and to prevent war.’48 
The shadow Defence Secretary, Rodgers, responded;  
‘We have asked, first, for a full and informed debate, which has not 
taken place. … There are those who will say that it could be a 
contempt of the House for the Secretary of State to make an 
announcement of this sort before the Select Committee and the 
House have had the opportunity to discuss the matter. … We believe 
that the case for buying Trident has not been made, and we cannot 
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approve it.’49 
Clearly the Opposition felt that the ability of Parliament to hold the executive to 
account had been circumvented in this case. 
Pym’s Open Government Document ‘The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent Force’ (OGD 80/23) was published in July 1980.  This document was a 
significant break with previous governments’ tendencies to keep official deterrence 
thinking out of the public eye.  It comprised five sections:  The Policy Background 
included an elementary description of NATO nuclear deterrence strategy and the 
unique role of the UK strategic forces in it, in particular, the concept of the ‘second 
centre of decision making’ and the related concepts of credibility of a deterrence 
capability and resolve to use it.  Section II; General Considerations on System 
Choice described the philosophy behind UK targetting policy, and the related 
benefits of an invulnerable retaliatory strike capability (SLBMs such as Polaris and 
Trident).  It then considered the timing and procurement of the Polaris Successor, 
and emphasised the risk and cost benefits of close cooperation with the USA.  
Section III; System Options considered the various options that were potentially 
available; air-launched cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles and 
various SLBM, including Polaris with a further Chevaline-style life extension 
programme, collaboration with the French SLBM programme, Poseidon and Trident.  
It starts with an objective assessment of the pros and cons of the available 
platforms and concludes; ‘For all these reasons, nuclear propelled ocean-going 
submarines remain the best launch platforms for a British missile force.’50  The next 
section amounted to cost benefits analyses of submarine launched cruise missiles 
and submarine launched ballistic missiles.  It describes in surprising detail the 
capabilities and limitations of the various existing ballistic missile systems and the 
existing and potentially-available cruise missile options.  Any one of these factors in 
isolation could (and would) be used to argue for and against any one system, but 
the paper assesses the complex relationship between missile capability (range, 
destructive potential and post-launch vulnerability to intercept), platform 
vulnerability, platform numbers, cost and technological risk.  Substantially, OGD 
80/23 Sections I-III comprised a redacted version of the Duff-Mason report, with a 
consideration of the decision-making process added. 
																																								 																				
49 Ibid. col 1237 
50 UK GOVT 1980. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force. London: 
HMSO.paragraph 33 
	 141	
The fourth section focused on Arms Control, always the parallel track for UK nuclear 
deterrence policy.  ‘Strong support for practical, balanced and verifiable arms 
control measures remains a key element in our approach to ensuring peace and 
security.’51 It indicated that the UK supported the Non Proliferation Treaty and that 
replacement of an existing system was not incompatible with that treaty, nor the US-
USSR SALT I and II treaties.  The final section was Cost:  
‘…we assess the likely order of capital cost for a four-boat force, at 
today’s prices, at around four-and-a-half to five billion pounds, 
spread over some fifteen years.  … There has rightly been 
widespread public interest in the effect which the replacement of the 
Polaris force will have upon other aspects of the defence 
programme.  Money spent on this is not money spent on other 
things.  … Even after spending on the Trident force, the 
Government is still planning to spend more on conventional forces 
than it does now.  The accommodation of large re-equipment 
programmes is a normal part of defence planning and budgeting. … 
There are no easy comparisons to be made with other defence 
capabilities.   There would be little point, for example, in diverting the 
full capital sum to buying more ships, tanks or aircraft which in the 
long term we could not afford to run and could not hope to man.’52 
Ironically, OGD 80/23 seems to have considered many of Armstrong’s proposed 
questions that were not addressed by MISC 7 above53 although it did not address 
his first two questions; ‘what good has it done us so far to be in the strategic 
deterrent league?’ and; ‘given the decline in our world position in other respects, will 
it do us enough good to stay in the league from the 1990s to justify the cost of the 
burden this programme represents in the meantime?’  These questions are, 
however, biased towards the assumption that the UK retains a strategic nuclear 
deterrent for purposes other than deterrence. 
In short, OGD 80/23 addressed the Polaris Successor decision logically and 
objectively and should have set most arguments to rest. That it did not was manifest 
in the increasingly vocal and influential anti-nuclear opposition.  How much of the 
resulting anti-nuclear activity might have been avoided had the answers in the 
document been published in late 1979 or earlier in 1980, and debated in the 
Commons before a decision (for which the Conservatives had a comfortable 
majority in any case) could be taken is simply a matter for counterfactual 
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speculation.  But Armstrong’s first two questions continue to bedevil UK nuclear 
policy decisions nearly 40 years later. 
Trident: Post decision debate 
In June 1980, the Commons Defence Committee began its inquiry into the future of 
the UK’s strategic weapons policy.  Clearly it was not ideal to have the government 
publish its decision less than a month later, seven months before the Defence 
Committee reported; and there was an element of chagrin in the tone of the Report; 
‘Subsequently in July 1980 the Government announced their decision 
to purchase the Trident missile system to replace Polaris; and on 3rd 
March 1981 the House endorsed that decision.  Since the House has 
voted, by 316 votes to 248, to endorse the choice of the Trident 
system, it is not for us to challenge the principle of that decision.’54    
There was clearly a strenuous debate within the Committee about the tenor and 
ultimate recommendation of the final report.  The draft report prepared by the 
Chairman (Sir John Langford-Holt (Conservative)) was challenged at the final 
Defence Committee meeting on this topic on 20th May 1981 by an alternative draft 
prepared by three of the five Labour members; Dr Gilbert, Mr Conlan and Mr 
George.  After the first reading of each draft, the challenge was defeated by one 
vote (the eleven members voted exactly on party lines) and Langford-Holt's draft 
was adopted by the Committee. 
The vigour and partisan nature of the Committee’s debate was exemplified by the 
alternative final conclusions:  the Committee’s Final Report read;  
‘We can see no case for the cancellation of the Trident programme by 
any future government.  For Britain to abrogate the Trident agreement 
would be seen as withdrawal from the commitments to the alliance 
which have been constant since 1949.  Cancellation would also have 
serious consequences for relations with the United States and other 
NATO allies...’55  
The Alternative Report concluded; ‘We cannot recommend that any future 
Government continue the Trident programme.’56   
The substantive contents of the reports are similar, although the Alternative Report 
included a section detailing the decision making process (outlined above) 
concluding; ‘…Parliament’s role in the decision to procure a successor system to 
Polaris has been limited to endorsing a decision already taken.  Decisions on 
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defence, and on Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent have historically been taken by 
a small elite of very senior Cabinet Ministers, Civil Servants and Service Chiefs, and 
this present decision was clearly no exception.’57 
‘While we are excluded by the terms of reference set by the 
Committee from addressing the questions of principle, strategic 
doctrine and arms control involved in such major decisions of 
strategic nuclear policy, we are clear that any future comprehensive 
investigation of Britain’s deterrent must deal with these matters in 
depth.  Such investigations will have to consider whether or not these 
weapons are qualitatively different from other weapons.  Any strategic 
nuclear exchange must inevitably generate radiation which is 
indiscriminate in both space and time, inflicting harm on non-
combatants thousands of miles from the battlefield…  However, if one 
concludes that nuclear deterrence is an ethically acceptable policy, it 
then becomes necessary to address specific strategic questions of 
how the threat is credibly to be made, and what political benefits are 
likely to accrue from the possession of a deterrent.  Unfortunately, 
there has been much more said by British Governments about the 
capability to exercise a deterrent policy, than about precisely what 
policy is.’58  
The Labour members of the Defence Committee clearly wanted the opportunity to 
make conclusions and recommendation which were beyond the terms of reference 
of the Report, but in the event were outvoted by the Conservative committee 
members.  There were other significant differences in interpretation of the same 
evidence throughout the two reports; and these were both symptomatic and typical 
of the increasingly dogmatic polarization of views over nuclear issues as the year 
progressed. 
John Nott replaced Pym at Defence in January 1981.  To the last, Pym had been 
seeking increased engagement with Parliament and had been in negotiations with 
the Leader of the House for debate on nuclear policy as soon as the Commons 
Defence Committee had completed its Report.  However, when the report was 
further delayed to March Pym felt that the timetable for discussion related to 
procuring Trident D5 rather than the C4 variant could be delayed no further.  If 
anything, Nott was even more enthusiastic about increasing education and 
understanding of nuclear deterrence matters than Pym had been and he 
immediately set in train a series of briefings for junior ministers and the Cabinet; 
although these were not popular with the Prime Minister.  Nott also quickly set about 
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mastering his nuclear brief and wrote to the Prime Minister within a month of his 
arrival:   
‘… we are losing the defence/deterrence argument at present.  The 
CND campaign is gathering strength but much more importantly, 
there is a growing sceptism among a much wider and thinking 
section of the population about the correctness of the Trident 
decision.  If we lose the Trident argument, it will be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to sustain the wider defence posture of the 
government.  I am convinced that Trident was the correct decision.  
But I must tell you that this is not, in my judgement, the general view 
of your Ministers, nor the unanimous view of the Ministry of 
Defence.  Only the Defence Committee of our party seem free of 
doubts.  We must win the argument in Whitehall, if we are to have 
any chance of convincing the outside world.’59  
The debate on nuclear policy was scheduled for 3rd March 1981.  Nott intended to 
open and close this debate because he felt that; ‘two Ministers can[not] be expected 
to have the time to master the strategic options and philosophical arguments…’60 
Mrs Thatcher did not agree, noting by hand on Nott’s memo; ‘I really think 2 
Ministers should be able to master this’.   
Nott’s hesitation in trusting part of the argument to one of his subordinate ministers 
is entirely in keeping with what had become routine for the oversight of deterrent 
policy, which was kept within small groups of very senior ministers and not even 
divulged to the full Cabinet until decisions had been made; Churchill had kept 
personal control of all communications about the Monte Bello test.    
In the run-up to the debate Nott planned to schedule a number of in-depth 
interviews with television and the newspapers; ‘we have had many useful requests 
to enter a serious debate on the moral and strategic issues.’61  This appears not to 
have happened until after the Parliamentary debate, with Nott announcing in an 
interview with the Times that he had ‘decided to wage a public relations battle to 
wean 'innocent well-meaning people' away from the ideas of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament...’62  
In early 1981, despite coverage of the ongoing Commons Defence Committee 
hearings on the Future of the UK Strategic Weapons Policy, there was no apparent 
increase in government participation in the public discourse.  In the meantime, 
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opposition was growing and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was attracting 
more members, increasing membership tenfold between 1979 and the end of 
1982.63 
Nott opened the debate as planned, and took the non-technical issues of nuclear 
policy head-on:   
‘In ethical terms, the issues surrounding nuclear weapons are 
difficult, if not agonising. But in the debate between those who judge 
it better to keep those terrible weapons so as to use them as a 
shield for peace, and those who judge it better to discard them in 
order to maintain peace by some new, untried and, I would suggest, 
historically improbable route, the arguments are, I would suggest, on 
the side of deterrence. To engage the emotions—as the promoters 
of CND know very well—is an easy task. The showing of the film 
‘The War Game’ in a village hall in the evening in the presence of 
young families has a predictable outcome. To argue the choices 
before us so as to engage the intellect is a much harder task.’64   
Nott considered again the key decision factors outlined in the Duff-Mason report, 
and already covered in the previous debates; including in particular the relevance of 
an independent centre of decision-making, the minimum deterrent, and the 
irrelevance of parity with the Soviet Union.  He concluded his introduction;  
‘Let me summarise the case that I am putting to the House. All of us 
fear and abhor the idea of war, and, above all, of nuclear war. All of 
us have a common aim—to prevent it, but it must be deterred away 
or negotiated away; it cannot simply be wished away. Britain has a 
distinctive role in deterrence—one that our allies acknowledge and 
welcome. It would be dangerous folly, in the world as it is, now to 
abandon that role. Much the best long-term way to sustain it at the 
strategic level is to build a new force around the Trident missile. 
That is, in absolute terms, not a cheap course, but the 
consequences of shirking it may one day prove unimaginably 
expensive.’65  
The opposition response opened with a commentary on the timing of the debate;  
‘… I should like to comment on the timing of the debate, which—
even given the Secretary of State's own tortuous logic—is most 
curious. The right hon. Gentleman gave lavish praise to the Select 
Committee on Defence, which has been studying this subject for 
several months. In a short time, it would have been able to assist us 
by publishing its conclusions.’66   
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Shadow defence spokesman, Mr John also had laudable intentions to face the key 
issues and eschew party politics, but as the debate unfolded, it became clear that 
there would be a bi-partisan division between Conservative and Labour on the 
nuclear deterrent for the first time since the deployment of Polaris. This was 
articulated in unequivocal terms by Labour MP Mr Snape;  
‘The Labour Party is against Trident. It ill-behoves the Conservative 
Party, which has cut, cut and cut again in relation to the social 
structure of this country, to spend a minimum—and Conservative 
Members know that it is a minimum—of £5 billion on the Trident 
project.  Those of us who are concerned for not only the future of 
Britain but the future of our children are determined to ensure that 
there will be no Trident project in the future. My hon. Friends and I 
are the vanguard of a movement which has a great depth of feeling 
throughout the country.’67 
The Commons endorsed the government's decision to maintain a strategic nuclear 
deterrent and the choice of the Trident missile system as the successor to the 
Polaris force.  The technical factors changed again within the year as the USA 
decided to proceed with the early replacement of Trident C4 with the D5 variant.  
The UK was faced with almost the same decision once again – change the plan and 
provide a system which would remain compatible with that deployed by the USA for 
the design life, or take the (slightly) cheaper option and face increasing 
obsolescence and UK-specific upkeep costs.   
Anti-Nuclear Protests 
Anti-nuclear opposition focused on both the Polaris Successor decision and the 
deployment of Cruise due for 1983.  CND membership rose from 4000 in 1979 to 
20,000 in 1981 and peaked at 100,000 in 1984.  Turnout at the annual 
demonstrations in the early 1980s regularly topped a quarter of a million. Peace 
Camps, most notably at the proposed missile bases at Greenham Common and 
Molesworth, were established (although CND's involvement at Greenham was 
tangential). A wide variety of non-violent direct action took place, usually at military 
bases and nuclear weapons manufacturing/storage sites. Whilst some was 
organised by CND at a national level, the norm was for local initiatives, with national 
CND coordinating rather than directing.68  The National Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party, which had voted in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament at its 
1980 party conference, was one of the sponsors of the 1980 demonstration against 
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Cruise.69 
Media coverage of the large march from Aldermaston to Trafalgar Square on 26th 
October 1980 tended to indicate that the media would find themselves unable to 
avoid taking a side in the rapidly polarizing debate. The Daily Express reported the 
rally itself objectively;  
‘More than 60,000 people turned up yesterday for the biggest nuclear 
disarmament demonstration since the 'Ban the Bomb' demo's of 
nearly 20 years ago.  Their message was - no Cruise missiles!  No 
Trident submarines!  And a massive cut in arms.  It was part of the re-
birth of the peace movement and the support overwhelmed 
organisers.’70   
But the same article also covered Michael Foot’s statement to ITV’s ‘Weekend 
World’;  
‘Mr Foot said that if he became Prime Minister he would send 
America's Cruise and Pershing missiles home - and get rid of Britain's 
independent nuclear weapons. … Labour defence spokesman William 
Rogers came out against Mr Foot's plans.  He said; ‘Michael Foot's 
remarks were a plain statement of unilateralism.  This is not the 
majority view of the parliamentary Labour Party.  I do not believe it is 
the majority view of Labour voters.  The people of this country believe 
that Britain should be properly defended.’’71 
The Daily Express also carried an Editorial considering Foot’s commitment should 
he become Leader of the Labour party and potentially Prime Minister; ‘He is 
prepared to do away with Britain's nuclear weapons unilaterally.  So the man whom 
we are being invited to consider as our next Prime Minister is a man who would 
deprive Britain of the decisive weapon of the modern age.’72  The Times editorial 
commented; ‘..the massive demonstration of support for the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament on Sunday afternoon was an event of considerable political 
significance because it represented the revival of a movement whose activities had 
such an impact on British public affairs at the beginning of the 1960s.  Why has this 
revival occurred now, and for how long can one expect it to last?’73  The 
investigative documentary programme TV Eye74 predicted that in the event of a war, 
the ‘First Nuclear missiles would fall on Britain’. Interviewing Francis Pym - a 
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relatively rare intervention by government - reporter Bob Southgate put together a 
map of American bases in Britain and asserted; ‘The American presence here is so 
large and so important that the Russians could feel forced to attack these bases 
first.’  Pym countered that ‘both a British and American nuclear arsenal are vital to 
the defence of the West and to stop nuclear war becoming a reality.’75   
The Times also sketched the reduction in interest in CND after the Cuban Missile 
crisis and suggested; 
‘... that has changed with the dispute over the Trident and Cruise 
missiles.  The argument has been joined once again, with a public 
many of whom are totally uninfluenced by the previous debate and in 
circumstances that are different in a number of respects.  One is that 
the international scene seems more forbidding… Recognition of this 
threat is seen in the new preoccupation with civil defence, which is 
both an acknowledgement of the danger and to many people an 
inadequate safeguard against it.’76 
As well as the ‘traditional’ mass demonstrations, anti-nuclear protest took novel 
forms.  At the end of a march from Cardiff, the Welsh group ‘Women for Life on 
Earth’ arrived on Greenham Common on 5th September 1981. They had marched 
with the intention of challenging the decision to site 96 Cruise nuclear missiles there 
by a debate with the Base Commander at RAF Greenham Common where the first 
detachment of GLCM would be based. On arrival they delivered him a letter which 
among other things stated ‘We fear for the future of all our children and for the 
future of the living world which is the basis of all life’.77  They were denied the 
debate, but took up residence in a makeshift camp on common ground adjoining the 
base, and remained there as a highly visible focus for the anti-nuclear protest 
movement until 2000, long after the GLCM had been withdrawn in 1991.  Similar 
camps were established at RAF Molesworth, RAF Alconbury and at Faslane, the 
Clyde base from which the Polaris (and subsequently Trident) submarines 
operated.  
These protests, committed to disrupting the daily working lives of the nuclear 
establishments, were highly disruptive and drew on tactics for anti-nuclear protests 
that had previously been avoided.  Nuclear convoys leaving the bases were 
blockaded, tracked to their practice areas and had their training and exercises 
disrupted.  Protesters would challenge security, cut wire fences and if they could 
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gain access, damage equipment within the perimeters of these facilities.  This move 
to non-violent direct action meant that protesters were arrested, taken to court and 
occasionally imprisoned.  Between March 1981 and 1984, over 5000 had been 
arrested across the country, with 1000 arrested at Greenham alone.78   
Civil Defence 
There was little that could have made the public presentation of British nuclear 
policy more demanding in 1980, but the Home Office managed to find it.  After the 
Strath Report in the 1950s, and continued decline throughout 1960s, Civil Defence 
had been put into a ‘care and maintenance’ state in 1968.  However, shortly after 
election in 1979, the Home Office commissioned a report on ‘Civil Preparedness’ for 
the Defence Overseas Policy Committee Cabinet (DOPC) sub-committee.  This 
Secret report highlighted the parlous state of civil defence and concluded that; 
‘There is widespread ignorance among the public, the media and 
officials of the threat and about protective measures.  For many 
years the perception has been of immediate general nuclear war.  
Until recently this has led to apathy in the face of the appalling 
consequence and of the perceived inadequacy of steps taken to 
alleviate them ... A more open approach by government now would 
counter criticism of undue secrecy and a more informed public might 
change its attitude.  It has been announced to Parliament that the 
pamphlet 'Protect and Survive' will be updated and placed on sale at 
the time the outcome of this review is announced.’79   
Cabinet endorsed the Report’s recommendations and advised that the Home 
Secretary should ‘… aim at an undramatic statement, in order not to arouse 
expectations which it would be impossible to fulfil.’80   
Prior to the announcement of the Report, the Chief Whip was worried; ‘I have not 
seen a copy of the paper which we shall be publishing, but I get the impression that 
it may cause a good deal of trouble by its inadequacy.’81  In June, the DOPC agreed 
that the Home Secretary should announce the report and the recommendations, 
and that the ‘financial problem should be considered further in the forthcoming 
Cabinet discussion of the 1980 Public Expenditure Survey with the aim of 
																																								 																				
78 HUDSON, K. 2007. CND Now More than Ever; The Story of A Peace Movement. Kindle ed.: Matrix 
Digital Publishing Loc 2565 
79 CABINET OFFICE Memorandum Cabinet Secretary to Cabinet OD(80)23 on 'Defence and 
Overseas Policy Committee Civil Home Defence' dated 18 Mar 80. TNA CAB 148/190. Paragraph 
27 & 28 
80 CABINET OFFICE OD(80) 9th Meeting of Cabinet Defence Overseas Policy Committee Minutes 
Thursday 20 March 1980. TNA CAB 148/189. 
81 CONSERVATIVE PARTY Letter Jopling (Chief Whip) to Whitelaw (Home Secretary) Unreferenced 9 
May 1980. TNA PREM 19/689. 
	 150	
implementing all of the Priority I and as many as possible of the Priority II 
measures.’82  This left Whitelaw in a nearly impossible position because the costs of 
most measures to protect the population from the consequences of a nuclear attack 
were prohibitively expensive, which was why they had been abandoned 30 years 
before and the focus had been shifted to deterring rather than fighting nuclear war.  
Whitelaw’s task now was to present the cheap options as part of a package 
designed to educate an increasingly sceptical public. 
‘Protect and Survive; Civil Defence Manual of Basic Training’83 was issued to the 
Civil Defence organization in 1950.  It incorporated all of the previously published 
pamphlets on Basic Chemical Warfare, Firefighting, First Aid, Rescue, Protection 
from High Explosive Missiles and Atomic Warfare.  It was reissued to the Civil 
Defence organization in various forms until 1968; Civil Defence handbook No 10 
‘Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack’ was issued in 
1963.84  It included advice on protective measures such as building a fall-out room 
under the stairs or the kitchen table.  The decision to update and reissue Handbook 
No 10 as a public document in 1980 was a disaster for the public presentation of 
government nuclear deterrence policy.   
Based on the experience of the 1960s, the decision to publish this document 
displayed a degree of ineptitude verging on the imbecilic.  ‘The government's civil 
defence pamphlet, Protect and Survive - perhaps the greatest own goal of the 
1980s - was a gift to the peace movement...’85 ‘[It] sought to persuade people that 
they could protect themselves against bombs with the power of millions of tons of 
dynamite by crouching under a table ...’86  In response, CND produced a pamphlet 
entitled, Civil Defence: The Cruellest Confidence Trick, which described Protect and 
Survive as ‘a mass confidence trick, a public fraud of the most heartless kind 
because it deals in human lives.’87  This was closely followed by ‘Protest and 
Survive’; CND seized on the title of the civil defence booklet and corrupted it into the 
campaign slogan ‘Protest and Survive’ which became ubiquitous, including as the 
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title of a photograph of a skeleton reading ‘Protect and Survive’ which was 
displayed at the Tate Gallery.88   
In 1980, the National Council for Civil Defence had started planning for Exercise 
Hard Rock, the first Civil Defence Exercise to consider a nuclear attack for nearly 
thirty years.  However, after 24 of the 52 Councils refused to participate, Whitelaw 
was forced to cancel it.   According to one press report, ‘…just 55 men and women 
are expected to handle all aspects of peacetime emergency and wartime 
emergency planning for more than 18,500,000 people … In Tyneside, one person 
would look after 1,100,000 people.’89  This Times article condemned CND for their 
attitude to civil defence and presented the government attempt to improve the 
situation favourably, but in doing so it highlighted the position baldly; either 
significant investment would be required, or the civil defence project was, as Kent 
put it, ludicrous.90 
Fiction – the lie through which we tell the truth91 
The public reaction to Civil Defence was pretty much that which had been predicted 
in 1955 with the Strath Report – hence the extreme secrecy which still surrounded 
that document -  and with the persistent concerns over The War Game in 1965.  
Fiction was also catching up and portraying fact; in the USA, a TV movie; ‘The Day 
After’ presented the aftermath of a nuclear war in the contemporary genre of a 
disaster movie, attracting the (then) largest ever TV audience (100m) when it was 
first screened in 1983.  Prior to airing, there was intense debate in the USA whether 
it should be screened, with the ‘… Educators for Social Responsibility and others 
worried that the program might do children more harm than good.’92 Immediately 
after the film was shown, ‘Viewpoint’ hosted Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, 
Brent Scowcroft, Carl Sagan and others for a 90 minute panel discussion with a live 
audience; 
‘Contrary to [host] Koppel's assumption that the … ‘simple-minded’ 
film would do little more than encourage the nation to ‘make policies 
by scaring ourselves to death,’ the audience members 
demonstrated themselves to be calm, rational and well versed in 
international affairs. … They were clearly not the easily frightened or 
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brainwashed masses conservatives feared or the eager converts 
hoped for by disarmament activists.’93 
In 1984, in the UK, the BBC produced ‘Threads’, depicting the destruction of 
Sheffield in a nuclear war.  It was of the same genre as The Day After, although it 
depicted far more the run up to the war itself, but in doing so illustrated the utter 
irrelevance to the film’s characters of the issue over which the war is fought.  The 
film contained several aspects paying ‘homage’ to Watkins’s ‘The War Game’; the 
‘Authorities’ come out very badly - shooting looters out of hand and holding 
summary trials, while the ‘legitimate’ local government is buried alive in a bunker 
and completely ineffectual.  The film follows the daughter of the main characters 
born 5 months after the bomb to the point where she gives birth to a still-born baby 
at age 14.  By this stage, British society has regressed to a neo-feudal state and her 
vocabulary is limited and sounds like medieval English. 94  Films such as these 
graphically portrayed the ‘breakdown’ of society which had so worried Strath.  The 
concepts of protection portrayed in ‘Protect and Survive’ were most ruthlessly 
parodied in Raymond Briggs’s book the ‘When the Wind Blows’ and the subsequent 
animated film of the same name.95 
Contemporary ‘teen’ fiction in the early 1980s also exploited the aftermath of 
nuclear war for plot lines; Children of the Dust96 recounts three individual stories in 
successive generations of survivors.  There is no depiction of the nuclear war, or 
mention of its cause, simply the creeping inevitability of death caused by 'dust'.  The 
government-imposed society fails because it cannot adapt to the new reality and 
simply tries to reinstate the previous technocracy and its long-defunct political 
legitimacy on the rest of the survivors.  It is as bleak as any of the adult fiction 
initially, but where the adult fiction tends to leave the reader either witnessing the 
death of all of the characters, and perforce, mankind, this offers a more positive 
outlook, albeit in a pseudo-science-fiction vignette with mankind evolving into a 
more peaceful post-holocaust humanity. Similarly, Brother in the Land97 focuses on 
the development of society immediately after a nuclear attack, suggesting it reverts 
to ‘pre-Neanderthal’; once again suggesting Strath’s ‘breakdown’.98   
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These children’s books painted a very bleak appraisal of humanity in a state of 
nature, and implicitly challenged the assumption that defence of a particular model 
of society could justify a nuclear war.   
Nott had noted three years before that the opposition to nuclear deterrence was 
essentially emotive, and that the government problem was how to counter it with 
rational points.  He had missed the most important point though – the opposition set 
the parameters of the debate, and anchored it in these highly emotive depictions of 
the aftermath of nuclear war – the government could have simply agreed that all 
war (and nuclear war in particular) was a dreadful prospect and then described the 
various options to avoid it, of which nuclear deterrence seemed the most viable.  
For whatever reason, this line was not successfully pursued. 
The Churches 
In April 1963, Pope John XXIII published the Papal Encyclical ‘Pacem in Terris’ 
which stated;  
‘Justice, right reason and consideration for human dignity and life 
urgently demand that the arms race should cease; that the 
stockpiles which exist in various countries should be reduced 
equally and simultaneously by the parties concerned; that nuclear 
weapons should be banned; and finally that all come to an 
agreement on a fitting programme of disarmament, employing 
mutual and effective controls.’99  
This directive to the World’s Catholics had little impact on national nuclear 
deterrence policies, but it set a precedent that had significant effect later. 
With concern mounting over the stand-off in Europe over the Long Range Tactical 
Nuclear forces in the late 1970s and early 1980s, pastoral concerns overcame 
political reticence and a number of churches chose to voice opinions on nuclear 
deterrence.  The prompt for this was the intervention of Pope John Paul II at the UN 
Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982:   
‘In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as 
an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive 
disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. …’100 
Probably the most famous development from this is the Pastoral Letter of the 
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American Catholic Bishops of 1983:  
‘As Catholic bishops we write this letter as an exercise of our 
teaching ministry. … At times we state universally binding moral 
principles found in the teachings of the Church; ... We do not 
perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear 
war, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified.’101   
As well as instigating a cottage industry in debate whether or not the Bishops’ views 
were a valid representation of the Catholic Church position,102 this pastoral letter 
presaged a number of similar exercises by other Churches.  In the UK, the Scottish 
Churches of both denominations, which would not normally agree on the colour of 
an orange, were both in vigorous opposition to the Polaris Successor and LRTNF 
decisions: ‘For 30 years the Church of Scotland has consistently condemned the 
existence and threat of nuclear weapons as sinful and an offence to God’s created 
order.’103   
‘If it is immoral to use these weapons it is also immoral to threaten 
their use. Some argue that the threat can be justified as the lesser 
of two evils. The crux of the problem is whether in any foreseeable 
circumstance a policy of self defence based on the use or even the 
threat of use of these weapons of terrible destructiveness can ever 
be morally justified.’104 
The English Churches took a more measured approach.  The Catholic Bishops 
invited the Cabinet Office to brief their ‘In Service Course’ on the matter in January 
1983: Goodall, the Cabinet Office Official who briefed them, reported; ‘On the 
question of principle, the Bishops were predictably wrestling with the morality of 
conditional intention: ie could it ever be right to have the intention to commit a 
morally monstrous act, however justifiable and desirable the objective.’105  Goodall 
suggested that the key debate among the Bishops was ethical; the extent to which 
deterrence was stable and therefore the conditional intent to use nuclear weapons 
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could be considered to be at a very small risk of realization.  He also pointed out; 
‘They seem to have been impressed by a presentation which they had received the 
previous day from Dr Paul Rogers of the Bradford University School of Peace 
Studies, who had apparently argued in favour of Britain conditionally offering to 
abandon Trident (and Polaris) in return for some matching move from the Soviet 
Union.’106  As described above, Michael Quinlan engaged in a personal (but tacitly 
officially sanctioned) manner with some of the protagonists of this debate,.  “In his 
1981 pamphlet ‘The Morality of Nuclear Weapons’, Ruston … argued that: ‘There is 
no way in which the present possession of nuclear weapons, intended for whatever 
purpose, can be justified in Catholic morality’ …  This was refuted by Quinlan, who 
argued that surrendering to an atheistic totalitarian regime would be an immoral 
act.’107  Quinlan remained active in his private correspondence until his death, 
effectively acting as a proxy spokesman for the official position in a slightly less 
overt manner than had Spaight in the 1940s. 
Given the febrile atmosphere, the Church of England issued a moderate pamphlet 
‘The Church and the Bomb’ and passed a relatively constrained motion at the 
General Synod of the February 1983 which recognised;  
‘…that it is not the task of the church to determine defence strategy 
but rather to give a moral lead to the nation;  
(i) Affirms that it is the duty of Her Majesty’s Government and her 
Allies to maintain adequate forces to guard against nuclear blackmail 
and to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggressors; 
(ii) … 
(iii) Judges that even a small-scale first use of nuclear weapons 
could never be morally justified … 
(iv) … 
(v) Bearing in mind that many in Europe live in fear of nuclear 
catastrophe and that nuclear parity is not essential to deterrence, calls 
on her Majesty’s Government to take immediate steps … to reduce 
progressively NATOs dependence on nuclear weapons and to 
decrease nuclear arsenals throughout the world.’108 
Government engagement with the Churches on nuclear matters in England 
remained amicable throughout the eighties, although individual churchmen of 
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personal principle were intimately involved in the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament and other protests. The Scottish churches were much less 
cooperative and have retained a much more radical anti-nuclear stance ever since.  
One subsequent Church analyst concluded; 
‘The English and Welsh bishops naturally want to keep talking to 
policy-makers. They want to be taken seriously and not dismissed as 
extremists or unrealistic. But the criteria of Just War teaching are not 
unrealistic or irrational, and many men and women - not just Catholics 
- would rejoice to hear Catholic doctrine affirmed as loudly and 
unambiguously concerning war as it has been in other discourses.’109 
Ultimately, as the Synod agreed, the role of the Church is not to determine defence 
policy but rather to give a moral lead to the nation.  A contemporary critique of the 
American Bishops’ Pastoral letter concludes; ‘Yet another level of criticism is that 
the Bishops really have taken account of the true alternatives to nuclear deterrence.  
Paul Ramsey said recently, “to judge the morality of deterrence, one must judge as 
well the morality of the alternatives.”’110  The Church critiques that were presented 
to the public tended to be deontological, rather than consequentialist, and therefore 
tended to contribute to polarization of any subsequent debate and did not contribute 
to consideration of alternatives to deterrence.  They also tended to conflate 
deterrence and war: ‘Pope John XIII stated that in an age of atomic power 'it is 
irrational to think that war is a proper way to obtain justice for violated rights'.  The 
Vatican Council emphasises 'the unique hazards' of modern war arising from the 
weapons now available.’111   This is not a critique of deterrence, but of war, the 
avoidance of which is the key function of deterrence.  This is another example 
where a key argument is corrupted by a superficial understanding of the full scope 
of the factors being considered, an argument that could have been substantially 
answered by informed official participation.  
Trident D5 Decision 
During 1981, the MOD progressed negotiations and plans for the procurement and 
construction of the Polaris Successor system. MISC 7 remained occupied (in secret) 
with the decision to procure Trident II D5 instead of the C4 system, offering cheaper 
through-life costs due to sustained commonality with the US Navy throughout the 
system life. In November, MISC 7 was ready to decide in favour of D5 and Cabinet 
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was informed on 21st January 1982.  Cabinet was invited to decide on D5 on 11th 
March, although in order to enable American Congressional briefings before the 
announcement on the same day, Cabinet made the decision on 3rd March. Nott 
announced the decision to the Commons on 11th March.  Trident II D5 was far more 
accurate than the C4, and offered greater range and more warheads per missile.  
There was therefore potentially a presentation issue – D5 offered far more firepower 
than the British minimum deterrent required, and it could be perceived as a 
‘warfighting’, rather than deterrence, system.  This point was made in the Commons 
reaction; ‘Does the Minister agree that it is not simply a replacement programme but 
that in terms of quality and quantity of warheads D5 represents almost a quantum 
leap forward?  Will the Minister tell the House why we require a hard kill capability?’  
Nott responded;  
‘The number of warheads on the missile need not necessarily be 
more than we now have on Polaris. That is a matter of choice for the 
British Government of the time.  As for the hard kill capability, it is 
certainly true that D5 is a more accurate missile than C4 and much 
more accurate than Polaris. It can knock out a specific discreet target 
in a way that Polaris could not. But that is not why we want it. We 
have chosen it because of commonality with the United States.’112   
This distinction added a further focus to the polarizing effect of the Trident debate in 
public.   
The Falklands War diverted much of the media and protest attention away from the 
nuclear debate, and over the summer, MISC 7 continued to explore means of 
reducing costs such as cancellation of the expansion of Coulport (part of the 
submarine base on the Clyde) to process the Trident missiles and negotiation of 
use of American facilities instead.  This would save £500m but at the cost of 2000 
jobs in Scotland over the next 15 years.  The Cabinet Secretary also noted that this 
move might be perceived as a loss of independence in the deterrent.113   
Trident, the Media and the Public 
In his routine ‘Media Relations Stocktake’ for Mrs Thatcher in August 1982, her 
Press Secretary Bernard Ingham did not mention nuclear deterrence as an issue at 
all; ‘…it is possible to identify the main (inter-related) issues which will preoccupy us 
over the next 12 months:  the Franks report... unemployment, pay, inflation, trades 
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union reform ... public expenditure ... crime and punishment ... membership of the 
EC ...’114  His subsequent preparations for the September 1982 meeting of the Lord 
President’s Liaison Committee which was developed ‘to give guidance to MPs and 
Ministers on the interpretation of Government policy and to take such action as in 
their opinion is necessary to sustain public confidence in Government’, included 
presentation on economic issues, law and order, housing and social security policy, 
with potential for a paper on nationalised industry.115  Ingham seems to have 
misread the priorities; in the event, the key agenda item was the identification of a 
nuclear policy presentation strategy:  
‘… the need for concerted effort to secure public acceptance of the 
Government's Trident decision.  Opponents were able to range widely 
in their criticism and to quote in their support sensible people who 
were concerned with eg; Conventional capabilities or industrial 
implications.  The CND campaign was likely to constitute serious and 
continuing problem.  A great deal of valuable material had already 
been issued by the Government to explain its decisions in this area 
and Conservative Research Department should draw on what was 
already available in the preparation of a consolidated paper on the 
presentation of defence and nuclear policies ...’116 
This meeting appears to have set in train a number of changes in the way that the 
Conservative government dealt with nuclear policy in the public domain.  Until this 
meeting, UK nuclear policy was presented in public only if it had to be, in a 
grudging, haphazard and often counter-productive manner.  At the October 
meeting, the Conservative Research Department paper on the presentation of the 
government’s nuclear defence policy was the only substantive agenda item.  It 
reported that;  
‘(b) Opinion polls suggested that a majority of the electorate were 
broadly in support of the retention of a proper military capability; but 
only a minority supported Trident even among the Government’s own 
supporters … 
(c) The unilateralist lobby had grown very strong and very influential.  
It seemed to be making an impressive impact not only among the 
general public but also in the universities and at local authority level.  
… It was essential to counter such campaigns effectively at the local 
level. 
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(d) In presenting its decision on Trident the Government had naturally 
set the issue in the context of the threat from the Soviet Union. … The 
Government’s defence policies needed to be presented in the round 
and set in a wider context than NATO alone. 
(e)  The wider work done by the Ministry of Defence to counter the 
unilateralist lobby was noted, as also the activities of outside 
associations which had been set up for the purpose, or were prepared 
to help.  But it was not clear that the Ministry of Defence had achieved 
a sufficient impact.  Some of its published material lacked appeal.  
The Government’s message was not getting over to the general 
public or to opinion formers as strongly as it should.  There appeared 
to be inadequate information officer effort devoted to this task. … 
(f) CND publications were simple, emotive and effective; and they 
were pushed hard by their supporters at all levels.  To redress the 
balance there was much to be said for harnessing the energy, 
imagination and enthusiasm of the Party organization … They could 
properly undertake the sort of presentational campaign which it would 
be improper for a Whitehall department to organise.  But they lacked 
financial resources.’117 
This, finally, was a recognition of Nott’s lament to the Commons 18 months before; 
‘The showing of the film ‘The War Game’ in a village hall in the evening in the 
presence of young families has a predictable outcome. To argue the choices before 
us so as to engage the intellect is a much harder task’.118  The Liaison Committee 
recognised that this area of presentation stood in need of urgent review, both in 
substance and method.  ‘Renewed efforts had to be made to present the message 
in appealing and effective terms and to get it over strongly to opinion formers… The 
Ministry of Defence needed to reassess the staff and financial resources allocated 
to this important job.’119  The committee recommended a full Cabinet discussion and 
the Minister of State for Defence was invited to report back to the Secretary of 
State.   
Defence Secretariat 17 was a small, long-standing section within the MOD which 
was tasked to advise the Secretary of State for Defence on advice on nuclear 
policy, arms control and disarmament.  In February 1983, Heseltine established a 
parallel 8-man unit, Defence Secretariat 19 (DS19), to advise him on how best to 
explain to the public the facts about the government's policy on deterrence and 
multilateral disarmament; its work was to be confined to departmental information 
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work and specifically ‘…it will be assisting in the preparation of speeches and 
articles, advising on leaflets and publications and advising on press aspects of the 
nuclear debate.’120  In the Lords, the debate focused on whether DS19 was involved 
in the presentation of government policy, or because the Opposition was publicly 
opposed to it, it was in fact presenting Party policy: Lord Jenkins inquired;  
‘Will the noble Lord accept that sometimes it is rather hard to draw the 
line between legitimate Government explanation of their policies and 
party political propaganda? Will the noble Lord agree that it is 
incumbent upon the Government to make sure that that line is not 
breached? Will he further agree that some of the films which are 
being issued under the aegis of this department [DS19] are highly 
contentious, and that to this side of the House they feel like party 
political propaganda?’121   
The noble Lord [Lord Belstead] neither accepted nor agreed. 
By April, a more proactive government campaign had significantly shifted the public 
discourse and Heseltine reported to the Cabinet that; ‘the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) had been successfully thrown on to the defensive by the action 
taken to identify the left wing affiliations of so many of its leading members.’122  The 
Authorised History of MI5 asserts that in the mid 1970s, 8 of the 15 seats on the 
CND National Executive Council were occupied by members of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain and ‘In March 1983 the Service provided the MOD with open-
source material on the political affiliation of seven leading members of CND.’123   
Anti-nuclear campaigners maintained a steady pressure; Joan Ruddock (CND 
Chair) recalled;  
‘1983 was general election year and attacks on CND escalated 
dramatically. We repeatedly asked to debate with ministers but to no 
avail.’124   
In 1985, an MI5 case officer approached Channel Four’s flagship investigative 
programme 20/20 Vision, alleging that, in violation of their own rules, MI5 had been 
conducting surveillance on CND leadership and senior leaders of the Miners’ 
unions.125  The programme was due to be aired in February 1985 but was cancelled 
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on the advice of the Independent Broadcasting Authority on the basis that it ‘had 
been advised by counsel that it would be committing a criminal act under the Official 
Secrets Act if the programme were shown and as it was a statutory body 
responsible to Parliament, it should not deliberately break the law.’126  The 
programme was shown to MPs, and the Home Affairs select committee demanded 
an inquiry into the activities of ‘Special Branch’ and MI5.  Amongst other claims, the 
MI5 ‘mole’ asserted that MI5 had passed to DS19; ‘non-classified information about 
the left-wing affiliations of senior members of CND, which, it is claimed, Mr 
Heseltine used in political speeches about the peace movement.’127   
This is consistent with the Authorised History of MI5 which records surveillance of 
the Greenham Common Peace camp and various members of CND leadership 
(including Kent and Ruddock) between 1982 and 1985.  Andrew also records - 
which of course would have been unknown to 20/20 Vision and CND - that; 
‘KGB directives passed by Oleg Gordievsky128 to SIS after he arrived 
at the London residency in the summer of 1982 demonstrated that 
Moscow regarded the anti-nuclear movement in Britain (as in the rest 
of the West) as ‘our natural allies’ and believed it could exercise 
considerable influence over it.’129   
Andrew also describes how Gordievsky’s allegations were moderated by senior MI5 
officials in briefings to the Prime Minister ‘…because of fears that the Prime Minister 
would take too literally exaggerated KGB claims of its ability to influence the 
movement.’130  Although there was some concern expressed by the Bridges Inquiry 
about increasing politicization of the Security Services,131 this does tend to suggest 
the opposite, with MI5 appearing to play down elements of intelligence evidence 
because of potential political interpretation: always an issue when political interests 
are exposed to raw intelligence rather than analysis.132   
Ruddock noted:  ‘It was spine-chilling stuff. Of course we always suspected, but to 
see it in print was just sickening. An MI5 whistleblower, Cathy Massiter, … detailed 
MI5 phone taps, agent infiltration and the use of MI5 material for party political 
purposes.’133 
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‘CND argues that opposition also has to be outside the normal 
democratic channels … the argument is that the immorality of mass 
destruction is such as to justify reference to a higher order morality — 
i.e. one is not only entitled, but indeed compelled to break the law if 
that law is itself fundamentally unfair or immoral.’134    
In a liberal democracy, it is a responsible use of the Security Services, with 
appropriate oversight and accountability, to exercise surveillance of those breaking 
the law to perpetrate such activities, however morally motivated.  Massiter’s key 
allegations were that this accountability was lacking, not that the activity per se was 
wrong.  A subsequent government inquiry found no such failure;  
‘The Prime Minister was personally ‘very concerned’ by Massiter’s 
appearance on television and asked Sir John Jones for an ‘absolute 
assurance that there had been no unauthorised interception of 
subversives.’  The DG replied that there had been none since 1972 
when it was within his knowledge.’135   
Lord Bridges was tasked with an inquiry, the output of which was labelled a 
‘complete whitewash’ by CND.136 
One (near-contemporary) commentator observed that:  
‘The halving of popular support for unilateralism between September 
1981 and the end of the 1983 election campaign suggests that CND’s 
message is a rather weak appeal which flourishes in a relative issue-
vacuum but which quickly wilts before the better-organised and more 
institutionally grounded appeals of political parties during election 
campaigns.’137   
The Labour Party, which suffered a crushing defeat in 1983, had adopted a 
unilateralist stance during this election, its manifesto being described as the longest 
political suicide note in history.138 Even Bruce Kent, the General Secretary of CND, 
was quoted saying ‘We were badly let down by the spokespeople of the Labour 
Party’.139 
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Historical evidence – conclusions 
These three chapters have considered the historical evidence for government 
engagement in public discourse on nuclear deterrence policy.  The complex 
relations between public perception and presentation, nuclear policy, nuclear 
strategy, technical factors such as cost and performance and realpolitik played out 
in the most real of circumstances, for the very highest stakes.  The relations 
between these issues have second and third order implications which could be 
significant but which are seldom addressed when formulating public policy.  They do 
tend to shape that engagement though. 
Capability of nuclear weapons is a relative measure; an atomic bomb is hideously 
powerful, but ineffective in comparison to a hydrogen bomb, although arguably an 
atomic bomb is just as capable a deterrent.  But when combined with missile 
technology, and then anti-ballistic missile technology, the arms race associated with 
maintaining the credibility of the nuclear deterrent during the Cold War meant 
significant resources were devoted to research and development at the very cutting 
edge of science and technology.  This drove significant costs into the maintenance 
of a credible deterrent.   
Technical factors were always a consideration in themselves, but they also 
influenced strategy and policy decisions.  Assuming cost is a technical factor driven 
by technological demands, the need to achieve credible (capable relative to the 
threat environment) systems to provide assured deterrence drove the decisions to 
purchase Skybolt, Polaris and Trident.  The need to purchase American systems 
was driven by the inability of the UK to sustain the research and development base 
because of the crippling cost.  The Chevaline project was the epitome of this, and 
the last example of a British sovereign nuclear weapon system development 
project. 
Military factors also played a part as technical imperatives.  Successive 
governments had treated NATO and the sovereign nuclear capabilities as distinct, 
although Alliance commitments were used by Wilson to support the case for Polaris 
in 1964.  This mindset hindered the Thatcher government response to the 
simultaneous protests over NATO intermediate range nuclear forces and the 
replacement of Polaris. 
All governments handled nuclear deterrence policy decisions in very constrained 
groups, with membership restricted to only the most senior ministers or officials; this 
was due in part to an inherited obsessive secrecy, and in part to a feeling that only 
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senior ministers could be trusted to consider and present the sensitive national 
security arguments in their ethical context; scruples, as Churchill put it. 
Some of these scruples have significantly influenced the nature of government 
engagement in public discourse on nuclear deterrence.  They appear to have their 
roots in the First World War, and to have been honed in the desire to appear to 
retain the moral high ground during the Second World War, to the extent that the 
real bombing policy was not revealed to the public.  A similar aversion to admitting 
the threat to non-combatants has inhibited discussion of the nuclear deterrent since.  
Given the influence of this ethical reticence on the development of public 
engagement, the next chapter will consider specifically the relationship between 
government nuclear policy and contemporary ethics of war.  This will provide the 
detailed analysis of ethical theory to underwrite the conclusions at Chapter 8.  
In the early 1980s, the Conservative government was concerned for how its 
message about nuclear deterrence was getting across to the public in the very 
febrile environment fuelled by the standoff between the USSR and NATO over 
intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe and the simultaneous decision to 
replace Polaris with Trident and the resurgence of CND.  Aggressive government 
campaigning targetting both the inherent arguments of nuclear deterrence in the 
Cold War, and the political sympathies of the leaders of the anti-nuclear opposition 
was successful in averting a major shift in public opinion away from the government 
position advocating an independent nuclear deterrent.  Despite some false starts, in 
particular the spectacular own goal over Civil Defence, the Conservative 
government started its second term in office with a clear mandate to procure Trident 
and to deploy the NATO ground-launched cruise missiles.140  
The successful Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 was more due to 
the success of this Alliance-wide realpolitik measure than the campaigning of the 
European anti-nuclear demonstrators. Ironically, the resilience and tenacity that the 
British, German and Dutch governments had to show in facing down their domestic 
opposition to the deployments must have indicated to Moscow the resolve within the 
Alliance to achieve either parity or removal.  The timidity the governments of those 
nations show today in addressing nuclear deterrence matters in public may well 
have the opposite effect. 
In short, a government that struggles to articulate its nuclear deterrence policy to its 
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own populace is unlikely to appear overly credible to a potential adversary.  The 
Thatcher government learned this, over three bruising years –chapter 8 below will 
consider whether those lessons have been retained. 
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Chapter Seven:  Ethical Considerations and Wicked Issues  
Chapter 4 concluded that Churchill’s government had gone out of its way to claim 
the moral high ground at the beginning of the Second World War and had then 
masked the true nature of the strategic bombing campaign in order to present it to 
the public in what they felt was a more acceptable light.  This aversion to a strategy 
that deliberately involved non-combatant casualties can be seen to have had its 
roots in the First World War, but it is equally clear that the lexicon to accommodate 
these concepts was developing in parallel with, if not actually in reaction to, the 
realities of 20th Century warfare.  Chapters 5 and 6 suggested that subsequent 
British governments avoided the ethical issues associated with nuclear weapons 
simply by not engaging with them in public.  It is also clear from private records and 
conversations however, that individual leaders felt the weight of the burdens they 
carried. 
Given that the issue of the ethics associated with nuclear strategy seems to have 
been critical for engagement on nuclear policy, this chapter will consider in more 
detail the current arguments relating to the ethics of war.  It will not provide an in-
depth analysis of the history of thinking on the morality of nuclear weapons, but it 
will attempt to put current thinking into the context of a constantly evolving 
paradigm; or perhaps more accurately, it will compare government thinking in one 
paradigm, with the contemporary rights-based ethical paradigm.  It will conclude 
with two brief case studies of alternative models of government engagement with 
the public on complex ethical issues.   
The Just War tradition – the traditional approach 
‘There may be dark days ahead, and war can no longer be confined 
to the battlefield, but we can only do the right as we see the right, 
and reverently commit our cause to God.’1  
This statement was made by King George VI in his radio broadcast to the Empire 
on 3rd September 1939; the day Britain declared war on Nazi Germany.  The main 
political purpose of this speech was to claim the ‘moral high ground’ and give the 
British Peoples the reassurance that they were doing the ‘right’ thing.  King George 
addressed the issues in terms of the commonly held tenets of the Just War 
tradition.2  
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He reassured listeners that there was a just cause for the war; the whole broadcast 
was designed to make the British Peoples feel that, however much they may abhor 
the need for a further World War, the country had been ‘… forced into a conflict, for 
which we are called, with our allies to meet the challenge of a principle which, if it 
were to prevail, would be fatal to any civilised order in the world…’ and that ‘…the 
freedom of our own country and of the whole British Commonwealth of nations 
would be in danger.’  He emphasised that war was the last resort; ‘Over and over 
again, we have tried to find a peaceful way out of the differences between ourselves 
and those who are now our enemies, but it has been in vain’.  He was clear that it 
was being ordered with the right intent; ‘For the sake of all we ourselves hold dear, 
and of the world order and peace, it is unthinkable that we should refuse to meet the 
challenge.’  War was obviously being declared by a competent authority; he was the 
King – but he couched the whole speech in terms of the collective ‘we’, implicitly 
including his democratically elected government in the authority (and also of course 
the responsibility).  In 1939, there was little doubt in government that Britain was ill-
prepared for war, but it would hardly have been appropriate for this speech to 
contain a detailed analysis of the chance of success, or the proportionality of the 
ends.  His concluding paragraph did give a flavour of the struggle his government 
was anticipating; ‘The task will be hard. There may be dark days ahead, and war 
can no longer be confined to the battlefield...’3  The whole speech offers an implicit 
commentary on the priorities of the government at the time that the Second World 
War was clearly, and from the start, considered from the Allies’ perspective as a 
Just War. 
The Ethics of Command of a Trident Submarine – a Personal Note 
If the reader will forgive the use of the first person briefly; I am not an ethicist, but I 
have given a great deal of thought to the morality of the use of force and, in 
particular, the concept of nuclear deterrence.  I have served in Polaris and Trident 
SSBNs on and off since 1986, including command of two Vanguard Class 
submarines between 2003 and 2007. I therefore have had ample opportunity, and 
motivation, to reconcile the full potential of my personal responsibilities with some 
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kind of moral compass.  In the absence of formal guidance,4 I sought to legitimise 
the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons to myself through consideration of the 
available contemporary Just War literature.  The rather binary options available 
seemed initially to be that either all those involved in the business of deterrence 
were acting immorally, or there was a shortfall in the literature.  I do not accept that 
all of the very honourable professionals with whom I served are merely immoral, or 
too stupid to notice or too hypocritical to care. Nor are they amoral in the 
Machiavellian realist sense; neither I, nor they, accept that there are no appropriate 
moral rules that should be governing this highly emotive and very difficult area of 
moral thinking.   
My own view defaults to the ‘Dirty Hands argument’ compellingly described by 
Walzer in 1973,5 the essence of which is that a person can be faced with a situation 
where they have two options, both of which appear morally reprehensible, but one 
of which must be carried out.  This argument, for me, pivots on the difference 
between deontological ethics and utilitarian morality.  In essence – according to this 
thinking - the end can sometimes excuse the means, but the actor must appreciate 
that the ends excuse his actions, they do not justify them: his actions mean that he 
is no longer innocent.  That is not to say he is guilty:   
‘Why shouldn't he have feelings like those of St. Augustine's 
melancholy soldier, who understood both that his war was just and 
that killing, even in a just war, is a terrible thing to do? (Other writers 
argued that Christians must never kill, even in a just war; and there 
was also an intermediate position which suggests the origins of the 
idea of dirty hands. Thus Basil The Great (Bishop of Caesarea in the 
fourth century A.D.): ‘Killing in war was differentiated by our fathers 
from murder ... nevertheless, perhaps it would be well that those 
whose hands are unclean abstain from communion for three years.’ 
Here dirty hands are a kind of impurity or unworthiness, which is not 
the same as guilt, though closely related to it.)’6 
Of course there is a further complication; deterrence is the threat of the use of force 
in order to prevent an adversary taking a course of action which would lead to the 
need to use force. Kenny argued: ‘This is still immoral since everyone involved still 
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must have the conditional willingness to launch such an attack.’7  He continues;  If 
someone involved says he would pull the trigger if deterrence fails, ‘... then I can 
only tell him, quite soberly, that he is a man with murder in his heart.’8  I do not 
agree; on one level, this is a man prepared to kill in war, but actually this is a man 
who, by being prepared to kill, prevents war.   In my view, nuclear deterrence has 
prevented war between the major powers for 70 years: the slight metaphysical evil 
of threatening violence is far outweighed by the good of preservation of the peace. 
This is a decision process every Commanding Officer must go through in their 
preparations; this Commanding Officer would have pulled the trigger.  
This thinking led, a few years later, to a ‘frank and open exchange of views’ with a 
historian who asserted that military officers simply did not understand or worry about 
the ethics of their profession.  This culminated in the following exchange: ‘After 25 
years of naval service, I do not recognise any of the stereotypes you have portrayed 
of military understanding of the ethics of war’.  His response was; ‘Well, I have 
described my ethically derived theoretical model; I can’t argue with your experiential 
model.’9  It seems, perhaps, that many of those involved in the application of force 
in modern Britain have a set of ethical parameters derived from an ‘experiential 
model’ that is not congruent with modern theoretically derived ethical models.   
The ‘experiential model’ moral paradigm within which I and my contemporaries 
(and, I suspect, many senior officers, officials and politicians) are able to justify 
nuclear deterrence to ourselves does not appear to be one that is in common usage 
in contemporary ethical theories and it is unlikely to find approval amongst a jury of 
ethicists.  In his seminal Just and Unjust Wars (1974) Walzer considered that even 
in extremis:  
‘These rights [the rights possessed by individual human beings 
regardless of circumstance; Walzer defines them as ‘war rights’] I 
shall argue, cannot be eroded or undercut; nothing diminishes them; 
they are still standing at the very moment they are overridden: that 
is why they have to be overridden. Hence breaking the rules is 
always a hard matter, and the soldier or statesman who does so 
must be prepared to accept the moral consequences and the 
burden of guilt that his action entails.’10  
In the dirty hands context, Walzer wrote; ‘ 
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‘When rules are overridden, we do not talk or act as if they had been 
set aside, canceled, or annulled. They still stand and have this much 
effect at least: that we know we have done something wrong even if 
what we have done was also the best thing to do on the whole in the 
circumstances.’11 
The premise of British nuclear deterrence in the 21st Century is that nuclear force 
would only be used in the general context of Churchill’s supreme emergency;  
‘In an emergency, neutral rights can be overridden, and when we 
override them we make no claim that they have been diminished, 
weakened, or lost. They have to be overridden, as I have already 
said, precisely because they are still there, in full force, obstacles to 
some great (necessary) triumph for mankind.’12   
Rodin interprets this concisely; ‘According to Walzer (and John Rawls …), a 
community is permitted to violate the most basic in bello norms if doing so will 
enable it to avoid destruction at the hands of a military aggressor.’13  As will be 
shown below, Rodin does not condone this view.  Bellamy describes it as; ‘when a 
state confronts an opponent who threatens annihilation, it can be morally legitimate 
to violate one of the cardinal rules of the war convention – the principle of non-
combatant immunity.’14  Just like the dirty hands argument, the concept of supreme 
emergency recognises that it does not justify, merely excuses;  
‘It is the acknowledgment of rights that … forces us to realize that 
the destruction of the innocent, whatever its purposes, is a kind of 
blasphemy against our deepest moral commitments. (This is true 
even in a supreme emergency, when we cannot do anything 
else.)’15  
Therefore, accepting that those responsible for Britain’s armed forces and nuclear 
deterrent are neither immoral, amoral, or simply hypocrites, they work to an ethical 
approach that considers different factors when formulating a moral framework than 
those in common currency amongst philosophers. Such a framework would seem to 
need to be Realist in its derivation and, from a post-enlightenment perspective, it 
might appear ruthless and therefore very easy to pillory in terms of theories of 
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rights-based and contemporary versions of the Just War tradition.  The dirty hands 
and supreme emergency arguments described above, best fit my ‘experiential 
model’, and reflect a commitment to the deterrence ethic while recognising the 
repugnance inherent in it. 
Supreme Emergency, Dirty Hands, and Nuclear Deterrence 
As described in Chapter 4 above, in 1944-45, the British government did not feel 
able to describe accurately the mission of the RAF Bomber Command to the public, 
preferring instead to dissemble.  Bellamy concludes that; 
‘British military and political leaders did not justify themselves by 
reference to either the moral tragedy they confronted or the need for 
special permissions. Significantly, they chose not to do either of 
these things because they calculated that a significant portion of the 
British public would oppose the deliberate bombing of German non-
combatants and believed that this could undermine domestic 
support for the war. In turn, this suggests that proponents of the idea 
of supreme emergency overestimate the extent to which liberal 
societies are prepared to accept the deliberate killing of non-
combatants by their governments, and underestimate the normative 
force of non-combatant immunity.’16 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 suggest that similar reticence has been prevalent throughout 
British consideration of acts of war that may cause significant non-combatant 
casualties, and in particular the public handling of nuclear deterrence policy.  At the 
start of the Second World War, King George VI was clearly setting a high ethical 
standard for the British entry into, and conduct of the war.  A democratic state 
requires the support of the population in order to commit to something like a total 
war – and King George’s address made clear that he was under no illusions about 
how ‘total’ the forthcoming conflict was going to be.  In terms of nuclear deterrence, 
a similar – if not greater - level of commitment would be necessary from the 
population if the UK were to face an existential nuclear threat, and the government 
of the day would be faced with the task of preparing the public, materially and 
conceptually.  The public of 1939 understood what war meant – many could 
remember the First World War and most families could number family members 
who had been lost in that conflict.  The modern public has almost no experience or 
understanding of war; other than as something professional armed forces deploy to 
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elsewhere.  Preparing a British 21st Century public for a war which would have 
significant domestic ramifications would be extremely demanding.   
Haslam mooted that; ‘The suggestion that the writings of academics on international 
relations are irrelevant to the needs of statesmen should come as no surprise ....’17  
It is the object of this chapter to investigate if this is the case; if so, why that might 
be, and; what moral factors statesmen, and those involved in the nuclear deterrence 
mission do consider. In particular, recourse to the ‘supreme emergency argument’ 
will be tested in the context of contemporary ethical arguments although, as 
demonstrated in the historical analyses above, there is little historical evidence of a 
direct link between contemporary ethical thought and decisions on UK nuclear 
deterrence policy.   
The Just War Tradition 
Almost without exception, contemporary western commentaries on the ethical 
aspects of warfare allude to the Just War tradition.  The use of the term tradition is a 
careful one; Just War thinking is too loose a concept to merit description as either a 
school of thought, a theory or a paradigm.  But there is clearly a thread of ethical 
thinking related to the conduct of violent relations between political entities that 
seems to merit some form of definition.  Bellamy describes it as ‘…a protracted 
normative conversation about war that has crystallised around a number of 
principles, labelled the ‘war convention’ by Walzer.’18  Within this tradition, or 
conversation, many, if not most, current writers on the ethics of war incorporate 
references to historical figures who have contributed to the evolution of the tradition, 
perhaps to demonstrate a degree of philosophical antecedence or authority.  But 
unlike Johnson, few situate their antecedents in their historical contexts.   
This chapter is framed within the perpetually evolving contemporary role of the Just 
War tradition.  It is not intended to provide a history or analysis of the derivation of 
the tradition. However, the relative importance of each of the parameters commonly 
considered to inform the Just War tradition has varied according to their contextual 
relevance, and this transient salience is an important factor when considering the 
contemporary debates within the analysis of the ethics of the use of force and will 
therefore be considered when relevant.  Johnson specifically analyses and 
contributes to, the evolution of thinking on the ethics of war;  
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‘Both just war and pacifist thought in Western culture have developed 
as historical traditions shaped by diverse influences ...  Exactly how 
these traditions have developed historically is fundamentally important 
for understanding them and drawing out their meaning in the 
contemporary context.’19   
He is not optimistic about the effect;  
‘…Using history deepens both our base of knowledge and our ability to 
formulate and analyse normative claims.  But it has to be used 
conscientiously, lest it lead to the kind of extremist positions that 
employ versions of history to support ideological commitments.’20  
Most commonly, St Augustine figures as the originator of Christian thought on the 
morality of warfare.  Rodin considers the tradition a ‘... combination of international 
law and contemporary philosophical apology backed by a legal, theological and 
philosophical tradition stretching to St Augustine and beyond...’21  McMahan 
considers Augustine ‘...the earliest writer of significance in the just war tradition’22 
and Bellamy is more qualified in his view; ‘Augustine undoubtedly made an 
important contribution to the tradition, but it is important to recognise that he did not 
put forward a single and coherent theory.’23  Butterfield would have disagreed.  He 
argued that Augustine actually put forward the most elegant and inclusive moral 
law; ‘... St Augustine could formulate the whole aspect of the resulting situation in 
the injunction; ‘Love God and do what you like.’24  Butterfield’s paraphrasing 
suggests that Augustine put forward a moral theory that covered every 
circumstance; one ultimate law which regulates the conduct of life and applies to all 
circumstances.  This;  
‘...stands as the final measure of the action, then that law must be 
much more flexible than our ordinary formulas and regulations, ...  At 
the same time, if it is to provide us with a genuine standard for the 
judgement of human conduct ... it is essential to assert its definiteness, 
its importunity and the clarity of its insistences.  ...  For the Christian 
this is not only the first of laws but it is a unique one - it stands through 
time as the source of all others that might be prescribed.  And it is 
absolute.’25 
Butterfield was writing, as a devout Christian himself, of a Christian.  His argument 
would appear to struggle for a secular grounding.  But the idea behind his 
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apparently simple one-line interpretation; ‘love God and do what you like’ is 
anything but simple, and can be applied equally to either secular or spiritual 
morality.  Augustine assumed that the person facing the moral choice would love 
God.  Clearly, such a person would aspire to heaven in due course, and would 
understand that he would be held to account for all of his actions, and his intentions 
when doing those actions.  Therefore, he would weigh very carefully all of the 
pertinent factors, and act in a manner of which he concluded God, not other men, 
would approve;  
‘For their Master had taught them not to seek to be good for the sake 
of human glory, saying, ‘Take heed that ye do not your righteousness 
before men to be seen of them, or otherwise ye shall not have a 
reward from your Father Who is in heaven. [Matthew 6.1]’’26   
Augustine himself anticipated the obvious criticism of this injunction, that it allowed 
men complete freedom with no earthly recourse or judgement;  
‘... nor must they allow themselves to believe that God overlooked their 
character when He permitted acts which no one with impunity commits. 
For some most flagrant and wicked desires are allowed free play at 
present by the secret judgment of God, and are reserved to the public 
and final judgment.’27 
A moral man should act in accordance with his own conscience, not in accordance 
with the approbation (or otherwise) of other men.  
As time has moved on, thinking about the just use of violence has grown ever more 
complex and prescriptive, and the third party approbation or condemnation that 
Augustine specifically prohibited has become ever more prevalent.  Butterfield, with 
his gloriously succinct turn of phrase and sense of humour, put it thus; ‘But it would 
appear that those whom Christ has made free hardly dare believe in their liberty.’28  
Certainly Augustine did offer views on a number of aspects of the conduct of war, 
and most contemporary analyses contain increasingly arcane discussions over the 
relative importance of ‘competent authority’, ‘right intent’ and what has become 
known as ‘discrimination’.   
The Moral Subject and Invincible Ignorance 
Bellamy suggests that; ‘The just war tradition fulfils two roles.  It provides a common 
language that actors can use to legitimise recourse to force and the conduct of war 
and that others can use to evaluate those claims.  It can also inhibit actions that 
																																								 																				
26 AUGUSTINE 413/1952. City of God, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Book V Ch 14 p220 
27 Ibid. Book 1 Ch 28 p146 
28 BUTTERFIELD, H. 1951. History and Human Relations, London, Collins. P43 
	 175	
cannot be legitimated.’29 The suggestion of a ‘common language’ will be further 
examined below.  Fifty years ago, Quade argued that ‘… the principles of just war 
become operative only after the classic political question is answered: who should 
do the judging?’30  Clearly, for Augustine this was simple; the actor was the judge 
and should act morally, and he would face a Divine accounting eventually.  This 
fundamental question is yet to be answered definitively for the secular actor, and it 
remains just as important.  The nature of the judge of the morality of an action 
changes the nature and purpose of the codification of the moral thinking; is ‘Just 
War’ thinking simply a tool for policy makers, or an analytical framework for 
subsequent philosophical debate, or should it be both?  This is not an esoteric 
distinction; it feeds a number of subordinate, but significant ethical issues.  If the 
person who should judge the morality of an action is the actor themselves, how do 
they ensure they have sufficient information about the moral ramifications of the 
action in order to make that judgement?  Can they?  Can a subordinate assume that 
his cause is just because his superiors have assured him that it is so?  Can both 
sides in a conflict rightly believe that they have a just cause?  Finally, if the 
appropriate judge is someone other than the moral actor, how can they apply an 
authoritative set of ethical criteria? 
Who should do the judging?  Clearly, the primary purpose of any ethical system 
such as the Just War tradition is to inform the decisions of statesmen and members 
of the armed forces on the use of force; both before it is used (jus ad bellum) and 
during conflict (jus in bello).  But to return to Augustine’s Divine judgement; who 
judges whether the decisions were ‘right’, in a moral sense?  
Policy must be made in real time, with limited information and probably with some 
assumptions.  The real World is riddled with misperception and accident, with 
deliberate deception and with bureaucratic and military ineptitude; and it is in this 
environment that statesmen must make decisions that have strategic implications; 
they cannot afford to wait for moral endorsement of their decisions after the fact.  
Plato’s ‘Rings of Gyges’ fable suggests a man would rather act immorally but 
appear moral publicly, than act morally but appear immoral.31  Walzer suggests that; 
‘There are, first of all, serious difficulties of perception and information 
(in war and politics generally), and so controversies arise over ‘the 
facts of the case.’ There are sharp disparities in the weight we attach 
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even to values we share, as there are in the actions we are ready to 
condone when these values are threatened.’32   
Walzer’s ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ is a far more compelling argument than some more 
abstract recent philosophical contributions to the Just War canon because it has this 
realistic grounding in the harsh realities of modern international relations.  Writing in 
1978, while the Cold War was at its chilliest, Childress wondered;  
‘What degree of certitude should policy makers and citizens have 
about the justice/justification of a particular war?  Should they be 
convinced that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the 
war is just/ justified according to the above criteria? Or should they 
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt?’33   
Childress doesn’t actually answer this question. King George VI was clear that he 
believed that ‘we can only do the right as we see the right’ and Browne, writing in 
1945, seemed to agree; ‘An action is moral, we shall say, when the agent judges 
that the act is right and the action would not have occurred if the agent had not so 
judged. Thus there must be a desire or intention to do what is right as such.’34   
Both Childress and Browne seem to imply that the agent of the moral action is the 
appropriate authority to determine its just nature.  Clearly, this was the view held by 
King George VI.  Whilst common, this is not a universal view; Walzer argues that; 
‘...the moral reality of war is not fixed by the actual activities of soldiers but by the 
opinions of mankind. That means, in part, that it is fixed by the activity of 
philosophers, lawyers, publicists of all sorts. ...’35  Walzer obviously reserves 
judgement to subsequent analysis.  This suggests that he considers that the Just 
War tradition could be an appropriate guide for the actor, but instead of Augustine’s 
Divine accounting, Walzer’s actor would be appropriately held to account by 
philosophers, lawyers and publicists.  Walzer continues; 
‘In moral life, ignorance isn't all that common; dishonesty is far more 
so. Even those soldiers and statesmen who don't feel the agony of a 
problematic decision generally know that they should feel it. Harry 
Truman's flat statement that he never lost a night's sleep over his 
decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima is not the sort of 
thing political leaders often say. They usually find it preferable to 
stress the painfulness of decision-making; it is one of the burdens of 
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office, and it is best if the burdens appear to be borne. I suspect that 
many officeholders even experience pain simply because they are 
expected to. If they don't, they lie about it.’36    
This cannot be substantiated and appears to weaken the case Walzer is trying to 
make.  If statesmen do lie subsequently because they believe they are expected to 
have felt pain when they felt none, they undermine the validity and certainty of their 
own real-time moral judgements in order to pander to the self-appointed jurists who 
are sitting in judgement upon them.  Actually, Truman did not say that he did not 
agonise over the decision, he merely indicated that he was sure that it was the right 
one. 
Michael Quinlan and Charles Guthrie, experienced and senior figures in Britain’s 
defence establishment during the end of the Cold War and subsequently have 
argued;  
‘...[decisions to go to war] entail taking very serious decisions on the 
basis of estimates of complex futures with wide margins of 
uncertainty and as a result much scope – often on both sides of a 
conflict – for different perceptions and judgements about where 
justice and prudence point.’37   
In a dwindling minority amongst theorists, Johnson argues vigorously that; ‘the 
decision whether to resort to use of armed force is properly the responsibility and 
right of those in positions of supreme political authority in a society, not that of 
moralists… ‘38  Neither are moralists, or publicists, omniscient;   
‘The difficulty of knowing what is right has been made more 
apparent by the recent shift away from absolutist types of ethical 
theory toward teleological, or consequential, types. For if the 
rightness of an act depends on its leading to consequences of a 
certain sort, knowledge of its rightness requires knowledge of its 
consequences, and this requires experience. The relevant 
consequences may in fact be so numerous and far-flung that 
anticipation of more than a small fraction of them is beyond the 
power of the wisest man.’39 
This difficulty in prediction of consequences is echoed by Fisher;  
‘A more serious criticism is that the kind of god-like calculation required 
to draw up such a balance sheet before the onset of war is beyond the 
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wit of man, given the uncertainty and unpredictability of war and the 
incommensurability of the values to be thus balanced.  What 
probabilities are to be assigned to the possible outcomes?’40   
Obviously, these criticisms are valid only from a consequentialist perspective.  If one 
views the same actions from a deontological stance, distance and time from the 
action should make no difference.  Is morality in the eye of the actor, or of the 
subsequent jury, and should the actor’s actions be determined by consideration of 
how they will be perceived by posterity, or by his own assessment of the 
appropriate moral decision? 
Just War in Practice? 
Former British Prime Minister Mr Blair used a striking turn of phrase in his retirement 
speech; ‘But I ask you to accept one thing. Hand on heart, I did what I thought was 
right.’41  It would be easy to deride this as empty rhetoric at the end of a premiership 
still shrouded in intense ethical debate about the Iraq War of 2003.  Alternatively, if 
taken at face value, it is a very Augustinian exit.  Blair’s government chose to go to 
war in Iraq in direct opposition to some of the most extensive public opposition ever 
seen in the United Kingdom.  None of the commentators on that decision know what 
all of the salient factors were.  Blair clearly felt he acted appropriately; many do not, 
but even if all the facts (as they were understood in the autumn of 2002) were 
commonly known, and they are not, there would still be vitriolic disagreements 
about the legitimacy of the Iraq War; ‘Yet the substance of justice has never been 
so universally recognised that, in practice, all men could agree upon the justness of 
a particular war - at least before it was fought.’42  Typically, however, Blair’s next line 
is altogether more nuanced:  ‘I may have been wrong. That's your call. But believe 
one thing if nothing else. I did what I thought was right for our country.’   Here the 
emphasis has shifted from a deontological ‘I did what I thought was right’ to a very 
secular and consequentialist; ‘what I thought was right for our country.’43  And the 
listener has become the judge. 
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But it is not clear what Blair was inviting the listener to judge; his actions and 
whether he thought they were the right thing to do, or the outcomes?  Browne 
differentiated between ‘moral’ and ‘good’:  
‘If the distinction is clearly grasped and the word ‘moral’ used to 
refer to a character which certain acts have because of their 
motivation, it will be recognised that an action may be moral even 
though the act performed is wrong, and an action may be immoral 
even though the act performed is right.’44  
He was thus able to argue coherently that a moral actor may act with right intent, 
even if he could not foresee all of the consequences of his actions.  The issue with 
subsequent analysts being the ‘judges’ of the morality of previous actions is that 
they will have a different set of information, and experience of the consequences, 
on which to base their opinions of the morality of the actions or decisions; and they 
have only the testimony of the moral actors as to their intent in the first instance.   
‘The clearest evidence for the stability of our values over time is the 
unchanging character of the lies soldiers and statesmen tell. They 
lie in order to justify themselves, and so they describe for us the 
lineaments of justice. Wherever we find hypocrisy, we also find 
moral knowledge.’45   
Here is the more ominous purpose of the ‘moral jurist’; the sceptic.  Augustine’s 
Divine accounting discouraged immoral activity disguised as righteousness because 
there would be no way for a Christian to conceal wrong intent from God. But, just as 
Walzer assumed a degree of hypocrisy in soldiers and statesmen that may not be 
warranted, he also assumed a degree of competence in his jurists that is not 
necessarily justified.  He suggests that philosophers, lawyers and publicists ‘fix’ the 
moral reality of war,  but as McMahan puts it; ‘Even the acknowledged experts - the 
theorists of the just war - disagree among themselves about the justice of virtually 
every war.’46  This does rather support Haslam’s assertion above; begging the 
question what value the ‘acknowledged experts’ are to those trying to formulate 
policy in real time?  Perhaps the real value of the Just War tradition is that it has 
provided a common lexicon for the analysts and policy-makers.   The next section 
will consider various contemporary debates within the Just War canon to examine 
this perpetual lack of coherence within the tradition. 
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Rights-Based Ethics of the Use of Force  
To start with another King’s speech on the eve of conflict, Shakespeare has an 
anonymous King Henry V discussing the justness of his cause with two of his 
common soldiers on the eve of the battle of Agincourt: 
Bates: ‘... For we know enough if we are the King’s subjects.  If his 
cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out 
of us.’ 
Williams: ‘But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a 
heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads 
chopped off in a battle shall join together at the latter day, and cry 
all, ‘We died at such a place’ ... Now if those men do not die well, it 
will be a black matter for the King that led them to it – who to 
disobey were against all proportion of subjection.’47 
The core issues here are; can a common soldier know if the cause for which he 
fights is just and is it possible for the cause to be just on both sides?  And who is to 
judge?  Traditionally, following Vittoria,48 the view is that soldiers cannot be 
expected to judge unless an action is manifestly wrong.  Revisionists challenge this 
moral equality.  McMahan extrapolates these questions to provide the core 
arguments in his book ‘Killing in War’;  
‘Some have argued, however, that it is possible for both sides in a 
war to be justified in fighting.  This could be true if justification is 
subjective in nature.  One side could be fighting an objectively just 
war ... while the other could be fully epistemically justified in 
believing that its war was just when it was actually objectively unjust.  
Both would be justified in fighting on a subjective account of 
justification.’49 
McMahan goes on to consider the position of the combatants in a war which is not 
objectively just.  ‘The wrong that is involved in fighting in an unjust war is very 
serious; it is the wrong of intentionally killing people who are doing nothing more 
than defending themselves and other innocent people from threats of wrongful 
harm.’50  Rodin supports this position: ‘Certainly the critique of the ‘moral equality of 
combatants’ seems generally sound; most combatants on the unjust side pose 
rights-violating threats to their adversaries.’51   This position is one side of one of the 
contemporary debates within the Just War tradition: it derives from the issue that 
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both sides in a war cannot be just – one must be objectively wrong, even if they 
think their cause is just.   
Basing his consideration of the legitimate use of force on the right of the innocent 
not to be attacked, McMahan constructs a sophisticated logic about the moral risks 
associated with participating in an unjust conflict.  He concludes that all combatants 
have a duty to assure themselves of the justice of their cause (and by implication 
not obey orders to fight until they have done so).  So Bates and Williams would not 
be exonerated of the wrongness of their cause merely because they were the King’s 
subjects.  McMahan does acknowledge the difficulty of this; ‘Even if soldiers were 
less willing to defer to the authority of their government, it would still be difficult for 
them to deliberate competently about whether a war in which they have been 
commanded to fight is just or unjust.’52 So if soldiers struggle to deliberate 
competently, who should? 
Just war and the rights-based framework 
Competent authority is another of the tenets of the Just War canon, exercising 
varying salience depending on the nature of the international order at the time.  
Much of the foregoing discussion about the moral actor assumes that the actor in 
question is the competent authority considering jus ad bellum; the decision to go to 
war.  In a modern liberal democratic state, that authority is vested in the elected 
government.  Some legalists might argue it has been abrogated to the UNSC, but 
regardless of legal theory, in the custom and practice of the last 70 years, this has 
not been the case.  For Shakespeare’s Bates and Williams above, the competent 
authority was King Henry V.  Clearly, King George VI and his government 
comprised the competent authority for the UK in 1939.  And, agree or not with his 
decisions, Mr Blair’s government comprised the competent authority for the UK in 
2003; a democracy is governed by the elected executive, not by demonstrations of 
public ire.  As Jurist Edmund Burke wrote; 
‘… his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened 
conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any 
set of men living. ... Your representative owes you, not his industry 
only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he 
sacrifices it to your opinion. ... a flatterer you do not wish for.’53   
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Burke wrote in his (unsuccessful) 1774 address to the electors of Bristol that the 
candidate was not there to reflect public opinion but to exercise his judgement on 
behalf of the public.  This is still the case; it is a necessary condition of the 
democratic function that the integrity of those elected to government is assumed.  
This is why there is such a furore when they are caught failing to maintain this 
standard of behaviour, as the 2009/11 MPs’ expense accounts scandals indicate.  
This phenomenon is even more pronounced in the armed forces.  The 2012/13 
scandals in the US army over relationships between married officers and ladies who 
were not their wives ended the career of the most senior and arguably highly 
regarded US serviceman of the 21st Century. Had this case involved politicians, it 
might not have wreaked the same career devastation; had it involved actors, 
nobody would have batted an eyelid.  The members of the armed forces, and the 
public at large, expect a higher degree of moral probity of their senior officers than 
of any other profession, except perhaps Churchmen.   
The moral values and social structures of ‘western’ armed forces do not reflect the 
highly individualistic liberal democracies they serve.  McMahan is disparaging about 
this; ‘In most military organisations, the ability of soldiers to engage in autonomous 
reflection and deliberation about the content of their orders is also deliberately and 
systematically sabotaged.’54  Certainly, disciplined service requires different 
personal priorities to a university campus; Nancy Sherman considers military 
training rather differently; ‘For those who believe manners build morals, the military 
offers the lesson in spades … inscribed on the faces and bodies of the midshipmen 
is a commitment not just to character but also to an aesthetic of character.’55  To a 
very great extent, military training is indoctrination, specifically designed to foster 
this aesthetic.   
‘More fundamentally, boot camp attempts to change the core values 
of a self, so that one is prepared to sacrifice in a way uncommon in 
civilian life, and prepared to overcome the fear and aversion to 
killing that is bred in the bone as a civilian.’56   
Servicemen trust politicians no more than do other members of the population.  But 
they do trust other servicemen, implicitly.  If a senior officer tells his subordinates 
that this or that conflict is necessary and just, the servicemen have every right to 
assume that this is the case and that their cause is just.  To a great extent, this is 
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the obverse of Burke’s point above.  It is the duty of the candidate to exercise his 
judgement to the best of his abilities, and it is the legitimate expectation of the voter 
that he will.  Similarly, it is the duty of the senior officer, with his access to highly 
sensitive intelligence information and strategic overview to assure himself that each 
military action is just, and it is a valid assumption, on which the whole discipline of 
the armed forces is based, of his subordinates to accept that he has done so; 
Shakespeare’s Bates and Williams are both correct.  McMahan however, disagrees:   
‘It should be apparent to them [soldiers] that unless they give very 
careful consideration to what they are being ordered to do, whether 
they end up as just combatants or unjust combatants is mainly a 
matter of moral luck.  If they fail to take these and other 
considerations into account, they are negligent.’57    
‘When a soldier is uncertain about the morality of a war, the presumption should be 
that the morally safer course is not to fight.’58 McMahan’s suggestion undermines 
the discipline and deep vertical and horizontal loyalties that underpin the military 
profession.  Whilst this may be a valid theoretical position, McMahan subsequently 
describes the practical difficulty, without moderating his position:   
‘…although there is a law of jus ad bellum, there is no authoritative 
interpreter of that law that soldiers can consult in advance of going 
to war.  When the legal authorities in a soldier’s society order him to 
fight in a war, international law fails to provide him with any source 
of guidance that might authoritatively controvert his government’s 
assertions about the legality of the war.’59  
In 2005, he had suggested that; 
‘There is, it might be argued, one way in which right intention could 
be satisfied even in the absence of a just cause; if people falsely 
believed that there was a just cause and fought with the intention of 
achieving it.  Yet it seems to me that this would clearly not be the 
right intention in the circumstances, though it might well be a good 
intention.’60   
McMahan has been consistent in his argument that the moral equivalence of 
combatants is based on the difficulty of achieving his criteria for just cause.  Sixty 
years earlier, Browne suggested that;  
‘Moral goodness is an attribute which characterizes certain actions 
(performances of acts) by reason of the motives from which they 
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spring, while rightness characterizes certain acts (the thing done) 
independently of the motives from which they are performed. Each 
is independent of the other’.61   
Thus, according to Browne’s criteria, a combatant who is involved in a conflict which 
he believes is just, and is fighting with ‘right intent’, is acting morally, even if the 
cause is not actually just.  This is derived from the ‘traditional’ 17th Century Just War 
tradition interpretation (following Suarez) that soldiers should follow their leaders; 
‘trust your prince’. This appears to be the basis of the case against which McMahan 
is arguing.  In 2008, Rodin suggests that; ‘…a person is generally held to be 
accountable for his or her actions according to the facts as he or she reasonably 
and honestly apprehended them to be at the time.’62  Although this is specifically 
looking at jus in bello, as a normative principle presumably it would also apply to jus 
ad bellum decisions.  Rodin continues; ‘War leaders are held responsible for the 
decisions they make in light of the facts as they honestly and reasonably believed 
them to be.’63  It is not clear whether Rodin considers that instructions from superior 
military authorities constitute legitimate elements among those facts. An assumption 
that they do underpins military service.  
McMahan goes on to develop the implications of a lack of just cause into an 
apparently coherent jus ante-bellum.  He argues elsewhere that ‘...just cause is 
necessary for the satisfaction of any of the other conditions of a just war...’64 
although he did qualify that by suggesting that Just War in this context meant more 
than merely a morally justified war.   But his usage of just cause requires 
subsequent experience; it is impossible to establish just cause until all the 
consequences can be identified and considered.  In that case, the actual 
‘operational’ utility of Just War thinking; the ability to use it to assist in decision-
making as opposed to subsequent critique, is minimised.  And as McMahan 
acknowledges, there is seldom consensus amongst the subsequent jurists.  In 
effect, McMahan’s definition and extrapolation of just cause preclude the moral use 
of force. 
That said, when considering jus in bello, there is in extremis a normative limit to the 
control of actions within conflict. ‘I was simply following orders’ is not a defence in 
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cases of manifest war crimes.  So to the extent that there are gross injustices which 
can never be condoned, McMahan’s view is valid.   This debate will never be 
satisfied, but the important aspect is the debate itself; only in engaging in it will the 
soldiers and politicians be kept ‘honest’.  
The Right of Self Defence 
Probably the least obviously contentious ‘just cause’ is the right of self-defence, and 
it is here that revisionist challenges seem to be challenging the common lexicon of 
the Just War tradition most vividly.  The Just War language of self-defence for 
states is embedded in the international system, not least as the most obvious 
manifestation of the concept of state sovereignty, and it is clearly articulated in the 
UN Charter, article 51: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.’65 
Johnson describes defence as;  
‘… justification for the use of force by private persons, did not 
reason from self-defense to the justification of the use of force on 
behalf of the political community, but instead rendered the idea of 
just cause for resort to force in terms of the sovereign’s 
responsibility to maintain justice, vindicating those who had suffered 
from injustice and punishing evildoers.’66   
He tempers this with further consideration of contemporary examples, including the 
pastoral letter of the American Catholic Bishops, which sought to set out the 
Church’s position on nuclear deterrence in 1983; ‘For the US Catholic bishops in 
1983, the focal aim was to prevent resort to armed force by the United States, and 
to allow it only if justified by the cause of defence.’67  Johnson goes on to consider 
the implications of the tendency for Western nations to protect individuals in other 
states from either the state itself, or from significant threats within those states.  He 
cites the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a significant factor for Western states when 
deciding to intervene (or not) in Somalia, Rwanda and former Yugoslav states and 
he concludes from those examples that states cannot claim a right of self defence in 
the same way that an individual can – the right of states to defend themselves is 
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more to do with their ability to act as a force for the health of the political community. 
68   By analyzing current events, Johnson considers the evolution of the Just War 
lexicon. 
In his 2002 book, Rodin re-examines the application of Just War theories of self-
defence to states, seeking to ‘…build an account of defensive rights as emerging 
from a complex set of normative relations between two moral subjects.’69  He 
develops a complex model of normative relationships based on a development of 
Hohfeldian rights theory and concludes that; ‘A right of defence exists when a 
subject is at liberty to defend a certain good by performing an action which would 
otherwise be impermissible.’70  He acknowledges that there may be other factors 
that could be considered but argues that;  
‘… rights have a distinctive stringency, such that they generally 
override competing moral considerations.  Secondly, they have a 
particular role in standing against, and placing limits upon, what may 
be called ‘goal based’ moralities such as consequentialism.  Thirdly, 
rights are moral considerations which have a unique relation to 
individual moral subjects.’71  
Rodin considers that there are two potential justifications for a state having a right of 
‘national defence’ ; the reductive strategy; ‘an organised exercise of the right of self-
defence by large numbers of individuals at one time’72 and the more commonly 
considered domestic analogy; a state can be treated as an individual existing in an 
anarchic state of nature.  ‘Rodin suggests that, at most, a right of national-defence 
can only be individually justified by its ends … it is a right that belongs to the state 
exercised against other states, but only for the benefit and protection of individual 
citizens.’73  But, Woodard suggests, Rodin then discounts this strategy because; ‘… 
[it] is pretty hopeless.  Much of the trouble stems from the limitations of 
proportionality, necessity and imminence to which, he argues, the individual right of 
self defence is subject.’74  And, specifically, it fails to address the circumstances of a 
humanitarian intervention against a state which is abusing its own population, so 
does not present a normative justification.   
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Similarly, Rodin discounts the domestic analogy arguing that the nature of 
sovereignty has changed since the inception of the UN and therefore the notion of 
state sovereignty cannot give legal substance to the right of national-defence and 
therefore even less is it capable of justifying it morally;  
‘The basic problem is that sovereignty is a factual and not a 
normative concept.  … The concept of sovereignty is, by itself, 
incapable of conferring normative content on the right of national-
defence because the sense of sovereignty here employed itself 
requires normative justification.  Morally speaking, it is an empty 
vessel.  For these reasons, the normative aspirations of the right of 
national defence in international law require a grounding in moral 
theory.’75 
Rodin then considers the right of defence of political communities in terms of 
defending the ‘common life of the community.’ 
‘… This interpretation attributes to the common life a moral value 
prior to, and independent of, the value of the individuals who 
compose it.  We may call this the ‘strong organic view’ of the 
common life.  …  Given such a view, it is extremely simple to 
account for the obligation to die on behalf of, and the right to kill in 
defence of, the common life, for the latter is seen as an entity whose 
value exceeds, and is prior to, the value of any individual life …  The 
strong organic view derives what credibility it has from observations 
about the essential role of the community in defining and shaping 
the very nature of the individual.  … People are what they are within 
communities, and in abstraction from them would be unrecognisable 
as moral beings.’76 
The quote above is extensive, but exemplifies the heart of one side of the argument.  
The basis of Rodin’s examination of the right of national defence is the perspective 
of individual rights.  The ethicist describes the ‘strong organic view’ in order to reject 
it: a realist (Morgenthau) suggests that; ‘The history of political thought is the history 
of the moral evaluation of political power.’77 As an explanation of real human 
behaviour, the strong organic view offers a much far coherent view of political 
history than Rodin.   
The Strong Organic View 
Rodin asserts that ‘It seems to me that it would also be disproportionate to use 
lethal force against someone who sought to deprive you of important political 
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freedoms such as the right to vote or freely express your opinions.’78  This concept 
would be alien to almost everyone who has fought for political freedoms since the 
enlightenment – from the Tolpuddle martyrs to Tiananmen Square and the Maidan; 
if the political history of the post-enlightenment world suggests anything, it shows a 
sustained and often violent struggle over hundreds of years to attain exactly those 
freedoms that Rodin writes off.   
Sharma (paraphrasing Johnson) counters Rodin’s presumption against war by 
insisting that it is actually a ‘presumption against injustice’, which stands at the 
forefront of Just War thought.79  Although he does not use Rodin’s terminology, 
Johnson suggests that the strong organic view; the idea that something other than 
‘rights’ merit the use of force, actually underpins the whole Just War tradition;  
‘In sum I have been arguing that just war tradition provides us with 
three fundamental moral reminders: first that sometimes the use of 
force may be necessary to protect or preserve values that would 
otherwise be damaged or lost; second that both the resort to force 
and the application of forceful means must be subjected to a 
searching intentionality of justification and restraint...’80  
Johnson draws on historical context to inform his understanding of the writings of 
Just War tradition, ‘I think it essential to take account of historical experience and 
traditions encapsulating that experience in politics and ethics.’81  This is a 
fundamentally different approach to Rodin and McMahan.   
Rodin and McMahan both conclude that there is no moral justification for the use of 
force in a state based international environment.  For different reasons, they 
conclude that the only legitimate use of force would be some form of world police 
power in the restitution or prevention of aggression.82  It is this type of ethical 
discussion to which Clement VIII, Pope from 1592-1605, was referring when he 
wrote; ‘Actually, in matters of business and affairs of state there is never any need 
to avail oneself of the work of academics [dottori] since with their excessive 
subtleties they are more likely to ruin them than bring them to a good conclusion.’83  
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In an anarchic world comprised of states, what use is a morality that insists 
everything is illegitimate to a statesman or soldier?   
Alternatives to Rights-Based Ethics 
Whetham suggests that the Just War criteria are merely a particular codification of 
the criteria which comprise most moral decisions.84  If Just War thinking could be 
reduced to a single sentence, accepting the gross oversimplification for discussion 
purposes, it might read something like this: A competent authority can, in a just 
cause, with a right intent, as a last resort and with a reasonable chance of success, 
do something harmful if the harm anticipated is not disproportionate to the good to 
be obtained.  According to Coleman this could be true of any moral decision; take a 
surgeon contemplating an operation on a patient.85  Clearly the surgeon is 
competent to conduct the operation but he will always seek informed consent from 
either the patient or a responsible person (usually the next of kin).  Between them, 
they would constitute a competent authority.  The operation will clearly bring some 
benefit (just cause) to the patient but there may be risks associated and the 
competent authority must understand these risks in relation to the benefit 
(proportionality) and surgery should be conducted only when all less risky options 
have been exhausted (last resort).  The surgeon must be conducting the operation 
for the benefit of the patient, not merely because he gets paid for it (right intent) and 
there must be a reasonable chance of success.  
Childress addresses this concept with particular reference to the Just War tradition;  
‘Actually we formulate and use criteria that are analogous to those 
that determine whether a war is just and justified whenever we face 
conflicting obligations or duties, whenever it is impossible to fulfil all 
the claims upon us, to respect all the rights involved, or to avoid 
doing evil to everyone.  Sometimes we confront two or more prima-
facie duties or obligations, one of which we cannot fill without 
sacrificing the other(s).’86   
This, of course, describes the nuclear deterrence ‘dirty hands’ argument considered 
above; the prima facie duty to protect the society and population of the state is in 
conflict with the prima facie duty not to inflict non-combatant casualties. Childress 
uses the concept of prima-facie obligations or duties to differentiate between moral 
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factors that have an absolute nature to them; ‘If an obligation is viewed as absolute, 
it cannot be overridden under any circumstances; it has priority over all other 
obligations with which it might come into conflict.’87 The reason that ‘Just War’ has 
such a long tradition is, of course, that there is a prima-facie obligation not to use 
violence against others, and the Just War tradition has evolved precisely in order to 
identify rationally occasions when this prima-facie obligation must be abrogated in 
the face of other prima-facie obligations.  It is merely one of a number of complex 
moral calculi that statesmen are forced to use when assessing their policy options. 
This ethical discussion now takes on a suspiciously realist tone.  Bellamy quotes 
Niebuhr; ‘Niebuhr … rejected traditional just war criteria, insisting that no moral 
values were absolute and that all could be sacrificed in order to protect other 
values.  …  Much better, thought Niebuhr, to deny absolute values and evaluate 
each case on its merits.’88  In his investigation of the evolution of the Just War 
tradition, Bellamy considered the impact of Realist thought; ‘Machiavelli placed no 
universal moral or legal constraints on the prince’s decision to wage war or its 
conduct.  The only guide was necessity.  For Machiavelli, this meant that morally 
evil means were permissible if they accomplished good consequences.’89  
Machiavelli was not interested in ‘good’ or ‘bad’, merely ‘effective’.  This was not a 
moral consideration but a purely political one – action was measured purely by 
effect, and good and bad action was assessed purely against its utility in the 
maintenance of the State.  It was this pervasive amorality; clearly applicable to the 
actions of the Church and states alike, which drew such opprobrium from his 
contemporaries, many of whom were key thinkers in the development of the Roman 
Catholic Just War canon.90  The realist canon of thinking is nearly as vast as the 
Just War canon, but more single-minded; ‘[Pope] Clement [VIII] asserted that ... 
sovereign princes might, because of reasons of state, make and break treaties and 
alliances, lie, betray, and follow other such practices.’91  Niebuhr suggested that no 
area of politics was ever immune from moral claims but, on the other hand, no moral 
action could escape the pull of parochial self-interest.92  Bellamy concludes that the 
Just War tradition incorporates sub-traditions dominated by natural law, positive law 
and realism.93   
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In the hands of philosophers such as Augustine and others, the Just War tradition 
evolved as an ethical tool that allowed recourse to violence under certain 
circumstances, but then inhibited action taken under that recourse.  As it has moved 
further from its roots, and since the end of the Cold War especially, it appears to be 
developing into a prohibition on the use of force, with increasingly arcane and 
narrowly defined exceptions.   Some contemporary treatments reduce Just War 
ethics into a normative fundamentalist theory which precludes the use of force by 
states in any circumstance, including self-defence, with a prescription that involves 
World government and morally legitimate police actions in the place of national 
defence.   It is difficult to see why statesmen would consider Walzer’s jury of 
philosophers, lawyers and publicists relevant if their actions were to be analysed 
according to these criteria, especially when there is no consensus amongst the 
‘jurists’ in any case.  In the 21st Century, Walzer’s jury could, alternatively, be 
construed as consisting of contemporary statesmen at the United Nations and, as 
Bellamy suggests; ‘Under the 1945 [UN] system, sovereigns are legally required to 
present their case for war to a group of peers.’94  Unfortunately, after 70 years of 
custom and practice, during which it has customarily failed to exert this authority, 
the UN system has little credibility in this regard. 
Implications 
There appears to be a fundamental aspect of common human morality which is 
insufficiently represented in the post-Enlightenment canon of Just War thinking 
which is, however, present in the thinking of those with responsibility for waging war.  
Modern moral philosophy is a factor for contemporary statesmen, officials and 
military personnel, but it seems to be only a factor, and those more intimately 
involved in ethics naturally feel that they would prefer to see it take a more central, if 
not pre-eminent role. There is a teleological tendency amongst modern moral 
philosophers to argue for a single normative rule, such as Kant’s categorical 
imperative, but they appear to be trying to simplify them too far and thus end up with 
a catalogue of prescriptions that apply in many cases, but not necessarily in all.  
The logic to get to them is so set around ludicrously hypothetical examples that the 
simplicity that Kant brought to the equation is lost.  Kant’s categorical imperative, 
‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law’ however, is in itself, anything but simple and harks 
back to the Augustinian directive to ‘love God and do as you will’.  It is an 
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exhortation to take every decision seriously, weigh every factor as it applies to the 
best of your knowledge at the time and to act in accordance with your conscience.  
In short, it is an ethical echo of Niebuhr’s realist insistence that no moral values are 
absolute and that all could be sacrificed in order to protect other values. 
This conclusion does not align with Rodin and McMahan, and others of similar ilk.  
The reason for that is that is they regard the rights of individual human beings as 
entailing more than prima-facie duties and obligations, and they do not attribute any 
inherent moral value to political communities, and states in particular.  Thus the 
rights to life of individuals cannot be abrogated under any circumstances, including 
defence of a community.  The efforts of Rodin and McMahan to identify a catechism 
to encapsulate this, however, fail to achieve the sophistication of either Kant or 
Augustine, and as a result their serious contributions to the understanding of the 
factors that statesmen should be taking into account are condemned to the 
sidelines; a functional pacifism, as Johnson put it.95   
In the first half of the 21st Century, this naivety has a pernicious and dangerous side-
effect; it threatens to hijack the lexicon of Just War thinking.  If the right of national 
self-defence is rendered meaningless in the moral vocabulary offered by modern 
ethics, then the language being used inhibits the thought processes available to 
those involved.  The reduction of the richly complex vocabulary of the ethics of 
international relations to that of pacifism introduces intolerable inhibitions on the 
moral use of force, and the discourse, or conversation as Bellamy put it, is 
diminished.  Legitimate regimes would struggle to justify the use of force in almost 
every circumstance, including Rodin’s ‘national defence’, and, ironically, the way 
would then be easier for only immoral regimes to use force without opposition.  
It appears that the most important thing about moral discourse is not that it has a 
single normative solution, but that the discourse exists.  Statesmen must feel that 
they must be able to justify their actions, and ethicists must be able to challenge 
them; and the lexicon of the Just War tradition provides the language and paradigm 
for that exchange; it is diminished at our peril.96  The Just War tradition does not 
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constitute a normative basis on which international relations is conducted, but it 
does provide the words we use to talk about it.  
Why don’t statesmen act morally? 
‘The clearest evidence for the stability of our values over time is the 
unchanging character of the lies soldiers and statesmen tell. They lie in 
order to justify themselves, and so they describe for us the lineaments 
of justice. Wherever we find hypocrisy, we also find moral knowledge’97   
As considered briefly above, one limitation with moral discourse is that it inhibits its 
own parameters by its lexicon.  Modern Western philosophy is almost exclusively 
derived through the lens of the Enlightenment and the focus on the rights of the 
individual; Rodin and McMahan regard the World as a collection of autonomous 
individuals, each with absolute rights and they formulate philosophical arguments 
accordingly.  Psychologist Jonathan Haidt suggests that ‘...philosophers since Kant 
and Mill have mostly generated moral systems that are individualistic, rule-based, 
and universalist. That’s the morality you need to govern a society of autonomous 
individuals.’98  He goes on to suggest that there are factors that legitimately inform 
moral decisions other than those which informed Kant and Mill, and subsequently 
most post-enlightenment thinking. 
Who judges therefore is important, because it changes the nature of the thinking 
behind Just War ethics.  Policy must be made in real time, with limited information 
and some assumptions; does the statesman act in accordance with his own 
conscience, or in accordance with what he believes will meet the approval of 
subsequent analysts?  And does this then have an effect on his actions?  Should it?  
This difference pervades every strategic decision.  The ‘jury’ is also important in this 
context because if the jury has an agenda, and the Just War tradition has always 
been susceptible to selective use,99 it can be used to devastating effect to make 
what might have been reasonable and well-considered decisions in the 
circumstances appear utterly immoral in hindsight if the ‘jury’ considers different 
factors to the statesman.   
One contemporary ‘jury’ for the British government could be seen as the British 
public.  This chapter started with a review of the King’s Speech of September 1939, 
considering the ethical tenets it invoked to persuade and encourage the British 
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public as they faced the second major war in their lifetimes.  Despite the moralising, 
rhetorical flourishes and public pronouncements, the British strategy for area 
bombing was exactly that which the government denied; terror bombing.  There are 
ethical arguments that can be made to excuse this, but as Bellamy concluded, there 
was clearly unease within the British government about how those arguments would 
stand up in public, even during wartime.100  In the event, the public acquiesced in a 
convenient fiction – that non-combatant casualties were the unintended 
consequences of attacks on military targets.   
Chapters 4-6 suggest that successive governments have simply avoided public 
discussion of this nature on nuclear weapons policy, not so much because the 
policy itself is morally reprehensible, but because it is difficult to present in terms 
which unambiguously appear ‘good’ to the public.  Plato’s Rings of Gyges morality 
still applies, and there is no evidence that the public is prepared for a more 
sophisticated argument, nor that the government could make it.  The next section 
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Wicked issues 
It is the lot of government to face ‘wicked’ issues.  Originally a term coined in the 
social policy environment in the USA, a wicked issue refers;  
‘… to that class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, 
where the information is confusing, where there are many clients 
and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the 
ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing. The 
adjective ‘wicked’ is supposed to describe the mischievous and 
even evil quality of these problems, where proposed ‘solutions’ often 
turn out to be worse than the symptoms.’101   
Use of this term has expanded beyond the social policy environment and, in effect, 
this thesis considers how one of those wicked issues has been addressed by 
successive British governments; the issue of nuclear deterrence policy. 
There has always been a tension in the relationship between ‘science’ and ‘ethics’.  
The increasing power of science to affect the world in which we live poses distinct 
ethical questions which often fit precisely into this definition of wicked issues.  The 
balance between the threats and benefits of scientific innovation in issues as widely 
spread as; energy production and climate change, use of animal subjects in 
research on human diseases, the teaching of evolution in religious schools, nuclear 
deterrence and; genetic analysis or modification, pose some of the key ethical 
issues facing modern society.  One commentator suggests; 
‘What has happened is that the speed of technological change has 
outstripped our ability to adjust our social life and ideas. It is clear 
that technology is forcing us to confront some of our most dearly 
treasured ideas because it has devised means of doing things that 
we would never countenance if it were proposed that they were 
undertaken without the benefit of technological assistance, as most 
them can be.’102  
Or, more bluntly; ‘We have created a Star Wars civilization, with Stone Age 
emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology.’103  The core of these 
issues tends to be at the heart of modern ethical debate; are there perpetual, 
deontological moral values which should preclude certain activities, even if those 
activities promise huge consequential benefits? ‘Scientific advances often create 
'policy vacuums' or situations that demand choices.  But the right path is seldom 
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clear.’104    It falls to government to make those choices, and they are potentially the 
most ‘wicked’ choices of all.   
In making difficult policy choices, there is always a number of government options.  
The default tends to be to avoid the issue altogether until the problem is so salient 
that something must be done.  This salience is increasingly dictated by public 
engagement and media coverage, or occasionally, particularly effective lobbying in 
Parliament.  Once a wicked ethical issue is in the public domain, there is no 
shortage of ‘experts’ prepared to argue for one solution or another, and the most 
vociferous of these tend to be the more dogmatic.  Thus, by the time government 
becomes engaged publicly in resolution of a wicked issue, there are often already 
well-established and entrenched positions, all of which will have an element of 
credibility sustained by selective presentation and interpretation of evidence, and a 
train of highly-opinionated supporters.  It is the government task to bound the issue, 
consider the advice of genuine experts and to make decisions on behalf of the 
society it serves.   
This thesis does not seek to investigate ethical, and in particular moral, positions 
per se, nor to pronounce judgement on government decisions, but simply to 
consider how those decisions have been made in one of the longest-standing and 
most wicked ongoing issues; nuclear deterrence policy.  In doing so, it considers 
British government engagement with the public at key points in the development of 
British nuclear deterrence policy but in order to provide a contextual framework for 
this analysis, this chapter will consider the treatment of two other wicked issues 
created by scientific advances in highly emotive areas; human embryology and 
fertilisation and; genetically modified crops.  The treatment of each of these issues 
has been very different, but the scope and symptoms of the ‘wickedness’ of the 
issues were similar. 
Human Embryology and Fertilisation 
On 7th December 1978, a Top Secret report titled ‘Factors Relating to the Further 
Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Deterrent’105 was submitted by 
the Cabinet Office to the Chancellor, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary.  
The remainder of the Cabinet did not know of its existence.  The Duff-Mason 
Report, as it become known, contributed substantially to the decision-making 
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process that culminated in 1982 with the Thatcher government decision to procure 
Trident from the USA.  The process that led to that decision was considered in 
detail above.  Another ‘wicked’ decision was playing out in exactly the same time-
frame.   
On 25 July 1978, baby Louise was born to parents Lesley and John Brown in 
Oldham Hospital; the first human being to be conceived outside the womb using an 
experimental technique to overcome infertility, In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF).  The event 
caused an immediate media sensation, and a flurry of strongly opinionated 
moralistic posturing.   On the same day, the government responded to a 
Parliamentary question asking ‘what control is required over research involving 
human fertilisation in vitro and embryo transplants’106 and whether the ethical and 
social aspects should be reviewed, by stating that; 
 ‘The techniques of human in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer 
do not involve genetic manipulation in any way... the Medical 
Research Council ... would not support research in these fields until 
there was satisfactory evidence from work with animals of the safety 
of the techniques.’107   
Of course, this did not address the question asked. 
The Medical Research Council (MRC) had been aware of the development of IVF 
since 1971, but had not become involved either in supporting this life-changing 
medical procedure, or in inhibiting or supervising the development of this morally 
challenging genetic process.  After Louise Brown’s birth, the MRC established an 
‘Advisory Group to Review Policy on Research on In-Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo 
Transfer in Humans’.  Its first meeting, in 1979, recorded; ‘In 1971, an application 
from Mr PG Steptoe and Dr RG Edwards for long-term support of a programme of 
studies on human reproduction had been declined because of serious doubts about 
the ethical aspects of some of the proposed investigations…’108  Having identified 
and expressed to itself serious ethical doubts, the MRC seems to have failed to 
identify that the issue at hand was not whether the research should be funded, but 
whether it should be authorised.   
By 1982, the British Medical Association (BMA), the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists, the Council of Churches and the Council for Science and 
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Society had all established working parties in this field.  Each of these bodies may 
have asserted authority within its own remit, but this ‘wicked issue’ transcended 
their areas of expertise and prerogative and none were sufficiently broadly based or 
sufficiently representative to be regarded as a source of authoritative advice to 
government.  The Department of Education and Science advised the MRC;  
‘…These further developments raise difficult moral and legal 
questions – the rights of a child vis-à-vis its genetic and its biological 
parent; the responsibilities and liabilities of those handling human 
embryos; the circumstances in which an embryo developed in vitro 
might be kept or destroyed; and so on. Public concern about these 
issues has been focussed by recent reports in the press and on 
television, and there have been repeated calls both inside and 
outside Parliament, for a Government enquiry…’109  
In July 1982, the Department of Health and Social Security(DHSS) announced a 
Government Enquiry into Human Fertilisation;  
‘...to consider recent and potential developments in medicine and 
science related to human fertilisation and embryology; to consider 
what policies and safeguards should be applied, including 
consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications of these 
developments, and to make recommendations.’110   
Announcing the Enquiry, the Secretary of State for Social Services continued; 
‘Membership will be broad based and includes, as well as doctors and lawyers, 
other relevant professionals and those with experience in family policy and the child 
care fields; other ‘lay’ and religious viewpoints will also be represented...’111  There 
had been no discussion of the impending enquiry at the MRC ‘Advisory Group’ 
meeting on 13th May 1982, suggesting that this was not necessarily a government-
wide initiative and there is no mention of the enquiry at all in Cabinet minutes prior 
to its establishment, although to be fair, the Cabinet was distracted by the Falklands 
War at the time. 
The surviving files do not give a good indication of the government rationale for 
establishing the enquiry, although there is enough to determine that it was not at all 
universally popular in Whitehall.  The best source of information on the 
establishment of the enquiry is actually the report of the Warnock Enquiry itself;   
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‘… it was our task to attempt to discover the public good, in the 
widest sense, and to make recommendations in the light of that … 
we had, in the words of one philosopher, to adopt ‘a steady and 
general point of view’. So, to this end, we have attempted in what 
follows to argue in favour of those positions which we have adopted, 
and to give due weight to the counter-arguments, where they 
exist.’112 
Warnock and public perceptions of scientific development 
Warnock and her committee identified that one of the major intangible imperatives 
for the enquiry was the anxiety generated in the public mind by the developments in 
scientific and medical techniques.  The Committee recognised from the outset that 
in a pluralistic society, one particular set of principles could never be completely 
accepted by everyone;  
‘We recognised that within society there is a multiplicity of views on 
the issues before the Inquiry. We therefore decided to seek 
evidence from as many organisations, reflecting as many different 
perspectives, as possible. ... But even with submissions from so 
many organisations we have to record with regret that we did not 
receive evidence from as wide a range of minority and special 
interest groups as we would have liked, despite our best 
endeavours.’113   
Analysis of the specific issues under consideration is not pertinent to this thesis, but 
a brief consideration of the bodies submitting evidence is instructive. 
The list of bodies and individuals which provided evidence is considerable and 
includes 23 universities, 12 Royal Colleges, the High Court (Family Division), bodies 
representing all of the established religions in the UK, over 30 Local Authorities, 
local and national groups with a particular interest in the related issues, charities, 
individuals and the Trades Union Congress.114  The MRC, already castigated in 
Parliament for its failure to identify the larger issues associated with human 
embryology, was one of the first expert bodies invited to present expert evidence to 
the Warnock enquiry.115  Despite having been silent on the issue previously, the 
MRC promptly published ‘a statement on research relevant to human fertilisation 
and embryology in the British Medical Journal of 20th November.’116   
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Subsequent internal correspondence between the secretary of the Warnock Enquiry 
and the Chair of the MRC suggests that the relationship between the MRC and the 
Warnock Enquiry was not entirely harmonious; in a draft of a ‘stock’ Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) response to letters from the public on the issue, 
Dr Rashbass (chair of the MRC) struck out by hand the two paragraphs which had 
read; ‘It would therefore be inappropriate for me to say anything at this point in time 
which might be seen as prejudicing the outcome of the inquiry under Mrs Warnock’s 
chairmanship’ and ‘… while I in no way wish to prejudice the inquiry’s work...’117  
Each of these stock phrases is used routinely within Whitehall to stress 
interdepartmental coherence, especially if there is none.  That this section was 
regarded as necessary by the Warnock Enquiry is indicative of interdepartmental 
tensions, but that it was struck out by the MRC is, perhaps, more so.   
The MRC publication of its evidence prior to presenting it to the Warnock Enquiry 
set a precedent which was followed by a number of other bodies which had hitherto 
been silent on the issue; The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
and the Royal Society each published pamphlets outlining their position, prior to 
presenting to the Warnock Enquiry.  Each of these publications was reported in the 
press at the time, pre-empting the Warnock Enquiry Report.  If MRC &c attempted 
to influence the public debate prior to the publication of the Warnock Report, they 
probably succeeded, but the report literally had the last word.  By addressing the 
issues that the evidence had raised in a measured and holistic fashion, the 
Warnock Enquiry took the rhetorical ‘heat’ out of the issue and enabled a genuinely 
informed and rational discussion in the media.  Although the public was not spared 
headlines such as; ‘Could my Husband be my Brother?’118 it was also treated to 
more well-considered and balanced discussions such as Radio Four’s flagship 
current affairs programme ‘Analysis’. 
In her subsequent analysis of the role of the Enquiry, Baroness Warnock 
recognised the constraints, and in articulating them, defined the crux of the matter 
under consideration in this thesis.  ‘One of the obvious difficulties is to establish 
what the moral sentiments of the public actually are. In a pluralistic society, such as 
ours, there is certain to be a wide diversity of views.’119  This is a generic 
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observation applicable to any ethical question, and when significant moral factors 
are involved, the difficulties are exacerbated;  
‘The more certain people are of the correctness of their views, as a 
rule, the more vocal they are.  It tends to be the hard-liners, in 
whichever direction, who tell their views abroad. And so there is a 
danger that ‘public opinion’ may come to be identified not with the 
views of the relatively confused, relatively open-minded majority, but 
with the views of the committed and the fanatical.’120  
However, the reality has never been so pure and public opinion on ethically 
challenging issues has long had an influence on government policy.   
In the early 19th Century, an increasing demand for human corpses for anatomical 
study and surgical training created an underground supporting industry of grave-
robbers; ‘Without the bodies, which were illegally obtained through grave robbers, 
the work of many anatomists would not have been possible.’ 121  In 1828, William 
Burke and William Hare bypassed the necessity of grave-robbery by simply 
murdering ten people and providing their bodies to the famous anatomist Doctor 
Robert Knox.  Burke was hanged. (With deliberate bureaucratic irony, his body was 
dissected and his skeleton remains on display in the Medical School at Edinburgh 
University.) The Lancet reported at the time; ‘Government is already in a great 
degree, responsible for the crime which it has fostered by its negligence, and even 
encouraged by a system of forbearance.’122  Only once the situation was publicised, 
did government act.  ‘The Anatomy Act of 1832 provided an adequate supply of 
bodies for the teaching of anatomy, gradually putting out of business 
resurrectionists: the end stooped to justify the means...’123  
Warnock further elaborated the limitations of her Committee; ‘The role of an Inquiry 
such as ours can only be to try to get it right, and above all to consider the moral 
arguments on each side, such as they are, and to set them out with clarity. This will 
help Ministers to make whatever case they decide to make, with a view to 
persuading Parliament.’124  She rather wryly observed that ‘… it is probable that 
Ministers hoped for more from us than they got.  They may have hoped for a 
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solution to the problems, and a clear unanimous voice explaining what was right 
and what was wrong.  In this we failed, and rightly so.’125   
Warnock’s point here is significant – she regarded the function of the Enquiry not to 
determine the ‘right’ answer, but to consider and present all aspects of the wicked 
issues.  She further described the need to ‘… sift through and sort out the facts that 
are relevant to decision making. But it has to be recognised that there is no such 
thing as a moral expert’126 and even if there were, the balance of deontological 
factors in each individual is unique, so no two people ever see eye to eye on every 
issue.  Lippmann argued nearly 100 years ago that the legitimacy of an expert 
‘depends upon separating himself from those who make the decisions, upon not 
caring, in his expert self, what decision is made,’127  and Pielke echoes this in a 
more modern context; ‘Because scientific results always have some degree of 
uncertainty and a range of means is typically available to achieve particular 
objectives, the task of political advocacy necessarily involves considerations that go 
well beyond science.’128 
Warnock and experts 
But, as Warnock argues, ‘the only reason to call such people ‘experts’ is so that 
their conclusions may be accepted as authoritative without question. Other people, 
both Ministers who have sought their advice and society at large, must be prepared 
to say ‘the experts have decided that this and that are right; and we must go along 
with it.’ 129  This is particularly pertinent for wicked issues which often have powerful 
deontological considerations; ‘Now in matters of life and death, matters of birth and 
of the family with which we were concerned in the Report, no one is going to give up 
his beliefs without a struggle. No one is going to accept what someone else thinks 
right just because he is told he should.’130  Warnock touches on two issues common 
to government handling of complex ethical issues; a tendency to defer to experts 
(so long as the expert opinion matches the government inclination), and the position 
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contemporary wicked issues where a government Enquiry is established in order to 
provide ‘expert’ advice to ministers. 
After the report of the Enquiry in July 1984, government established an interim 
Licensing Authority to regulate work on in-vitro fertilisation until legislation could be 
introduced based on the Enquiry’s report.  There were two unsuccessful challenges 
to the Enquiry’s recommendations in Parliament; in 1985 (the ‘Unborn Children 
Protection Bill’ which sought to prohibit embryo research and limit artificial 
insemination only for named women to bear children); and a similar bill in 1986.  
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was introduced in 1990 and came into 
force in 1991, establishing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in 
1991.  Since then, a number of statutes of limited scope have been introduced to 
manage embryology, but none have elicited the public interest that the original 
enquiry generated.   
In 1978, any government action, including inaction, would have been vilified by one 
or other lobby within this particular wicked issue.  Even after the establishment of 
the Warnock Committee, various lobbies, including other government bodies, 
attempted to influence the public debate prior to the publication of the Enquiry 
Report by publishing their evidence to the enquiry, effectively monopolising the 
‘narrative’ in the public domain for short periods.  This clearly resulted in short 
periods of criticism for the government.  But in the longer run, the Enquiry balanced 
the opposing views of the various lobbies, and delivered an objective assessment of 
the risks associated with all of the issues.  This allowed the government to remove 
the highly emotive rhetoric characteristic of many of the lobbies, and to legislate in 
an environment that was much more level-headed and representative of a 
genuinely well-informed public debate; a circumstance sadly lacking on occasion 
elsewhere. 
Genetically Modified (GM) Crops 
The advent of genetic engineering has allowed the modification of crops to provide 
greater yields or resistance to pests thus enhancing productivity.  However, food 
scares and lurid media headlines about ‘Frankenstein Foods’131 or ‘Mutant 
Porkies’132 in the late 1990s fuelled British public concern about the safety of these 
techniques.  government figures indicated that in 2002, ‘68% of UK adults claimed 
to be very or fairly concerned about food safety issues.’133  As above, it was this 
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public perception of this wicked issue that drove government action.  The 
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was established in 
2000 to ‘look at current and future developments in biotechnology which have 
implications for agriculture and the environment, and to advise the Government on 
their ethical and social implications and their public acceptability.’134   
It is illuminating that the Commission’s 2001 report recommended that;  
‘It will be crucial for the public to be involved in the important decisions 
which need to be taken.  We have to find a way to foster informed 
public discussion of the development and application of new 
technologies: whatever decisions are ultimately reached, they will be 
more palatable if they have not been taken behind closed doors.’135   
The AEBC report made explicit the recognition of the importance of public education 
and, at least the feeling of, engagement in decision-making of this type and it 
recommended active public participation in a national debate about GM Crops.   
Critical to that process is the question of risk perception.  As described above, there 
is a tendency to defer to ‘experts’, of which scientists and medical professionals 
certainly form a cohort.  But for significant scientific breakthroughs in areas of 
intense ethical interest such as genetic modification or IVF, the issue becomes an 
intrinsically wicked one, where the scientific experts view the associated risks from 
an informed perspective not shared by the public.  Often, the public perception is 
substantially informed by media coverage, which is why headlines such as those 
above, or ‘GM food threatens the planet'136 and ‘M&S sells genetically modified 
Frankenplants’137 are so pernicious.  
Understanding Risk 
One contemporary analyst suggests; 
‘The technical definition of risk is 'the likelihood of adverse 
consequences from any hazard', but that is not the way the public 
sees risk. It does not explain why some risks trigger so much more 
alarm, anxiety or outrage than others, seemingly regardless of 
scientific estimates of their seriousness.’138   
The perception of risk in a simple binary decision is significantly complicated if there 
are diverse potential outcomes of which some are bad, but of very low likelihood, 
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and some are good, and of a high likelihood, or usually, some combination of good 
and bad outcomes.  Expertise could be alleged to provide the basis for an objective 
decision amongst these competing outcomes:  
‘Many risk experts resist the pressure to consider [public] outrage in 
making risk management decisions; they insist that ‘the data’ alone, 
not the ‘irrational’ public, should determine policy. But we have two 
decades of data indicating that voluntariness, control, fairness, and 
the rest are important components of our society’s definition of 
risk.’139   
Certainly that challenge was an element in the composition of the Warnock Inquiry 
above, but as she insisted; ‘it has to be recognized that there is no such thing as a 
moral expert.’140  The deontological position seems to default to a demand for no 
risk (ie zero probability) of a morally unacceptable outcome, regardless of the 
potential benefits.  Those who take this position seldom appear to have 
responsibility for the provision of the potential benefits to society, and such dramatic 
oversimplification is characteristic of the majority of media coverage of such 
complex issues. 
One could infer from the various (incomplete) records of the handling of the genetic 
modification of crops issue that government had long understood the importance of 
inclusive decision making;  ‘Public attitudes have long been identified as one of the 
key determinants of the development, application and subsequent technological 
evolution of technology.’141  The AEBC report went on to recommend the format of 
the GM debate and stipulated that it should ‘… include, but not be dominated by, 
the Government and current interest groups – the biotechnology and farming 
industries, NGOs, and scientists. But to have public credibility and added value over 
the current level of debate, they must reach beyond these interests to a wider 
public.’142  In the event, the AEBC commissioned a series of Farm Scale 
Evaluations in 2003-04 and simultaneously, the government commissioned a GM 
Public Debate as part of a wider GM Dialogue which also incorporated a review of a 
scientific review and a cost benefit analysis but was not made public.  The Public 
Debate was held; ‘Over a thousand people attended the six regional launch 
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meetings and it has been estimated that a further 675 local meetings were 
organised across the UK…’143  35000 feedback forms and 1200 letters or emails 
were received by the Steering Board.  A report was produced and in 2004, after the 
Farm Scale Evaluations reported, the government simply aligned its position within 
EU legislation.144  
What is pertinent to this thesis is the lesson that this exercise in public consultation 
provided for the government.  In a specifically commissioned report, DEFRA noted 
‘… the debate generated ‘unprecedented levels of interest, participation and 
considered discussion about complex matters of science and policy amongst a 
relatively large number of the general public.’145  That report acknowledged the 
context of wider government efforts to engage with the public on issues raised by 
scientific and technological development and specifically, it comments that ‘it is also 
important to consider what lessons can be learned from the debate process, to help 
inform future public engagement activities.’146   
An Independent Commission was more credible in the eyes of the public, although 
more difficult to manage, and the process itself helped to educate the public.  The 
Minister responsible had written to the Chair of the Commission in February 2001; ‘I 
am convinced that the issue of separation distances is not simply a matter of 
science, but equally a question of public acceptability.’147  Despite Mr Meacher’s 
rather patronising view; the report recognised that the public had been more 
discriminating in its use of evidence than expected, noting ‘It is clear that the public 
like to know who is advancing a particular view, and whether it is supported by 
evidence.’148   
These episodes suggest increasingly sophisticated government understanding of 
the part played by public opinion in complex decision making.  The Warnock Inquiry 
was a successful experiment in the use of ‘experts’ to inform both government and 
public in an ethically challenging area of technological progress.   The GM Debate 
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specifically included the public as part of the wider GM Dialogue within government 
and this appears to be a logical progression from the 1970 report, through the 
Warnock Inquiry findings.  It is also echoed by Lord Robertson’s intent for the 
Strategic Defence Review for which he insisted on an extensive public engagement 
strategy.149   
‘Experts’ and public have different risk perceptions.  The government reports 
suggest that the public is more discriminating when faced with conflicting evidence 
than government tends to give it credit for, but public understanding can be 
significantly affected by expert opinion and, it appears, media presentation.  The 
handling of the GM Debate does hint that government tends to patronise the public 
and expect deference to experts if their opinion coincides with government 
inclination.150 The conclusion that appears to be drawn by the government is ‘We 
take public concern very seriously, and we have weighed public opinion alongside 
the scientific evidence … [we will] consider the best ways of providing the 
information which the public wants and in an open and transparent way.’151  This 
conclusion is specific to the GM debate, but could reasonably be extrapolated to 
other wicked issues. 
The Nuclear Debate  
There has been no similar inquiry established to consider UK nuclear deterrence in 
the broadest sense.  It could be argued that there is no need because there are only 
two departments of state to which nuclear deterrence is pertinent; the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defence (coordinated through the Cabinet Office) and they 
already collaborate on policy formulation and the delivery of capabilities.  Similarly, it 
could be argued that there have been numerous MOD and Cabinet Office enquiries 
into the strategic nuclear deterrent.   But because so many of the details are 
classified, the findings cannot be made public, except in carefully edited inputs to 
public documents.  One such was the 1980 ‘Open Government Document 80/23’ 
which, even so, contained more information and detail than many of the Cabinet 
considered appropriate.  The detail of how this was achieved and managed, and the 
associated studies and decisions prior to the deployment of Trident has been 
considered above, and more contemporary work will be considered below.  This is 
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not to say that there have not been inquiries or debates about nuclear deterrence 
held publically by various organisations, merely that the government has not 
participated.
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Chapter Eight – Conclusions:  British Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century  
‘We have to find a way to foster informed public discussion of the 
development and application of new technologies … At present, 
there seem to be no avenues for a genuine, open, influential debate 
with inclusive procedures, which does not marginalise the 
reasonable scepticism and wide body of intelligent opinion outside 
specialist circles.’1 
This quote, from the 2001 government report on genetic modification of crops, 
seems to encapsulate a persistent problem for government that is prevalent in more 
than just the agriculture domain.  It is striking that the same frustrations appear 
perennially across Whitehall but there is no cross-government remedial action plan.   
Introduction – is this important? 
This thesis has considered the factors that affected British government engagement 
with the public on deterrence policy and demonstrated that many appear to have 
their roots in the experience of the First and Second World Wars.   Despite 
occasions where the government of the day has decided to engage more with the 
public in order to explain or justify particular policy and procurement decisions, such 
engagement has seldom come to fruition; probably the most notable exception 
being OGD 80/23.  The previous chapters have considered the historical evidence 
supporting this assertion. In conclusion, this chapter will consider British 
government engagement with the public between the end of the Cold War and the 
2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, a period which has seen fundamental 
changes in the international security architecture and British defence, security and 
foreign policy objectives.  
The 2015 YouGov poll conducted for Prospect Magazine on the 70th anniversary of 
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in July 2015 was designed to gauge public 
attitudes to defence spending and the decision to replace Trident.2  The survey 
suggests that about 1/3 of those polled thought the use of atomic weapons in the 
circumstances of 1945 was appropriate, about 1/3 thought it wrong, and the other 
third had no definite opinion.  Among those under 25, and amongst women, a 
higher proportion thought the use of atomic bombs was wrong.  Only about 1/10 
think nuclear weapons make Britain less safe, with just under ½ thinking that they 
make us safer.  About 1/3 would prefer like-for-like replacement for the Trident 
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system, with about just under 1/3 preferring a cheaper nuclear deterrent and about 
1/5 advocating unilateral disarmament.  In Scotland, about 2/5 advocate unilateral 
disarmament.  Kellner concludes ‘Whether we regard nuclear weapons as a useful 
deterrent against bad behaviour or an insurance policy in case things go badly 
wrong, or simply as a symbol of national pride, most of us want the UK to keep 
them.’3   
To a certain extent Kellner’s terminology encapsulates one of the issues facing 
early 21st Century government; nuclear deterrence appears a very familiar and 
simple concept, but a dwindling minority of increasingly focused specialists is 
familiar with its key tenets and principles.  Much of the commentary both inside and 
outside government is inconsistent, with inaccurate language and riddled with 
misleading metaphors.  Nuclear deterrence is not an insurance policy that mitigates 
outcomes if things go badly wrong; it is part of a range of mechanisms that help 
prevent things going wrong.  Caricaturing ‘National pride’ or ‘prestige’ can trivialise 
the genuine security and foreign policy benefits to the United Kingdom of a ‘place at 
the top table’; United Nations Security Council permanent membership is not an 
inconsequential national interest.4   
The use of inaccurate terminology is widespread:  the options provided to its 
‘Opinion-Formers’ Panel’ in the 2013 YouGov poll were; ‘Britain should disband 
Trident and focus defence spending on conventional weapons and forces; Britain 
should replace Trident with a new and upgraded system; Britain should maintain 
Trident; Don’t know; Other.’5  The YouGov analysis based on the result was; The 
most popular option, with over a third agreeing (36%), was for Britain to ‘… disband 
Trident and focus defence spending on conventional weapons and forces …’6  
However, this poll actually shows that an absolute majority (52%) of the opinion 
formers desires the retention of the nuclear deterrent (25% felt it should be 
maintained and a further 27% that it should upgraded) but the inaccuracy of the 
language used by the poll skewed the result, and the analysis headline.   
The choice facing the government in 2016 is not to replace Trident; it will continue 
until the 2040s.  The choice is to replace the submarines carrying it which will reach 
the end of their service lives in the 2020s.  The 2016 Parliamentary Briefing Paper 
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‘Replacing the UK’s Trident Nuclear Deterrent’ perpetuates these inaccuracies, 
although it does state on page 6 that; ‘Although commonly referred to as ‘the 
renewal or replacement of Trident’, the Successor programme is about the design, 
development and manufacture of a new class of four submarines.’7  The executive 
summary for this briefing paper considers 14 polls of public opinion since 2009 and 
suggests that;  
‘a review of the available opinion poll evidence does suggest that, 
broadly speaking, the British public is divided on the question of 
whether Trident should be renewed. However, the public’s views on 
Trident are nuanced and their responses to public opinion polls are 
sensitive to the wording and framing of the question they are asked.’8   
Better understanding and information seems to be in order. 
In a commentary on the result of the Brexit vote in the UK, populist Professor Brian 
Cox concluded that education is an important national security issue; ‘What you rely 
on in an open democracy is the ability of people to take an informed position but 
we're not teaching people how to think and we are becoming unstable as 
democratic societies.’9  His core point is not that the state should teach the public 
‘what’ to think, but ‘how’; a democratic population must be equipped with the 
intellectual analytical tools to consider assertions made in the media in terms of 
provenance and determine which are valid, and which are mere polemic.  As the 
government report quoted at the head of this chapter notes, ‘We have to find a way 
to foster informed public discussion.’ This is particularly true for all ethically complex 
policy areas, including human embryology, genetic modification of crops, and 
nuclear deterrence.  
Nuclear deterrence theory in the 21st Century 
In a Facebook thread circulated amongst the doctoral candidates at Cambridge 
University in July 2016, the decision flowchart below was published, but not 
challenged, in a medium in which such assertive polemic is usually hotly contested.   
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Figure 1:  Do we need to replace Trident? Facebook circulated Decision Flow 
Chart10 
Nuclear deterrence is a complex matter based on a very simple foundation.  It is 
defined in the Trident Alternatives Review; ‘Deterrence rests on the notion of 
‟unacceptable loss‟ - the ability to inflict a level of damage that a potential aggressor 
would judge outweighed any benefit they might gain by a particular course of 
action.’11  The risk of damage to which an aggressor would be exposed through an 
attack against conventional defences is determined and controlled by the aggressor 
and is subject to a straightforward risk-benefit analysis, and the aggressor can 
decide when to stop if aggression is proving too costly.  If, however, the defender 
has nuclear weapons, the aggressor must consider the prospect that the defender 
reserves to himself the ability to respond at a level of punitive retaliation entirely of 
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his own choosing; the aggressor loses control of the level of risk to which he is 
exposed.12   
This ownership of the level of risk to which the aggressor is exposed is the essential 
difference between policies of deterrence by denial (conventional deterrence; 
defence) and deterrence by punishment (the threat of retaliation).  The box in Figure 
One titled ‘Is the enemy mad enough to use his nukes?’ should reflect a decision 
which would be something like; ‘would the enemy be deterred from the use of his 
nuclear weapons by the threat of retaliation?’ with outputs that would most 
appropriately read; ‘perhaps not’ and ‘probably’.  Starkswood’s flowchart at Figure 
One fails to discriminate between nuclear deterrence and the use of nuclear 
weapons, and it reduces international security concerns to categorical answers 
where the reality is an infinity of variable probabilities.  What is perhaps of more 
concern, however, is that none of the cohort of potential opinion formers to whom 
this diagram was circulated felt able, or motivated, to challenge it.  The nature of 
social media such as Facebook is that they tend to consist of self-referencing circles 
of like-minded thinkers, so on one level, a lack of challenge might be expected.  But 
the nature of this particular cohort is that it is self-referencing only in the sense that 
it distributes posts, in order to challenge them.  One member noted subsequently; ‘I 
didn’t challenge it – I should have done and it’s interesting that I didn’t.  I didn’t 
agree with it, but didn’t know how to challenge it.’13 
The decision-making process of a potential aggressor contemplating coercion or 
aggression against a nuclear armed state14 is complicated by nuclear deterrence.  
However, for most 21st Century states, nuclear weapons have no unique military 
utility; there are very few military facilities that could not be successfully attacked 
with conventional means and the ability to destroy those facilities with nuclear 
weapons is no more of a deterrent than the ability to destroy them with precision 
guided conventional munitions.  The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons relies on 
something else.  As Attlee grasped intuitively 70 years ago, ‘…the only deterrent is 
the possibility of the victim of such an attack [on cities] being able to retort on the 
victor.’15  The difference in the political effect of nuclear deterrence is this unique 
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fear that nuclear weapons engender.  An aggressor must consider that as a last 
resort, and regardless of peacetime assurances, a nuclear-armed defender might 
target an aggressor’s population centres.   
Quinlan, the key author of the 1980 Open Government Document16 noted;  
‘… the language was deliberately chosen - partly with ethical 
concerns in mind - to convey that while cities would not be 
guaranteed immunity, the UK approach to deterrent threat and 
operational planning in the Trident era would not rely on crude 
counter-city or counter-population concepts.’17   
Although not palatable, the cornerstone of UK national security strategy relies on 
nuclear deterrence, which is based on the contingent willingness to threaten civilian 
populations and, as Windham Goldie argued above for The War Game; ‘…the 
people should be trusted with the truth...’18   No modern democratic state openly 
advocates a deterrence policy that explicitly threatens non-combatants, and the 
examples from the First and Second World Wars above catalogue historical British 
reticence about just such thinking.  But it is, although probably not deliberately, still 
tacitly confirmed in public statements.  Defence Secretary Michael Fallon wondered; 
‘… how would the United States or France respond if we suddenly announced that 
we were abandoning our nuclear capabilities, yet will still expect them to pick up the 
tab and to put their cities at risk to protect us in a nuclear crisis?’19  Fallon went on 
to describe the British independent nuclear deterrent as ‘… minimum, credible, 
assured and independent…’20   
A minimum deterrent 
Much of the technical debate above (chapters 5 and 6) on Chevaline and the 
Polaris replacement centred on the precept of a minimum deterrent.  The ‘Moscow 
Criterion’21 was a measure of how little destructive power would be required in order 
to deter the most credible threat; at that time, the Soviet Union.  The debate was 
conducted in extreme secrecy; in 2007 Lord Owen argued that ‘Of course we had to 
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keep it private.  One was not in those days able to let the Soviet Union know that 
one had doubts about one's own deterrent capacity…’22 He was making this 
argument in the context of his request for the government to release the papers 
from that period, in order to inform a similar analysis of minimum deterrent for the 
21st Century, arguing:  
‘A minimum nuclear deterrent is not, however, a static concept.  If we 
are to start, in 2010, the process of genuinely contributing to the 
elimination of nuclear weapons, it will not be credible if the British 
government commits to a new UK ballistic missile deterrent similar to 
Trident into the years 2050-60.’23   
Owen considered that the blanket application of ‘secrecy’ to the nuclear deterrent 
mission continues to be just as much an inhibition on effective public engagement 
as it was for Macmillan, Callaghan and Thatcher. 
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) announced; ‘We will retain our nuclear 
deterrent with fewer warheads to meet our twin challenges of minimum credible 
deterrence backed by a firm commitment to arms control.’ The SDR reduced the UK 
stockpile from 300 to less than 200 operationally available warheads, and from a 
limit of 96 warheads to 48 per submarine, at a reduced day-to-day alert state.24  The 
2006 White Paper which committed to the initial development of the Vanguard class 
successor submarines stated; ‘…it will be the minimum necessary.  We already 
have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear 
weapon states and are the only state to have reduced to a single delivery system.’25  
Both the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review26 and the 2015 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review27 refer to a minimum deterrent, without stipulating 
what level of destructive potential that involves, although the minimum deterrent in 
2006 was reduced to up to 48 warheads on each submarine,28 and in 2010 further 
reduced to 40.  There is detailed study conducted in support of these decisions, the 
nature and results of which are obviously extremely classified (as Commanding 
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Officer of one of the Vanguard class submarines I was not aware of the details).  
The 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, conducted by Whitehall departments to meet 
the demands of the Coalition government, is a fascinating resource for research 
because it exposes more of the rationale, if not the numbers, behind such arcane 
calculations than the White Papers:  The key determining requirement for the 
‘Trident Alternatives Review’ was;  
‘‘A minimum nuclear deterrent capability that, during a crisis, is able to 
deliver at short notice a nuclear strike against a range of targets at an 
appropriate scale and with very high confidence.’  The study 
deliberately did not define ‘minimum’, ‘short notice’, ‘scale’ or ‘very 
high confidence’ as that could have overly-constrained the list of 
system options for analysis.’29 
Intuitively, a minimum deterrent seems morally desirable over a more substantial 
capability, but a recent sophisticated analysis of contemporary US nuclear 
deterrence policy puts even this apparently simple logic under intense scrutiny: 
‘Minimum deterrence is a mode of deterrence that depends on the 
threat of nuclear retaliation alone and makes no effective 
accommodation for the principles of discrimination and proportionality 
or for a theory of deterrence that depends on putting at risk those 
things most valued by enemy leadership. … But retaliation against 
cities would violate the principles of discrimination and proportionality, 
and thus U.S. deterrence strategy requires being able to put at risk 
other assets in an enemy country that enemy leaders would not want 
to lose.’30 
This supports the assertion that nuclear deterrence works because of the fear of an 
attack on cities. That said, American and British understanding of what causes wars 
and therefore how to manage and deter them differ slightly, and this has a 
fundamental effect on theories of deterrence and associated ethics.  The USA 
provides ‘extended nuclear deterrence’, for a number of its allies, including NATO.  
In order for such extended deterrence to be credible to a potential adversary, it 
requires an ability to be graduated in order to offer a capability to respond in 
proportion to the aggression being deterred; a threat of a strategic nuclear response 
to a border incursion by a reconnaissance aircraft in, say, Bulgarian airspace, would 
be literally incredible and morally untenable.31  Thus, the ethical justification for 21st 
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century American nuclear deterrence presented by Roberts incorporates Just War 
concepts of proportionality, and therefore discrimination, in a way that a British 
independent nuclear deterrence tailored as a last resort for national survival does 
not.  In this author’s experience, there is no strategic discourse in Britain at this level 
of complexity. 
A credible and assured deterrent 
The credibility of any deterrence policy depends on a combination of the resolve to 
carry it out and the capability which includes readiness, reach, survivability/ 
invulnerability and destructive power.32   
Reach and survivability/ invulnerability are functions of the delivery system.  
Uniquely amongst the nuclear weapon states, the UK has reverted to a single 
nuclear weapon system; the Trident submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).  
The USA and Russia maintain a triad of submarine, ground-based and air-launched 
nuclear weapon systems, France maintains both submarine and air launched 
systems and China maintains submarine and ground launched systems.  Each 
system has strengths and weaknesses; ground launched intercontinental ballistic 
missiles have a significant reach and in-flight survivability, but are vulnerable to 
attack pre-launch.  Free-fall bombs are as vulnerable as the aircraft on which they 
are embarked (but as a system very flexible for messaging resolve to an opponent 
in an extended deterrence strategy), air-launched cruise missiles are similarly 
vulnerable to modern air defences, and all aircraft are critically vulnerable on the 
ground.  These vulnerabilities tend to demand very high fidelity intelligence and 
warning capabilities, with a correspondingly high readiness of the nuclear forces, 
especially in a crisis.  This can have an inflammatory effect of its own although it 
can also be used as an indication of resolve and an active part of a sophisticated 
deterrence system particularly appropriate for extended deterrence such as the 
USA provides for NATO.   
A submarine-launched ballistic missile offers an assured second response system; 
it is not subtle and cannot be readily employed for messaging but it provides a 
credible threat of a guaranteed response in extremis, even if the parent state is 
attacked in a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack.  The defender does not have to 
specify what this response would be, but a potential aggressor must consider the 
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prospect that a nuclear weapon state faced with a threat to its vital national interests 
or its survival could retaliate against any element of the aggressor state.33  
The perception of the agent being deterred is critical; if the defender’s resolve is not 
evident to the aggressor before the aggressor makes decisions, a policy of 
deterrence is less likely to be effective.  The everyday peacetime communication of 
capability and resolve is therefore fundamental to a policy of deterrence.  
Contemporary British defence policy is more predicated on deterrence than ever 
before, with the Foreword to the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) stating;  
‘we have reconfigured Britain’s Armed Forces so they are able to 
deal with modern and evolving threats. Where necessary, we will be 
ready to use force.  … we will use … our soft power to promote 
British values and to tackle the causes of the security threats we 
face, not just their consequences.’34   
The theme of deterrence in preference to conflict is repeated throughout SDSR 
2015; ‘We will strengthen our Armed Forces and our security and intelligence 
agencies so that they remain world-leading. They project our power globally, and 
will fight and work alongside our close allies … to deter or defeat our adversaries.’35 
SDSR 2015 introduces an interpretation of deterrence that appears to move away 
from ‘conventional deterrence’ and ‘nuclear deterrence’ to deterrence using the ‘full 
spectrum of our capabilities to … deter potential adversaries, including through 
renewal of our nuclear deterrent.’36 
This innovative interpretation of the concept of deterrence stems from a project led 
by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and potentially heralds 
one of the most fundamental changes in national deterrence and defence policy in 
recent years.  It is a significant evolution and will require more than a simple 
statement to enable it fully; coherent ‘full spectrum’ deterrence will require 
departments of state to coordinate their activities in order to achieve a tailored effect 
against a potential adversary that some may not yet consider a problem.  One early 
step towards this has been the formation of the Cabinet Office Communications 
Steering Group which includes representation from Cabinet Office, MOD, FCO and 
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others as required.  
This group was formed in 2015 due to an increasing recognition in the nuclear 
policy sections of the MOD and FCO that the departments had effectively been 
deterred from engaging with the public at all on nuclear deterrence matters since 
the Civil Defence Handbook debacle of 1980.37  The imperative for this change to 
the status quo was the imminent decision to commit to the next stage of the 
development of the Vanguard Class Successor submarine.  This recognition was 
compounded by an acknowledgement that there was a corresponding lack of 
understanding of many aspects of British nuclear deterrence policy and programme 
not only among the public at large, but throughout Whitehall and Westminster; at all 
levels.  
An independent nuclear deterrent 
Since the Labour party argued in 1964 that ‘[Polaris] will not be independent and it 
will not be British and it will not deter,’38  there has been a perceived lack of 
independence of the British nuclear deterrent.  Greenpeace argue:  
‘Trident is not a 'UK' weapons system - this is another well-worn myth. 
Nearly all of the weapon parts are sourced or leased from the US, with 
few exceptions, such as the warhead, is manufactured in the UK based 
on the US W76 design. The software, targeting and weather data are 
all US-sourced.’39  
and CND suggest that;  
‘Our nuclear weapon system is neither politically or technically 
independent. It has been assigned to NATO since the 1960s, meaning 
Trident could be used against a country attacking – or threatening to 
attack – one of the alliance’s member states.’40   
This is true, the UK does participate in the collective defence of NATO Allies, and 
British forces form part of the NATO deterrence and defence posture; this has been 
the basis of British defence policy since 1949.  But the implication that there is a 
loss of control over the decision to launch a strike is misleading; decision-making is 
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a fully sovereign UK function; only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of the 
UK’s nuclear deterrent, NATO can only request it.41   CND also assert that the 
system is ‘…dependent on US technical support. … The British submarines must 
also regularly visit Kings Bay [the US Trident operating facility in Georgia, USA] for 
the maintenance and replacement of these missiles.’42   
Commons Defence Committee evidence suggests otherwise; ‘…operationally the 
system is completely independent of the United States. Any decision to launch 
missiles is a sovereign decision taken by the UK and does not involve anybody 
else.’43  The British reliance on the USA for deep technical support for missiles is 
true, in the sense that the missiles receive maintenance only in the USA, not while 
they are embarked on British submarines.  They remain embarked for the duration 
of each operational commission, between 12 and 14 years.44   Otherwise, and in 
every operational sense, UK Trident is fully independent. Although official 
references to the independent nuclear deterrent are almost ubiquitous, dependency 
is an example of a myth that once created, seems to be difficult to refute. 
A reluctant nuclear weapons state 
From the very start of its nuclear weapons programme, Britain has been a reluctant 
nuclear weapon state.  Attlee, even as he defined the essence of deterrence, 
sought a means of inhibiting the use of war as a tool of policy in future, suggesting 
that; ‘All nations must give up their dreams of realising some historic expansion at 
the expense of their neighbours.’45  His government recognised only after 
strenuously seeking some form of international agreement, that the UK ‘… should 
itself undertake the production of atomic bombs as a means of self-defence as soon 
as possible.’46  This focus on some form of international control of nuclear weapons 
has been an element of British thinking about nuclear weapons ever since.  A 
similar ‘twin’ focus has been present throughout the history of British nuclear 
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weapons policy, although it has been peripheral to this consideration of historical 
development of nuclear deterrence policy. 
Each of the Defence Reviews since the end of the Cold War has addressed nuclear 
deterrence in the context of a commitment ‘…to working towards a safer world in 
which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons…’ and made corresponding 
assertions about disarmament achievements.47  These are closely linked to 
perceptions of minimum deterrence, maintaining the lowest force levels necessary 
to meet that capability.  After the 2006 White Paper, the FCO published ‘Lifting the 
Nuclear Shadow’; a concise appraisal of the issues surrounding nuclear arms 
control, cataloguing the aspirations for a nuclear weapons free world.  In the 
foreword, then Foreign Secretary Mr Miliband wrote;  
‘These are issues which do not just concern Foreign or Defence 
policy. They are about the security of our world both now and in the 
next generation and deserve wider engagement. I therefore asked for 
the issues to be set out in a way that does not expect the reader to 
know the subject inside out.  ... The path to eliminating all nuclear 
weapons. To achieve this will require bold thinking and careful work 
by many nations. The UK is wholeheartedly committed to playing its 
part in this process.’48 
‘Lifting the Nuclear Shadow’ included an explanation of International Agreements 
and what Britain’s role in them is, a consideration of the concept of ‘Global Zero’ (a 
reduction to no nuclear weapons worldwide) and a consideration of the implications 
of security without nuclear weapons.  It was soon followed by a government-wide 
document ‘The Road to 2010’49 which set out the British position in advance of the 
2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference.  Unfortunately, this document 
was less clear and much of the elegant alignment of deterrence policy and 
disarmament aspiration described in ‘Lifting the Nuclear Shadow’ was muddled and 
the message confused or lost.  This is the type of incoherent official contribution to 
public discourse on nuclear deterrence that the Cabinet Office Communications 
Steering Group should avert.   
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Factors in the development of British Government policy 
Strategic Imperatives 
The rationale that the ‘bomber would always get through’ was born in the perceived 
inability to respond effectively to the Zeppelin raids of 1915 and the Gotha raids of 
1917.  It is the essence of the deterrence argument; Baldwin’s famous dictum 
continued; ‘The only defence is offence. You have to kill more women and children 
more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.  I just mention that . . . 
so that people may realize what is waiting for them when the next war comes.’50  
This was borne out by the reports from Guernica and China.  In the First World War, 
Cabinet had been dealing with a wicked problem; technological change had 
enabled warfare to evolve to challenge accepted moral standards, but there was a 
clear demand from an increasingly vociferous lobby to retaliate in kind, and a 
strategic imperative to combat such tactics.  A lack of response might damage 
already strained morale among the British population, defence against such attacks 
was limited, but to retaliate was repugnant to many in office.  In the event, limited 
retaliation was conducted, but in the context of an almost apologetic government 
narrative. 
In 1940, Churchill’s Cabinet was faced with a similar dilemma; after Dunkirk the only 
means of offensive action against Germany was to bomb its industrial capabilities, 
but despite the RAF actively preparing for just such a campaign between 1928 and 
1940, the British bombing forces were technologically incapable of mounting a 
sustainable bombing offensive, and the scant resources were in demand for every 
other task as well.  By 1942; ‘Bomber Command provides our only offensive action 
yet pressed home directly against Germany. All our other efforts are defensive in 
their nature, and are not intended to do more, and never can do more, than enable 
us to exist in the face of the enemy.’51  There is no evidence that suggests that had 
Britain had the capability to conduct precision bombing and avoid collateral 
casualties in cities, it would not have done so, although some advisers did advocate 
it; ‘If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas 
of these 58 German towns the great majority of their inhabitants (about one third of 
the German population) would be turned out of house and home.’52  The gradual 
build-up of Bomber Command between 1941 and 1943 enabled the vision of a 
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substantial bombing campaign against German industry, but although the new 
heavy bombers were capable of delivering substantial payloads, they were very 
vulnerable to air defences during daylight and their navigation was still not accurate 
enough to conduct night attacks and achieve the precision bombing which the 
British government had used as the cornerstone of the moral case for the offensive.  
Britain therefore made the decision to shift to night bombing, accepting the reduced 
accuracy in order to achieve lower RAF casualty rates.  
The evolution of NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War was almost entirely 
driven by the USA.  That said, Britain played an important role, particularly during 
the 1960s, with Healey advocating the graduated deterrence strategy which evolved 
into NATO’s flexible response.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, this further 
developed into a nuclear warfighting strategy (using nuclear weapons for military 
effect, not just deterrence) which survived until the INF treaty in 1987 and the 
demise of the Soviet Union.  Since the Cold War, NATO has openly adopted an 
explicit policy of nuclear deterrence; the 1991 Strategic Concept stated:  ‘… Allies 
concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward 
defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible 
response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.’53  This suggests that 
NATO still envisaged the use of nuclear weapons for military effect, albeit with 
reduced reliance on them.  In 2010 this evolved into; ‘Deterrence, based on an 
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of 
our overall strategy.’54 Whilst this may appear semantic, the change in terminology, 
with deterrence elevated before defence, represented a significant step for NATO.  
The Warsaw Summit of 2016 saw intense negotiation on the ‘nuclear language’ to 
be included; evolving to a more robust, but non-confrontational, statement of 
resolve;55 
‘The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to 
preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear 
weapons are unique. Any employment of nuclear weapons against 
NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict.’56   
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This text implies that Alliance nuclear weapons remain for deterrence purposes, and 
the communique treads a fine line between resolve and restraint. 
Industrial Capacity 
This research has found no historical evidence that suggests that industrial or 
technical capacity in itself is a factor in the decision to become or remain a nuclear 
power.  Arguably this might be related to ‘prestige’ and that is considered below.  
Advances in high-technology industrial capacity is acknowledged as a valuable 
side-product of nuclear related work, but not as the motive for it.  In the Trident 
decision of 1980 and the recent Successor debate, industrial capacity and the 
limited facilities to construct nuclear submarines have been noted as limitations on 
decision making and timelines; ‘…greater industrial collaboration and affordability 
are essential components in any new submarine programme and that it needs to 
address its own shortage of skills in managing a programme of the scale of a 
Vanguard successor.’57   The BASIC Trident Commission concluded; ‘Industrial and 
economic impacts are important for the communities concerned, but cannot play a 
key role in determining whether the UK continues to deploy a nuclear deterrent.’58 
Cost – a technical factor? 
In the early days of the atomic programme, British national strategy had been 
simple – atomic bombs dropped from heavy bombers would act as a deterrent.  
Budget restrictions meant, however, that the bomb technology would not be paired 
with a suitable bomber until 1957, by which time, the atomic bomb was perceived as 
obsolete in the face of the hydrogen bomb, and the heavy bomber, free-fall bomb 
combination was obsolescent in the face of developing missile technology.  The 
pace of technological change and perceived associated strategic imperatives drove 
the UK into the position where Britain could no longer afford to develop a sovereign 
nuclear capability; and as described above, purchased the Polaris system from the 
USA. 
Similar combinations of budget and technical strategic imperatives have dominated 
British national system choices ever since, in particular the decision to purchase 
Trident.  Trident D5 was acknowledged to be more precise and capable than the 
minimum deterrent required by Britain, but in terms of cost and ‘future-proofing’ it 
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would have been ludicrous to reject it in favour of a less capable system that would 
have been more expensive.  In one sense, a similar situation pertains in 2016.  
Simply as a technical planning factor, cost suggests that the cheapest option 
available to sustain the current level of deterrence capability is to replace the 
submarines carrying Trident.  The supporting work for the 2006 White Paper 
included a very substantial study which considered over 100 different combinations 
of theoretical and existing weapons and delivery systems.  This study considered 
technical risk, cost and effectiveness; including scale (minimum destructive 
capability), independence, range, invulnerability and readiness.   These options 
were narrowed down to four generic options; long range aircraft equipped with 
cruise missiles; surface ships equipped with Trident missiles; a land-based (silo) 
system equipped with Trident missiles and; submarines equipped with Trident 
missiles.59  The political decision to proceed with the Successor Project was the 
result of that choice. 
Cost can also, obviously, be used as a tool of political argument.  Much of the anti-
nuclear opposition of the 1950s and 1960s was against the possession of nuclear 
weapons in the first place; a moral position.  In the 1980 decision on Trident, this 
remained an element but the nature of the opposition was coloured by the NATO 
long range tactical nuclear forces decision of December 1979, the siting of cruise 
missiles in the UK and an increased public perception of the immanence of the 
threat of nuclear war.  There was opposition to the decision to replace Polaris with 
Trident on cost grounds, but it was not a pre-eminent aspect of the anti-nuclear 
platform.  Since 2006, however, there has been sustained and coherent criticism of 
the ‘Successor submarine’ decision on cost grounds.  For example, CND maintains 
that the costs will be ‘… at least £205 billion. This money would be enough to 
improve the NHS by building 120 state of the art hospitals and employing 150,000 
new nurses ...’60  CND does not make clear that the headline figure is calculated 
taking into account the entire capital, through-life running and disposal costs into the 
2060s.61  The government publishes costs in terms of the way it budgets which, in 
this case, is for the capital cost of the Successor project; ‘… as set in the 2015 
SDSR we estimate that 4 new Dreadnought submarines will cost £31 billion to build, 
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test and commission, spread over 35 years, with a contingency of £10 billion. On 
average, that amounts to 0.2% per year of government spending.’62  Officials and 
government politicians tend not to share platforms with CND lobbyists, so these 
figures are seldom tested like for like.  
Cost becomes a factor only if the principle of possession of nuclear weapons is 
accepted.  If it is, then a cost benefits analysis of various systems is entirely 
pertinent and an appropriate function of parliamentary debate and oversight.  It is 
notable that the public focus of anti-nuclear opposition has moved away from the 
principled opposition to nuclear weapons of the 1958 CND Policy Statement,63 
which has had limited public resonance despite the 1960 and 1980 peaks, to 
arguments about costs.   CND also asserts that; ‘Former Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
one of the biggest supporters of replacing Trident in 2007, has admitted that the 
only purpose of maintaining the nuclear weapons system is to give Britain status.’64 
Prestige 
One of the most invidious criticisms of British nuclear deterrence is that it is a virility 
symbol; a sop to politicians’ vanity.  Healey said of Macmillan’s government ‘…they 
clutched at the nuclear missile as a virility symbol to compensate for the exposure of 
their military impotence at Suez…’65 and Joan Ruddock asserted ‘… the 
Government are committed to a massively expensive useless virility symbol called 
Trident.’66  The virility critique is a corruption of the suggestion that nuclear weapons 
give a state a unique status, or prestige.  This is a perpetual, but discretely 
acknowledged factor.   Macmillan briefed his Cabinet in July 1954; ‘unless we 
possessed thermo-nuclear weapons, we should lose out influence and standing in 
world affairs.’ 67  Ironically, Healey subsequently noted ‘a few Polaris submarines 
would be worth more than the same number of hunter-killers, both because they 
would give Britain more influence, particularly in Washington.’ 68   Alec Douglas 
Home said when interviewed by Robin Day; ‘… I do believe that if we deprive 
ourselves of all control over our nuclear arm then Britain becomes a second-class 
Power.’69   This different interpretation of virility was prevalent at all levels; the 
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Chiefs of Staff advised Macmillan’s Defence Policy Committee; ‘To that end we 
must strengthen our position and influence as a world Power and maintain and 
consolidate our alliance with the United States.’70  One of the unanswered questions 
raised by Armstrong to Mrs Thatcher’s cabinet was; ‘Given the decline in our world 
position in other respects, will it do us enough good to stay in the league from the 
1990s to justify the cost of the burden…?’71 
The situation pertains today. As the Shadow Chancellor;  
‘Ed Balls argued at the Trident Alternatives; it is nothing to do with 
defence, at the end of the day it is the argument that nobody can use 
in public, that if you opt out of the nuclear club then you opt out of 
senior rank in the World.  It’s the price tag, otherwise the French have 
it, the only European nuclear power, the Americans will feel betrayed 
and therefore you just relegate us…’72   
While there is no evidence that nuclear weapon status is related to permanent UN 
Security Council membership, the Times concluded in 2009 that;  
‘Trident and its successor are as much about national power and 
Britain's position in the world as about military effect.  The five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, Russia, 
China, Britain and France) achieved their positions by being the 
victors of the Second World War. But they now retain those seats only 
thanks to their possession of credible nuclear deterrents. It's not about 
GDP, hospitals, improvements in child poverty or school league 
tables: abandon the deterrent and, sooner or later, Britain loses its 
seat.’73 
The issue of prestige is not simple, nor is it superficial; Liam Fox argued; ‘…’a global 
role for the UK is a necessity, not a luxury’.  This accords closely with the view of 
this government, that Britain must help shape a changing world, rather than merely 
react to it.’74  The 2010 SDSR stated;  
‘The National Security Strategy sets out two clear objectives: (i) to 
ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, 
economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks 
that can affect us directly; and (ii) to shape a stable world, by acting 
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to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests 
overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to 
shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source.’75   
This is sustained in SDSR 2015 where Britain; ‘… plays a strong, positive global 
role. We project our power, influence and values to help shape a secure, 
prosperous future for the UK and to build wider security, stability and prosperity. We 
have unique strengths that enable us to do this.’76  If Britain wants to shape a 
changing World, rather than merely react to the changes, then a seat at the top 
table, or prestige, is an invaluable and irreplaceable asset in the national ‘toolbox’.  
There is no evidence that there is a correlation between a state possessing nuclear 
weapons and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but a number of senior 
politicians, including some who ridiculed the idea previously, believe that ‘prestige’ 
is related to the nuclear deterrent and believe it merits consideration in its retention. 
Civil defence 
Civil defence has not really been considered as a genuine factor in nuclear 
deterrence strategy since the debacle of the early 1980s.  The derision to which the 
publication of the Protect and Survive pamphlet exposed the concept was sufficient 
to ensure the end of the civil defence project.  To a certain extent, this process had 
been ongoing since the mid 1950s when the Strath report highlighted the inability to 
provide any credible defence against nuclear weapons, except for a select few in 
deep underground facilities.  The choice between preparation to fight a nuclear war, 
and investment in deterring it was really made in 1955 and tacitly made public in the 
Sandys Defence Review of 1957.  The War Game was an unwitting step in the 
process, ridiculing the Civil Defence Organisation claims that nuclear war would be 
survivable.  It stemmed from the recognition that deterrence was more credible than 
defence, but that this would be difficult to present in public, as the Cabinet Office 
recorded in 1954:  
‘These and other changes recommended in this report certainly could 
not be defended in isolation. Public acceptance of them can only be 
secured if they are presented as parts of a coherent plan based on the 
recognition that no purely defensive policy could ensure the safety of 
these islands and those who live in them and that the main weight of 
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our defence effort must now be concentrated on building up the 
deterrent strength which will prevent the outbreak of a major war.’77   
Despite officials’ advice, the contents of the Strath Report and their ramifications 
remained closely guarded secrets in Whitehall and went no further to avoid the 
need for awkward explanations of meaningless shelter and evacuation policies.78 
The publication of the Civil Defence handbook by the Home Office in 1980 was an 
own goal of epic proportions.79  Survival of a nuclear war provided plot lines for 
much of the fiction produced at the time and civil defence was a staple for comedy 
such as Yes Prime Minister.  The irony is that when given the opportunity to engage 
in informed debate after seeing ‘The Day After’, American audiences proved to be 
rational and well-informed, and not radicalised to one extreme or another.80   This 
suggests that the public should be trusted with the truth and enabled by government  
to make an informed opinion.  
Moral views 
The tension between the ability of modern warfare to bypass traditional concepts of 
battlefields, combatants and non-combatants and the ethical implications of doing 
so has been at the centre of British strategic thinking since 1915, both in public and 
in Parliament.  ‘The invention of the bombing plane abolished chivalry for ever.  It is 
now 'retaliate or go under.'81  In 1915-18, there was no evidence that it was ‘retaliate 
or go under’, but there was a determined minority that advocated retaliation for what 
was commonly perceived to be the ‘haphazard murder’82 of aerial bombardment by 
German aircraft.  There was a similarly vociferous lobby that advocated a strongly 
deontological position; ‘Does the Government think that, if we send aeroplanes to 
kill little innocent German babies, that is going to help the situation?’83  Neither side 
really engaged much with the other, and the government, which was trying to 
sustain a war the like of which had never been seen before, was caught in the 
middle of two mutually exclusive positions.   
During the interwar years, although states unsuccessfully sought to outlaw aerial 
bombardment, the embryonic Royal Air Force adopted the doctrine as its raison 
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d’être, but this doctrinal focus was not successfully converted into capability.  The 
debate at the Chiefs of Staff meeting in 1928 is instructive for the continuity of 
issues associated with strategic bombing and (ultimately) nuclear deterrence.  
Trenchard argued that while it was immoral to bomb cities purely in order to 
terrorise the civilian population, bombing which interrupted manufacture, 
transportation etc, which also terrorised the civilian population, was legitimate.84  
During the Second World War this was the strategy ostensibly followed by the RAF, 
although casualty rates during daylight raids forced a shift to less accurate night 
bombing.  The USAAF in the same period, faced with similar factors, chose to 
continue with day time bombing, and developed additional protection for the 
bombers.  The issue here, of course, was the balance between casualty rates 
amongst aircrew and the desire to minimise civilian casualties.  
There were thus serious tensions between the leadership of Bomber Command, the 
senior leadership of the RAF, and the Cabinet over the public presentation of the 
activities of Bomber Command; ‘Any public protest, whether reasonable or 
unreasonable, against the bomber offensive could not but hamper the Government 
in the execution of this policy and might affect the morale of the aircrews 
themselves.’85  Modern analysts of the strategic bombing campaign tend to describe 
the moral thinking that enabled it as the ‘supreme emergency’ idea; ‘what we fight 
for is of such ultimate importance that we have to break some of our own rules to 
defend it.’86   This does not sit well with modern rights-based ethics which admit of 
no such violation. 
Although there may be elements of the nuclear briefing provided to senior Ministers 
which deal with the ethical questions, I have found no official evidence of formal 
ethical consideration of the nuclear deterrence mission, although Macmillan’s 
account of Churchill brooding a good deal about the atomic and hydrogen bomb87 
does indicate that individuals did genuinely agonise over these issues.  Nothing was 
provided to SSBN Cos between 2003 and 2009.88  The supreme emergency logic is 
certainly one to which many involved in the nuclear deterrent mission would 
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subscribe, supported by the less well articulated feeling that deterrence of war by 
those with dirty hands imposes peace, which is a desirable moral good in itself.   
Fitch, writing in 1940, supposed that; ‘For if history means anything, then Jesus 
developed his thought by criticizing traditional materials in the light of the challenge 
of new circumstances. This is apparent everywhere ....’89  This argument to adapt 
traditional moral thinking to prevailing circumstances seems to undermine the basis 
and character of any kind of moral certainty, and reflects Johnson’s view on the Just 
War Tradition.  But, Fitch continued;  
‘Doubtless, in a world of fixed structure and pattern we should find 
certainty in a body of fixed moral principles; but in a world that is 
characterized by growth, plasticity, and emergence such a set of 
principles can lead only to chaos and confusion.’90   
The tendency of modern ethical study to seek fixed normative prescriptions in a 
rapidly evolving social and international environment seems to seek these fixed 
moral principles which, in Fitch’s view, are largely illusory and of limited utility to 
practitioners.   
Much more useful, even to a non-Christian, is Butterfield’s 1951 analysis of 
Augustine; ‘Love God and do what you like.’91  This would not support pithy public 
debate; a moral framework of this sort is not conducive to simplification, but it would 
enable detailed consideration of the factors in play at the moment of decision in 
highly complex situations without having to reduce it to public soundbites such as 
‘Does the Government think that, if we send aeroplanes to kill little innocent German 
babies, that is going to help the situation?’92  Such a framework could be construed 
as a miscreants’ charter, but if the essential morality of the decision-makers is 
accepted, and their decisions are tested in specialist environments, it provides a 
better test for practical ethics than the current arrangement where engagement is 
avoided altogether.93  Ethicists and practitioners need never agree, but the 
conversation is critical and, at present, seems to be missing.  
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Experts and the public debate 
The Warnock Inquiry at Chapter 7 was a successful experiment in the use of 
‘experts’ to inform both government and public in an ethically challenging area of 
technological progress.  This inquiry model is unlikely to be successful in the public 
analysis of defence policy because of the security considerations; even if the 
experts were exposed to the classified material, their report could be no more 
classified than official public engagement.  Recent examples of official inquiries 
could include the Chilcot Inquiry into the 2003 Gulf War which was commissioned 
in 2009 and reported in 2016 and the Saville Inquiry into the 1972 ‘Bloody Sunday’ 
which was commissioned in 1998 and reported in 2010.  Such timescales are not 
conducive to policy formulation, and the public reports which contained previously 
classified documents (albeit redacted) would not be possible for information that 
would remain classified during and after the inquiry. 
Nott’s reluctance to include a second minister in the Trident debate in 1981 is 
striking; he did not believe that two ministers could ‘master the brief.’94  Mrs 
Thatcher did not agree.  Given that the core (if not the whole) of British Defence 
Policy in 1980 was the maintenance of the security of the NATO alliance through 
deterrence of the USSR, it is surprising to note the degree of ignorance of the key 
aspects of the deterrent which Nott seemed prepared to accept, from the very 
ministers expected to oversee it.  The current provision of nuclear deterrence 
training for military officials is negligible.  There is one half day session allocated to 
the (year-long) Defence Academy ‘Advanced Command and Staff Course’ (ACSC) 
and no specific policy training provided for those involved in the mission.95  Those 
joining departments of state which deal with the nuclear deterrent are expected to 
pick it up in post.  In contrast, CND offer a series of educational packages for 
schools aligned with the National Curriculum for various subjects including ‘Drama, 
English, Citizenship, Religious Education, Maths, ICT, Computer Science, Art & 
Design, Government and Politics, Social Sciences, History’96  Such educational 
facilities are not available from official sources. 
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A further challenge is one highlighted by Warnock; there is no such thing as a 
moral expert.97  While the public may defer to doctors, engineers, or airline pilots 
etc as experts, where their expertise Is technical, there appears to be a much less 
deferential attitude to moral issues where the acknowledged technical expertise 
challenges intuitively-held moral convictions.  Engagement on moral issues is 
therefore more important.   
‘Insofar as possible, it is wise to simplify language rather than 
content – that is, take the extra words to make hard ideas clear. 
Unfortunately, neither the expert source nor the lay audience is 
usually willing to dedicate the time needed to convey complex 
information a step at a time.’98 
Sandman was writing about public perceptions of risk, but the principle holds for 
emerging technologies, such as nuclear weapons.  The onus is on the experts to 
make their expertise accessible.  At present, they struggle and the situation is 
exacerbated because the majority of the public, and decision-makers, receive 
information filtered through the mass media. 
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review deliberately drew on extensive public 
consultation.  The review was programmed to take twelve months; in the event it 
took eighteen.  Lord Robertson subsequently noted; 
‘we would invite everyone, the CNDers, the unions, journalists, 
academics. … we wanted to be as open and inclusive as possible, 
both because it was a good thing to do and partly because I thought 
‘I want people at the end of the day to say it’s our review’ and I joke 
now and say that I had always said that if the SDR was successful, 
it would be called the SDR and if it was a failure it would be called 
the Robertson review.99   
This inclusive engagement was reflected in the Commons Defence Committee 
which had eleven sessions of evidence on the SDR in the two weeks after 
publication, working hard to ‘… attain the knowledge required to create a 
convincing critique …’100  Nuclear deterrence had actually been ring-fenced and 
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separate from the SDR, although decisions on the scale of the deterrent were 
taken.101 
Scrutiny of government policy decisions should be conducted by Parliament, and 
the Commons Defence Committee has a distinguished tradition of holding 
government to account on many matters.  However, it takes evidence in an 
unclassified environment and publishes unclassified reports, so the same security 
inhibitions apply.  Moreover, on nuclear deterrence issues, the government of the 
day has regularly circumvented or inhibited the Commons in their ability to do even 
this level of scrutiny.  The Defence Committee outrage at the government 
announcement of the decision to purchase Trident in July 1980, seven months 
before the publication of the Committee report is illustrative;  ‘Since the House has 
voted, by 316 votes to 248, to endorse the choice of the Trident system, it is not for 
us to challenge the principle of that decision.’102 The House of Commons Defence 
Committee was placed in a similar position in December 2006 when the 
government published the White Paper and announced the Parliamentary debate 
would be held in March 2007.   
This left the Defence Committee three months to complete a report to inform the 
debate, and constrained them in their ability to express an opinion since to do so 
beforehand would be to pre-empt the prerogatives of Parliament; ‘We do not 
express a view on the merits of retaining and renewing the UK’s nuclear deterrent. 
Endorsing or rejecting the Government’s proposals will be for the House of 
Commons, as a whole, to decide.’103  Notwithstanding the limitations imposed on it 
by the government programme, the Defence Committee’s report concluded; ‘The 
Government deserves to be commended for exposing its proposal to renew the 
strategic nuclear deterrent to public debate and decision in Parliament, which 
previous Governments have not done.’104  The report considered; the timing of 
decisions, the scale of the UK nuclear deterrent, nuclear deterrence in the 21st 
century, legal and treaty obligations and; deterrent options and costs.  Specifically, 
it did not consider whether the UK should remain a nuclear weapon state.  The 
Defence Committee reported that it remained unclear how the Government 
determined what constituted a minimum nuclear deterrent and advocated more 
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clarity on what constitutes UK vital interests so as not to lead to a lowering of the 
nuclear threshold.105   
The Debate on the White Paper in March 2007 divided in favour of the government 
motion ‘to take the steps necessary to maintain the UK’s minimum strategic nuclear 
deterrent beyond the life of the existing system and to take further steps towards 
meeting the UK’s disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty.’106  The Deputy Leader of the House (Nigel Griffiths) resigned 
from the government in protest, followed swiftly by three other junior Labour 
ministers.  One major topic of debate was the nature of the decision to which the 
motion committed the House, and whether it could expect a further substantive vote 
at a later stage of the procurement process.  The debate was also notable for the 
(Labour) Foreign Secretary’s response to the intervention of Labour MP and CND 
member Mr Corbyn which, she said, was ‘… complete and utter rubbish...’107 In turn, 
Mrs Beckett was castigated by Mr Hague (Shadow Foreign Secretary) for her own, 
more pliable convictions:  
‘It was all the more powerful coming from her, in a way, because 
she was a long-standing member of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament … The fact that someone with her long-held views has 
reached the clear conclusion—in Government, and with all the 
information available to her—that the British nuclear deterrent must 
be retained, updated and replaced is in itself an indication of the 
powerful case for doing so.’108 
All in all, this debate was an example of British Parliamentary politics at its worst 
with the serious issues in the debate virtually swamped by procedural distraction, 
party points-scoring and personal attacks. 
The press reports were mostly similarly trivial; the Daily Express commented on 
the implications of the vote for the Labour leadership; ‘Surely it is a serious 
indictment of Mr Blair's leadership that Labour cannot muster a parliamentary 
majority on a matter as crucial as defence.’109  The Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror 
revelled in the government’s need to rely on the Conservative opposition to carry 
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the vote110 and the Scotsman insisted that the argument was not over.111  The 
Independent protested that ‘The voters have good reason to feel let down’ and 
commented;  
‘The renewal of Trident… is an issue of paramount national 
significance that cried out for a thorough debate. Instead, a 
succession of mostly lacklustre speeches preceded a vote that the 
Government was never going to lose.  The voters, and taxpayers, 
have good reason to feel let down. Mr Blair's suggestion that a future 
Parliament may decide about contracts for the new submarines was 
neither here nor there. Mr Hague was correct when he said that the 
decision taken yesterday was the decision.  
…. It is regrettable that neither the Government nor David Cameron's 
new Conservatives could suggest anything more original than an 
expensive renewal of the current arrangements. Regrettable, too, that 
the Liberal Democrats, so staunch in opposing the Iraq war, asked for 
nothing more than more time to make up their minds. A unique 
chance for new thinking has been lost.’112   
Such a considered and balanced contribution towards a genuinely informed debate 
was notable by exception. 
Since the May 2011 ‘Initial Gate’, the MOD has published an annual ‘Update to 
Parliament’ on the Successor Programme.   These are in the form of Command 
Documents which do not require agreement or legislation.  Whilst these documents 
are political in purpose, they are expected to conform to Parliamentary standards 
for rigour and accuracy and are, therefore, valuable contributions to the available 
authoritative information necessary to inform a public debate.  The Commons 
Defence Committee report ‘Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century’113 was a very 
wide-ranging report on the National Security Strategy and the tiers of threat that 
document assessed.  It was more about the use of the concept of deterrence 
based on conventional forces against asymmetric and terrorist threats than in the 
use of nuclear deterrence against state threats.   
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Expertise in public 
The expert analysis and debate of British nuclear deterrence policy in public 
therefore falls to non-official bodies.  This is not unusual in any policy environment, 
but in the case of British nuclear weapons policy, there is a conspicuous absence 
of government participation.  
The 2005 Royal United Services Institute conference ‘The Future of Strategic 
Deterrence for the UK’114 included participation from the leading academics in the 
field of nuclear strategy and security studies, and input from the French Foundation 
for Strategic Research, but no military or government participation.  In 2006, the 
Oxford Research Group, in collaboration with the Acronym Institute for 
Disarmament Diplomacy, the British American Security Information Council and the 
WMD awareness Programme, formed a new initiative, ‘Beyond Trident’ to;  
‘conduct new and in-depth research, foster debate in Parliament and 
among stakeholders, raise public awareness at all levels and create 
pressure for a high level non-partisan investigation and inquiry into UK 
nuclear weapons policy in the context of actual security needs and 
objectives.’115   
Its report, published in 2006, is a balanced debate which picks up on many of the 
key aspects of a contemporary discussion of the British nuclear deterrent, sadly 
lacking in the official and parliamentary environment, with input in the form of 
debates by eminent academics and specialists, including serving politicians and 
retired officials and officers.  The result was a valuable contribution to the public 
debate, bereft of official input. 
The significant exception to the lack of government participation in a public debate 
was the 2007 RUSI Debate; ‘Renewing Britain’s Independent Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent’116 which saw Defence Secretary Des Browne share a platform with three 
expert academic commentators. The debate ranged over the rationale for retention 
of an independent nuclear deterrent.  On ‘prestige’, or status, Lord Browne argued 
that; ‘I would never advocate that we do this for reasons of status …. We don’t rely, 
for our position and our status and our relationships internationally, on the fact that 
we are a nuclear weapons state…’ Why decide now was a significant factor.  The 
																																								 																				
114 RUSI 2005. The Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent. RUSI London: RUSI. 
115 BOOTH, K. & BARNABY, F. 2006. The Future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons:  Experts reframe the 
debate. In: OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP (ed.). Oxford: Oxford Research Group. 
116 WILLETT, L. 2007. Renewing Britain’s Independent Strategic Nuclear Deterrent; A Debate [Online]. 
RUSI RUSI. Available: https://rusi.org/commentary/renewing-britain’s-independent-strategic-
nuclear-deterrent-debate [Accessed 20 November 2016]. 
	 238	
debate also considered non-proliferation, legal challenges, industrial challenges, 
the maintenance of continuous at sea deterrence, a need for genuine initiatives to 
create the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons and consideration of 
Britain’s contribution to NATO.  On cost, the government figures were accepted, 
and the focus was on the opportunity cost of those sums, but since then, cost has 
become a highly contentious aspect of the Successor Project. 
In February 2011 the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) 
established the Trident Commission, an independent cross-party inquiry to 
examine UK nuclear weapons policy.  BASIC is a small think tank consisting 
mostly of very senior ex-officials and politicians, supported by experienced 
academics, with ‘…one very large idea: … a world free from the threat of nuclear 
weapons.’117  The Commission consisted of two previous Secretaries of State for 
Defence, an ex-Chief of Defence Staff, a retired UK ambassador to the UN and 
four eminent academic experts, including two peers.   
The BASIC commission was supported on an off the record basis by the Cabinet 
Office, FCO and MOD to ensure that the government policy was explained fully, 
within the classification limits of the Commission’s remit.  The report, published in 
July 2014, addressed three critical questions under a national security framework: 
‘Should the United Kingdom continue to be a nuclear weapons 
state? 
If so, is Trident the only or best option for delivering the deterrent? 
What more can and should the United Kingdom do to facilitate faster 
progress on global nuclear disarmament?’118 
The final report was a dense read and (in an echo of the Cabinet Office quip about 
the ‘Daily Mail’ version of the ‘Daily Telegraph’ version of the 1980 Open 
Government Document),119  BASIC produced a 2 page precis of the ‘headline 
commission messages’ to accompany it.  The report, unlike official publications, 
attempts to deal with the critical question in Armstrong’s memo to Mrs Thatcher 
from 1979; what is the nuclear deterrent for?120  In addressing that question, the 
report considered the historical legacy as it affected the present day and 
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considered the pertinent threats. It considered three scenarios that would justify 
retention of the strategic nuclear deterrent credible; re-emergence of a state with a 
significant nuclear arsenal and conventional capabilities (Russia); an existing or 
emerging nuclear state that enters into strategic competition with the UK and; 
emergence of a future massive overwhelming threat involving bio-weapons or 
other comparable mass destruction technologies still unknown in which a state 
might consider the explicit use or threat of use against the UK.  The key conclusion 
of the Trident Commission was;  
‘Based upon the two key specific considerations, namely national 
security concerns and responsibility towards the Alliance, the 
Commission has come to the unanimous conclusion that the UK 
should retain and deploy a nuclear arsenal, with a number of 
caveats expressed below. Most notably, it remains crucial that the 
UK show keen regard for its position within the international 
community and for the shared responsibility to achieve progress in 
global nuclear disarmament.’121 
Of note is that the Commission did not see this as the final word in the debate, but 
merely looked to focus the debate on the weighty national security questions they 
believed should frame the political debate.  Public discourse tends to consist of 
debate conducted in the absence of official participation based on parameters and 
questions identified by those hostile to the government position.  As detailed above, 
since the 2006 White Paper, the government has been very proactive in the 
provision of information to Parliament and the public.  The 2006 White paper itself 
derived a great deal from the 1980 Open Government Document; the Parliamentary 
report into the 2011 Initial Gate is similarly informative on technical factors, and the 
annual reports to Parliament continue this trend.  In addition, direct provision of 
policy information to the public such as the 2016 MOD Policy Paper ‘UK nuclear 
deterrence; what you need to know’122 has been greatly improved, and the 
Parliamentary Library briefing paper ‘Replacing the UKs ‘Trident’ Nuclear 
Deterrent’123 is a very approachable description of the policy decisions and context.  
Although a Parliamentary, rather than government document, the library briefing 
paper describes both policy and challenging views, without drawing conclusions.  It 
appears that current government provision of details on nuclear deterrence policy is 
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very much better than it has been in the past, but that public engagement with those 
opposed to the official position remains as elusive as ever.  
Public engagement 
‘Even when you’ve got Vladimir Putin waving nuclear weapons and 
you’ve got what’s happening in Ukraine, the case is still not properly 
being made… on the nuclear side even more so.  The case goes by 
default because the assumption is that people will know that it is 
right.  We’ve got the deterrent and Putin’s rattling sabres … we just 
assume that we don’t have to really argue…’124  
When the 2006 White Paper was published, it formed the nucleus which anti-
nuclear lobbying has been focused on refuting.  Much of the criticism seemed to 
assume that the White Paper was the output of a political essayist, rather than a 
carefully worked out, extensively researched and rigorously scrutinised piece of 
research, by experts.  There is a healthy scepticism about government 
pronouncements, perhaps exacerbated since the Iraq War and the Hutton Inquiry, 
but the tendency of self-appointed experts to challenge every aspect of the 
derivation of nuclear policy decisions is disappointing.  In 2007, the Guardian cited 
US atomic physicist Richard Garwin;  
‘… one of the architects of the first hydrogen bomb, questioned Tony 
Blair's claim that work must start soon on replacing the ageing 
Vanguard-class submarines.  He told the defence select committee the 
submarine's working life could be extended to 45 years or more, 
putting off the need for a replacement into the late 2030s or beyond.’125   
It is not clear why an American physicist had been invited to give expert evidence 
on submarine life extension to the Defence Select Committee on an area not within 
his specialisation. 
Although they draw on studies with access to all of the MOD’s intelligence, horizon 
scanning, detailed technical information and authenticated costing from industry, 
every government paper which concludes that Trident is the most cost effective 
means of provision of the deterrent has been challenged and queried.   After the 
2011 Initial Gate decision to proceed with the concept phase of the successor 
programme, the MOD conducted a further Value for Money study to check the 
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predictions and, especially, the technical and financial risk in the programme.  Lord 
Owen subsequently observed; 
‘… if CND only read [Nuclear Papers, 2009]126 and understand the 
level of debate that was going on, which was far more informed and 
on the nub of the issue, than anything that was going on inside 
CND’s own discussions.  I think that quite a few people have been 
very surprised at the level of debate that was going through.’127 
In the academic and informed debate milieu, Nick Ritchie provides probably the 
most comprehensive and testing intellectual critique of British deterrence policy.  He 
has challenged the relevance of the British deterrent,128 the policy of Continuous at 
Sea Deterrence,129 the decision making on the Trident replacement,130 and Britain’s 
efforts towards a World free of nuclear weapons.131  Ritchie makes very cogent 
arguments reflecting personal conviction, mostly drawn from a theoretical 
framework of social constructivism.132  This tends to assume that the rule of law in 
the international environment can provide a viable sole basis for security planning.  
History would not support this view, having all too often had to learn Machiavelli’s 
dictum the hard way: ‘The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every 
way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous.’133  Or, as 
Browne put it; ‘Are we prepared to tolerate a world in which countries who care 
about morality lay down their nuclear weapons, leaving others to threaten the rest of 
the world or hold it to ransom?’134  Governments tend to work in a Realist 
environment, but if the public debate is already being framed in a social 
constructivist paradigm, it can be difficult to argue that a particular defensive 
capability is necessary because Britain must be capable of enforcing the rule of law, 
without appearing to suggest that the UK has no faith in the UN or other 
international bodies. 
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Non-engagement with CND has been deliberate on the part of government since 
engagement with a highly doctrinaire body such as CND is regarded as pointless; it 
does not lead to real engagement with the debate, it merely raises the profile of the 
opportunity for CND to make its case.135  This is the 21st century version of the 1941 
debate about the ‘Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing’ where the Home 
Secretary responded ‘I have no reason to suppose that this misguided propaganda 
is attracting or will attract any serious attention.’136 
In this debate, the government is caught between engaging, and giving the 
otherwise very low key and almost ignored debate the oxygen of publicity and 
longevity and not engaging, and allowing the argument to spread within limited 
circles, without the countervailing policy perspective.  This was the decision facing 
Churchill’s Cabinet in the 1940s, it was Butler’s experience when ‘He exposed 
himself to a crossfire of questions five accomplished controversialists who bitterly 
oppose the Government’s basing of defence policies on the big bombs...’137 and has 
been the political experience since. It is clear from the public viewing figures for 
Threads and ‘The Day After’ that there was considerable public appetite for the 
subject, and the evidence above suggests that at present, that appetite is being met 
by material that is generally partisan or simply misinterpreted.  The MOD has 
decades of experience of not engaging with anti-nuclear campaigners; MOD 
personnel believe that CND argue from positions of strongly held principle and 
therefore cannot acknowledge the alternative perspective.138 (The same argument 
could of course be made of the MOD, but the policy papers in the public domain do 
make clear the degree of internal study and debate that precedes them.)   
In the 1940s, Spaight was arguably a proxy voice for the official perspective in the 
strategic bombing debate.  Such a voice was missing in the 1960s when Watkins 
created The War Game, but in the early 1980s Michael Quinlan was given 
extraordinary permission to engage carefully with selected opinion formers; on a 
non-official basis.  There appears to be no government proxy voice to engage in the 
21st century discourse, although the active participation of retired senior officials and 
politicians gives a welcome authority and gravitas to aspects of the debate. 
‘To create a climate in which defence decision-making operates 
sensibly, sensitively and objectively is in the interests of every 
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citizen.  It will not be achieved by avoiding the difficult moral and 
humanitarian issues that any defence policy inevitably raises.  It can 
be achieved only by a far deeper public involvement in the 
discussion of military affairs than exists today.’139   
Little appears to have changed in the engagement of the public in defence policy 
generally, and nuclear deterrence policy in particular since the [then] Foreign 
Secretary Dr Owen, made this point at the height of the Cold War.  
The press and other media 
‘Democracy cannot flourish without fair and reasoned dialogue’140 wrote Robin Day, 
having interviewed every Prime Minister of the previous 35 years.  He was 
considering the demise of the one-on-one political interview as a tool of democratic 
engagement and oversight:   
‘In the sixties and seventies major television interviews, such as those 
of BBC Panorama, were newsworthy events of much value in the 
political process.  They attracted big headlines, verbatim news 
reports, fierce editorials, strong political reaction, and lively viewer 
response.’141   
He would; ‘ … try to ask questions which will reflect what the viewers may wish to 
know.  But I also ask questions which the viewers ought to want asked if they knew 
a little more about the subject.  I try to say ‘what does the ordinary person want to 
know about this?’142 
Political leaders may not have relished the set piece interview, but the importance 
was not lost on them;  
'television has really by-passed the House of Commons in its political 
interviews of Ministers, not even excepting the Prime Minister and 
Leader of the Opposition… Are we really willing to allow the television 
interview, viewed admittedly by several million people, to assume 
greater importance than the proceedings of the House of Commons?'143   
Robin Cook was adamant that the fault of the demise of these interviews lay with the 
interviewers; ‘…most political choices involve a trade-off between positive and 
negative consequences, but reducing every political interview to a one-dimensional 
confrontation suppresses any chance of an honest and balanced discussion of the 
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real dilemma.’144  Day seemed to agree with the effect; ‘In recent years the TV 
interview has become more argumentative than interrogative.’145  Marr wrote of the 
role of the interviewer; ‘... If your story needs to be seen more than once before it 
can be understood, and many do, then it will have totally failed ... You are distilling 
information, not packing it in.  Get to the point, stick to it, know when it's finished, 
then end it.’146  It is this single minded focus that agitated Cook; ‘…the presumption 
behind the badgering is that all politicians set out to evade the truth and deceive the 
public, which feeds cynicism with the political process.’147  
Nott noted the difficulty of engaging on the complex ethics of nuclear deterrence in 
an environment where others would contest the issues in more emotive terms: ‘To 
engage the emotions—as the promoters of CND know very well—is an easy task. 
… To argue the choices before us so as to engage the intellect is a much harder 
task.’148  This remains as pertinent today as it did 35 years ago, or perhaps more so 
since there are now three generations who have no experience of war.   
Discussing how to explain the basic concepts of nuclear deterrence and the ethical 
issues involved in a deterrence policy based on the conditional willingness to launch 
nuclear missiles, Lord Owen noted;  
‘The generation that is the cross-over from the World War have 
grappled with this issue and it is so frightening; the numbers game 
in the Cold War, and it isn’t just thousands, it was millions.  It is 
almost enough to make you sick to contemplate, and therefore how 
do you engage on that?’149 
Conclusions 
This thesis has demonstrated that there has been a sustained reluctance amongst 
British governments to engage in public dialogue on strategic nuclear deterrence 
policy.  Some of the factors in the decision-making process for that policy have their 
roots in the arguments about reprisals for air raid attacks during the First World War.  
That experience and similar factors were significant for decision-making on strategy 
and public presentation of strategy during the bombing campaign of the Second 
Word War.  Strategic factors such as cost, capability and industrial capacity have 
had a significant impact on the choice of systems employed by the British strategic 
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nuclear forces, including ultimately driving the decisions to procure Polaris and 
Trident, but they have had limited impact on the evolution of the uniquely British 
understanding of nuclear deterrence. 
Britain has a different understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and nuclear 
strategy to any other state, and British theories and motives cannot readily be 
determined using the same logic as other nuclear weapon states may pursue.  Due 
to decades of reticence in this policy area, within and outside government, there is a 
need for education in the lexicon of that theory and strategy at all levels in Whitehall 
and Westminster.  This would inform a profound shift in the leadership exercised in 
the nuclear policy area if the hard decisions required to ensure the maintenance of 
the strategic nuclear deterrent are not to be derailed by ineptitude or simple 
ignorance. 
Moral factors have had a profound effect on the nature of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. 
Britain has been a reluctant nuclear power always trying to balance its realist 
understanding of the utility of nuclear weapons with an idealist aspiration to find a 
way to create the conditions for a world free of them.  The two are usually in 
tension, most evidently during periods where decisions on the future of nuclear 
weapons systems are required. 
Technical factors have affected the decisions taken about the nature and scale of 
the British nuclear deterrent.  The perceived scale of destructive capability 
necessary to deter the Soviet Union drove the decision to procure systems as 
capable as Polaris and subsequently Trident, and limited national industrial capacity 
and cost drove the decision to seek those systems from the USA.  A similar balance 
of technical and moral factors pertains today; since the 2006 White Paper, the 
British government has been more open than ever before about the technical 
factors driving system decisions, but as guarded as ever about the moral factors 
which are taken into account in the decision to remain a nuclear weapon state. 
The British government has used different means of dealing with policy 
development in challenging ethical areas, some of which are considered above. In 
the case of nuclear weapons policy, government has invariably reverted to reticence 
and avoidance of the issue in public debate, and that has been the crux of this 
thesis; why? 
In a contemporary, rights-based ethical paradigm, the concept of war as a tool for 
political objectives is nearly untenable.  In the realist paradigm in use by statesmen, 
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war is justified under certain parameters.  The evolution of British ethical thinking 
after the German air attacks of the First World War and the Allied strategic bombing 
campaign of the Second World War pushed the boundaries of what could be 
considered acceptable in a war for national survival, and led subsequently to the 
evolution of the concept of ‘supreme emergency’.  This concept excuses, although it 
does not justify, the killing of non-combatants under certain circumstances.  The 
supreme emergency concept is incompatible with modern ethical models. 
The nature of contemporary media is such that complex issues tend to be reduced 
to simple catchy phrases; soundbites.  These cannot convey the range of factors 
required to make decisions about fundamental moral questions such as human 
embryology, genetic modification of crops or nuclear deterrence policy.  In these 
ethically challenging areas, the public is uncomfortable deferring to experts, and 
tend to want to know more for themselves. Modern media are not equipped to 
provide the necessary environment for rational and considered debate.  Nor is it 
common any longer in any Parliamentary environment, including select committee 
evidence sessions, although it can be found in specialist environments such as 
think tanks. 
As a result of feeling unable to articulate the complex ethical factors associated with 
these policy areas in a suitable public environment, governments have tended to 
avoid occasions where extempore intervention might be necessary, and official 
intervention has tended to be either; by proxy; formulaic or; not present at all.   
The current Successor decision process is symptomatic of this lack of engagement.  
Since the 2006 White Paper however, the Labour government, the 2010-2015 
Coalition and, it appears, the 2015 Conservative government, have been 
addressing this to a certain extent with the formulation of the Cabinet Office 
Communications Steering Group, and there is a coherent ongoing process of 
conveying official nuclear deterrence policy through government papers and 
publications.  This is a significant step forward, although it still concentrates on the 
technical factors. 
The backbone of British defence and security policy remains nuclear deterrence.  
The present public debate about the successor for the Vanguard class is essentially 
sterile and tends to be in a context set by anti-nuclear lobbyists, with the reactive 
official view appearing defensive.  Technical discussions about cost and capability 
have become the primary area of decision because the underlying rationale for why 
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nuclear deterrence is important to the UK is not understood well, if at all; and is 
certainly not well articulated. There is more risk now than ever before that future 
decisions will be made purely on cost grounds and the deterrent cancelled almost 
by accident, or without understanding the strategic ramifications such a decision 
entails.  
To enable nuclear policy decision-making to operate in the more open style of 21st 
century British government is in the interests of every one of us. This will not be 
achieved by perpetuating the historic avoidance of difficult ethical issues that it 
raises.  It will be achieved only through better education of ‘experts’ in deterrence 
ethics, better communication of those expert views to the public, and better 
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